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1. INTRODUCTION
The HIV/AIDS2 epidemic is a fundamental human rights issue3
both in terms of the rights of those who have been infected and the
absence of rights that serves as its fuel. Primarily targeting the
poorest of nations and the most vulnerable of people,4 forty million
adults and children are currently living with HIV/AIDS5 and more
than twenty-seven million have died since 1981.6 Assuming the
2 Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS).
3 See, e.g., A Human Rights-Based Approach to HIV/AIDS, United Nations Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, Special Sess. on
HIV/AIDS, (2001) (discussing the link between HJV/AIDS and human rights);
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, U.N. GAOR, 26th Special Sess., Agenda
Item 8, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/s-26/2 (2001) [hereinafter Declaration of Commit-
ment] (reviewing the problems of HIV/AIDS and securing a commitment to en-
hance international efforts to combat the disease); Report on the Global HIV/AIDS
Epidemic 2002, Joint U.N. Programme on H1V/AIDS ("UNAIDS"), at 62-69, U.N.
Doc. UNAIDS/02.26E (2002) [hereinafter Report on Global HIV/AIDS] (discussing
how the lack of human rights protection may limit access to life saving drugs for
HIV/AIDS infected persons); Handbook for Legislators on HIV/AIDS, Law & Human
Rights, UNAIDS & Interparliamentary Union ("IPU"), U.N. Doc. UNAIDS/99.48
(1999) [hereinafter Handbook for Legislators] ("The purpose of this Handbook is to
assist parliamentarians and other elected officials in promulgating and enacting
effective legislation and undertaking appropriate law reform in the fight against
AIDS."); Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 22d Sess., Agenda Item 3, para. 2, U.N. Doc E/C.12/2000/4
(2000) [hereinafter Substantive Issues] ("The human right to health is recognized in
numerous international instruments."); HIV/AIDS and Human Rights International
Guidelines, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
("OHCHR") & UNAIDS, U.N. Doc. UNAIDS/02.49E (2002) [hereinafter Interna-
tional Guidelines] (articulating guidelines nations should follow in responding to
HIV/AIDS).
4 For example, of the forty million people currently living with HIV/AIDS,
25-28.2 million live in sub-Saharan Africa and 4.6-8.2 million live in South and
Southeast Asia. AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2003, UNAIDS & World Health
Organization ("WHO"), at 5, U.N. Doc. UNAIDS/03.39E (2003), available at
http://www.unaids.org/wad/2003/Epiupdate2OO3-en/Epi03-0l-en.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2004); see also Helen Epstein, AIDS: The Lesson of Uganda, 48 N.Y.
REV. BooKs 11, July 5, 2001, at 18 ("HIV has been seen as an indicator of social in-
justice, both globally and locally. It infests some of the most fragile nations on
earth, and increasingly strikes the weakest men and women within them.").
5 AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2003, supra note 4, at 5.
6 See AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2002, UNAIDS & WHO at 3, U.N. Doc.
UNAIDS/02.58E (2002) (stating that 3.1 million people died of HIV/AIDS in
2002), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/epidemiology/epi2002/en (last
visited Oct. 12, 2004); AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2003, supra note 4, at 4 (stat-
ing that three million people died of HIV/AIDS in 2003); AVERT, World HIV &
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status quo, it is estimated that sixty-eight million people will die
from HIV/AIDS-related causes in the most affected nations be-
tween 2000 and 2020.7 Adult infection rates have now reached
20.1% in South Africa and 37.5% in Botswana,8 and the epidemic
continues to escalate in areas such as China, Indonesia, Central
Asia, the Baltic States, and North Africa.9 While three million peo-
ple died of AIDS in 2003 (including 500,000 children) and five mil-
lion more people were newly infected with the virus, the vast ma-
jority of victims were left untreated, and only 1% of pregnant
women had access to services that prevent mother-to-child trans-
mission ("MTCT").10
Despite these figures, the world's major research-oriented
pharmaceutical companies are not (nor should they be) govern-
mental or charitable institutions. Instead, they are business entities
based upon traditional western notions of rational profit maximi-
zation, individualism, and risk-reward management. These enti-
ties make substantial investments where profits are expected. The
profit incentive breeds inventiveness and innovation that will
benefit society through the creation of new goods, new services,
and the dissemination of knowledge.
As a result, the solution to this need for access/need for incen-
tive dichotomy, as well as solutions to a variety of issues surround-
ing the distinction between the existence of a human right and the
duty to protect and fulfill that right,11 will not be based on such ar-
guments as morality, excessive profit margins, or the desirability of
AIDS Statistics (stating that there have been 21.8 million AIDS deaths since 1981
until the end of 2001), at http://www.avert.org/worldstats.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2004).
7 See Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 45 ("In the 45 most affected
countries, it is projected that, between 2000 and 2020, 68 million people will die
earlier than they would have in the absence of AIDS."). In regard to infection
rates, see Geoffrey Cowley, Can He Find a Cure?, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 2001, at 39
("[A] vaccine is our ...best hope of ending the pandemic . .. we'll be lucky to
have even a crude one on the market by 2007. At current rates, an additional 50
million to 100 million people will have contracted the virus by then....").
8 AVERT, AIDS Around the World, at http://www.avert.org/around
world.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
9 AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2003, supra note 4, at 5.
10 Id. at 4. The 1% figure refers to women located in "heavily-affected coun-
tries." Id.
11 For a discussion of the duty to "respect, protect and fulfill" the right to
health, see Substantive Issues, supra note 3, paras. 30-37 (discussing particular legal
obligations of states to respect, protect and fulfill the right to health).
20041 757
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
758 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 25:3
shifting costs to users of luxury drugs. Instead, such a solution will
be found in a constitutional approach to international law that rec-
ognizes the interlocking relationships of enforceable contractual
and normative duties that have developed between states and their
citizens and between sovereigns and other sovereigns. Such an
approach may draw, at least in part, from theories such as Imman-
uel Kant's inevitable progression toward a federation of states,
12
the 'constitutive process' of the New Haven School,13 and the 'in-
ternalization' of Harold Koh.14 It may also draw upon theories
such as Christian Tomuschat's legal framework of 'common val-
ues,' 15 Alec Stone's 'regime continuum, ' 16 and even Bruce Acker-
man's 'higher lawmaking' and 'constitutional moments."
17
Such a constitutional approach does not attempt to prove that
the Charter of the United Nations represents a global constitution
12 See IMMANUEL KANT, KANT POLITICAL WRITINGS 47-51, 90-92, 102-08, 127-30,
164-65, 170-71 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (explaining the problem of
a law-governed external relationship with other states and describing the different
outcomes).
13 W. Michael Reisman, for example, has indicated that "[a] constitution is a
continuing process, not a single event." W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional
Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 96 (1993). For a discussion of the
New Haven School, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2618-24 (1997) (book review) (contrasting the New Ha-
ven School with the international legal process school); and Bardo Fassbender, The
United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 544-46 (1998) (defining the key terms of the New Haven
School as they relate to the U.N. Charter).
14 See Koh, supra note 13, at 2602-03, 2641, 2645-58 (1997) (examining the in-
ternalization of norms by domestic legal systems). For a brief outline of Koh's ar-
guments, see Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use
of the WFO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Estab-
lishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413,
473 (2001) (describing Koh's explanation of the internalization of international
norms).
15 See Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against
Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES CouRs 195 (1993) (expanding the concept of an interna-
tional constitution interdependent of the international community cited and dis-
cussed in Fassbender, supra note 13, at 548-51).
16 See Alec Stone, What is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay in Interna-
tional Relations Theory, 56 REV. POL. 441 (1994) (providing ways to assess forms of
"institutionalized cooperation in the international system").
17 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (examining the power of the constitution as a tool for
democratic self-government); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (calling for
the American people to retake control of the government).
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or that truly autonomous legislative, executive, or judicial bodies
function at the international level. It does not deny the relevance
of sovereignty, the demands of domestic effect, the frailties of indi-
vidual and collective enforcement, or the need to identify an inter-
national 'community.' Nor does it argue that the web of interlock-
ing treaties, covenants, customary laws, peremptory norms, and
domestic legislation represent any form of a complete international
constitution 18 or world government.
Instead, the theory of progressive global constitutionalism rec-
ognizes that international relationships are not completely anar-
chic. 19 Sovereign states have exercised their right to surrender a
degree of their sovereignty20 through a variety of enforceable con-
tractual agreements. Additionally, all States have become bound
to certain fundamental norms even without their agreement, as the
expanding doctrine of humanitarian intervention clearly indi-
cates, 21 and the citizens of those non-agreeing States have similarly
18 For a discussion of various aspects of the international constitutionalism
debate, see Fassbender, supra note 13 (suggesting that the U.N. Charter is the con-
stitution of the international community); Ronald Macdonald, The Charter of the
United Nations in Constitutional Perspective, 20 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 205 (1999) (ana-
lyzing the U.N. Charter from a constitutional perspective); John 0. McGinnis &
Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. L. REV. 511 (2000) (ar-
guing that the WTO can promote international trade and domestic democracy);
Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: The Reconstruction of Article 2(7) and Rise
of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 353 (1996) (ex-
plaining the expansion of the Security Council's powers); Ernst-Ulrich Peters-
mann, Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the
U.N. Dispute Settlement System?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 753 (1999) (questioning
the reformation of the U.N.); Reisman, supra note 13 (discussing the increased sig-
nificance of the U.N. Charter as an international constitution after the Cold War);
Stone, supra note 16 (characterizing constitutions as one end of a spectrum of meta
norms).
19 For a discussion of issues surrounding anarchy, see Stone, supra note 16, at
448-70 (discussing international relations theory and supranational constitutional-
ism).
20 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 131
(June 27) (indicating that "[a] State... is sovereign for the purpose of accepting a
limitation of its sovereignty... ").
21 For a discussion of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, see Douglas
Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 195
(1993) (providing anecdotal evidence of humanitarian intervention); Christine
Ellerman, Note, Command of Sovereignty Gives Way to Concern for Humanity, 26
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 341 (1993) (determining the legal justifications for hu-
manitarian intervention); Yvonne C. Lodico, The Justification for Humanitarian In-
tervention: Will the Continent Matter?, 35 INT'L L. 1027 (2001) (exploring enforce-
ment mechanisms of human rights); Perez, supra note 18 (discussing humanitarian
2004]
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been placed (at least under certain circumstances) within the juris-
diction of a higher external authority.22
As a result, the totality of a common set of enforceable values
and a myriad of interlocking agreements represents a progression
with constitutive and rule of law dimensions. It is a progression
that is expanding the scope of individuals as subjects of interna-
tional law; broadening both the rights of those individuals and the
duties of their States; recognizing that such concepts as 'commu-
nity,' progressive realization, 23 and 'universal jurisdiction' 24 are not
illusional; and viewing self-determination and economic and social
development as inalienable rights with which no other nation may
interfere.25 As the overlap between international and domestic
domains continues to increase, a theory of progressive global con-
stitutionalism refutes the fact that a constitution must either be in a
complete state of existence or a complete state of nonexistence.
It is within such a framework that this Article will examine the
relationship between the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
intervention in the context of supranational constitutionalism); Richard Schifter,
Human Rights at the United Nations: The South Africa Precedent, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 361 (1993) (tracing the history of international intervention on domestic
matters); The U.N. Human Rights Regime: Is It Effective?, 91 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 460
(1997) [hereinafter The U.N. Human Rights Regime] (debating the effectiveness of
the institutions of the U.N. Human Rights Regime).
22 For example, Article 12.2 (a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute] appar-
ently grants the new International Criminal Court jurisdiction over citizens of
non-party States who commit a covered offense within the territory of a party
state.
23 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art 2.1, 993 U.N.T.S. 4, 5 (entry into force on Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
ICESCRI (stating that "[e]ach State Party ... undertakes to take steps.., to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means ...."). For an excellent review of the doctrine of progressive realization,
see Substantive Issues, supra note 3, paras. 30-52. For an application of the doctrine,
see Treatment Action Campaign v. Minister of Health, 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) (S.
Afr.) (deciding a class action suit in South Africa for failure to provide HIV
drugs).
24 For an excellent discussion of universal jurisdiction, see Beth Stephens,
Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Reme-
dies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
25 See Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 41st
Sess., 97th mtg., Annex, Agenda Item 101, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986)
[hereinafter DRD].
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Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement"), 26 and the need
of individuals in less-developed countries for treatment and pre-
vention of HIV/AIDS. In doing so, however, there are two caveats
to keep in mind. First, while this Article will primarily discuss the
HIV/AIDS crisis, its arguments are equally applicable to other
health issues, such as those surrounding malaria and tuberculosis,
as well as to epidemics that are as yet unknown. Second, while
this Article will address questions concerning such 'rights' as the
right to the 'highest attainable standard of health,' 27 the right to ac-
cess, and the right to development, it is primarily directed at the
other side of the 'rights equation'- namely, the duty of a sovereign
to respond to the rights of its citizens and the duty of other nations
not to interfere with those obligations. As a result, this Article will
not concentrate on the right of a nation to exercise the flexibility
inherent in the TRIPS Agreement but rather on a nation's duty to
do so. It will argue that while the need for access may conflict with
certain theories of intellectual property rights ("IPR"), it does not
conflict with the TRIPS Agreement. It will also argue that a na-
tion's unwillingness to exercise such flexibility constitutes a breach
of a duty owed to its citizens, and a breach of a duty owed to other
States that may be adversely affected by such a decision.
Section 2 of this Article will explore the HIV/AIDS crisis, the
social and cultural factors that contribute to its spread, and the lack
of infrastructure that frustrates treatment and prevention efforts. It
will highlight the pandemic's destructive effect on the social fabric
of a nation, including its impact on both social structure and future
economic development. It will also address the HIV/AIDS crisis
from a human rights perspective in light of a variety of declara-
tions and covenants, and will touch upon such issues as discrimi-
nation, human dignity, equal protection, self-determination, and
26 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [here-
inafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], re-
printed in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ("WTO") THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTINATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 321 [hereinafter
LEGAL TEXTS].
27 See ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 12.1 ("The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health."); see also Substantive Issues, supra
note 3, para. 1 ("Every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest at-
tainable standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity.").
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the rights of women and children.
Section 3 will examine some of the arguments advanced by
pharmaceutical companies, including the position that the
HIV/AIDS crisis is far more than an access-to-drugs issue. It will
briefly discuss the philosophy of patents and the benefits provided
by the protection of intellectual property, including the provision
of incentives for innovation, the ability to recoup research and de-
velopment ("R&D") and other costs inherent in bringing products
to market, and the stimulation of foreign investment and technol-
ogy transfer.
In Section 4, this Article will turn its attention to the flexibility
provided in the TRIPS Agreement. It will examine the objectives
and principles set forth in Articles 7 and 8, the issue of patentable
subject matter under Article 27.2, the limited exceptions found in
Article 30, the compulsory licensing provision of Article 31, the
transition extensions established in the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ("Declaration on TRIPS"), 28
and the somewhat ignored security exception of Article 73.29
28 See Press Release, WTO, Council Approves LDC Decision with Additional
Waiver (June 28, 2002) (citing the WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14,
2001) [hereinafter Declaration on TRIPS] and reporting that the WTO council re-
sponsible for intellectual property approved a decision allowing least-developed
countries to not provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals), at http://
www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres02_e/pr3Ole.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
29 For a discussion of the various aspects of the flexibility contained in the
TRIPS Agreement (including a variety of discussions regarding such flexibility as
it relates to public health and access to medicines), see WTO Panel on Canada,
Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000)
(reporting panel findings with respect to the protection of inventions in the area of
pharmaceuticals under relevant provisions of the Canadian implementing legisla-
tion in relation to its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement); FREDERICK M.
ABBOTr, COMPULSORY LICENSING FOR PUBLIC HEALTH NEEDS: THE TRIPS AGENDA AT
THE WTO AFTER THE DOHA DECLARATION ON PUBLIC HEALTH (Friends World
Comm. for Consultation, Quaker United Nations Office-Geneva, Occasional Pa-
per 9, 2002) [hereinafter COMPULSORY LICENSING] (analyzing relevant legal issues
from the perspective of developing members and making recommendations for
action), at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/OP9%2OAbbott.pdf (last visited
Oct. 12, 2004); FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, ACCESS TO MEDICINES
AND THE WTO DOHA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (Friends World Comm. for Consul-
tation, Quaker United Nations Office-Geneva, Occasional Paper 7, 2001) [herein-
after ACCESS TO MEDICINES] (analyzing issues presented by the TRIPS Agreement
to assist a near-term formal interpretation of TRIPS and to raise issues that might
be the subject of a longer-term review of the Agreement), at http://
www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/OP7%20Abbottl.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004); Fre-
derick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72
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Section 5 will examine the duty to exercise this flexibility in
light of both contractual and customary international and domestic
legal obligations. It will argue that a failure to take advantage of
the flexibility provided in the TRIPS Agreement actually consti-
tutes a breach of these legal obligations30 and that such a breach is
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 385 (1996) (discussing the TRIPS Agreement and the relation-
ship between IPR and economic development); Timothy G. Ackermann,
Dis'ordre'ly Loopholes: TRIPS Patent Protection, GATT, and the ECJ, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J.
489 (1997) (focusing on the clauses allowing patent exclusion based on the need to
protect ordre public or morality); Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to
Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21
MICH. J. INT'L L. 333 (2000) (proposing a procedural and substantive approach to
expressly acknowledge, discuss, and understand the differences of the competing
interests involved); Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS
Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 941 (2000) (attempt-
ing "to alleviate some of the confusion surrounding compulsory licensing and
[recommending] an interpretation of the Article 31 language in the TRIPS Agree-
ment that would satisfy broad interests"); James Love, Compulsory Licensing: Mod-
els For State Practice in Developing Countries, Access to Medicine and Compliance with
the VATO TRIPS Accord: Prepared for the United Nations Development Programme (Jan.
21, 2001) (examining models for compulsory licensing and government use of
patents "as a tool to increase access to medicines in developing countries"), avail-
able at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recommendedstatepractice.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2004); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite
Form of Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996) (discussing
"the current predominance of natural rights theory in the area of intellectual
property and of patents in particular"); TRIPS Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Developing Country Group's Paper, IP/C/W/296 (June
29, 2001) [hereinafter Developing Country Group's Paper] (addressing the relation-
ship between the TRIPS Agreement and public health and seeking "to ensure that
the TRIPS Agreement does not undermine the implementation of public health
policies by Members"); TRIPS: Council Discussion on Access to Medicines, EU's Pa-
per, IP/C/W/280 (June 12, 2001) [hereinafter EU's Paper] (summarizing the views
of the EU and their member states on some of the provisions of the TRIPS Agree-
ment); and Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry
Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining VVTO Legal
Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069 (1996)
(analyzing how intellectual property protection has become a central part of major
global trade agreements and what that means for the Third World); Joint Letter
From Consumer Project on Technology, Essential Action, Medicines Sans Fron-
tieres, Oxfam International, Health GAP Coalition, and the Third World Network
to the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Council (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Joint
Letter] (calling on the TRIPS Council to ensure that "the safeguards of the TRIPS
work for both rich and poor countries, for countries with large or small domestic
markets, and for countries with different levels of technological development"), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/art30exports.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
30 See, e.g., Substantive Issues, supra note 3, paras. 46-52.
Violations of the right to health can also occur through the omission or
failure of States to take necessary measures arising from legal obliga-
tions. Violations through acts of omission include the failure to take ap-
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actionable (under appropriate circumstances) by both nationals
and other sovereign States.
Finally, Section 6 will place these obligations in the perspective
of progressive global constitutionalism and will explore issues sur-
rounding increasing hierarchy and intervention, the rebalancing of
the concepts of sovereignty and individual interests, and the de-
velopment of a totality of legal expressions that go far beyond the
status of treaty law. By conceptualizing a constitution as a continu-
ing process of expression establishing the rights and duties of indi-
viduals and States -and not as a document or body of institutions
-this Article will conclude with a synthesis of constitutional pub-
lic health concepts that are mandated by logical progression. In
doing so, it is hoped that the tragedy surrounding the HLV/AIDS
crisis will give rise to an additional sense of "human interdepend-
ence" 31 and an acceptance of a new and critical axiom of interna-
tional law.
2. THE HIV/ AIDS CRISIS AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE
2.1. The Nature of the Crisis
Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome is now the most "lethal
pandemic since the Black Death 650 years ago."32 Nearly twenty-
eight million people have died, 33 including more than five million
children.34 Of the forty million people now living with HIV/ AIDS,
propriate steps toward the full realization of everyone's right to the en-
joyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
Id. para. 49.
31 This term is borrowed from the Proclamation of Teheran, OHCHR, Pro-
claimed by the International Conference on Human Rights at Teheran on May 13,
1968, reprinted in U.N. CTR. HUM. RTs., 1 A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS at 51, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.5, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.2 (1994),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/b-tehem (last visited Oct. 13,
2004).
32 Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs
Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886, 1892 (2001).
33 See AVERT, supra note 6 (providing the latest statistics on HIV/AIDS). For
earlier statistics, see Christopher S. Wren, Before U.N., Powell Renews Call for Global
War on Aids, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at Al.
34 See AVERT, supra note 6 (noting that 4.3 million deaths occurred by 2001,
another 500,000 in 2003); AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2002, supra note 6, at 3
[Vol. 25:3
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two-thirds are located in Sub-Saharan Africa,35 and in the words of
President Obasanjo of Nigeria, "the prospect of extinction of the
entire continent looms larger and larger."
36
Unfortunately, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is still in its early
stages of development, 37 and nearly fourteen thousand people are
still contracting the virus every day.38 The epidemic is no longer
recognizing geographic boundaries. In the Caribbean, for example,
approximately 2.5% of all adults have now been infected.39 Re-
ported HIV infections in China rose more than 67% in one six-
month period 40 and the epidemic is expected to explode not only in
that nation but in India, Russia, and the countries of Eastern
Europe as well.
41
Despite the rapid spread of the virus, it has been estimated that
only 2% of those needing antiretroviral treatment in Africa are ac-
tually receiving the life-saving drugs42 that can slow the effects of
the virus on the body's immune system and significantly extend
the lives of those infected.43 The World Health Organization's
("WHO") new "3 by 5 initiative" (designed to provide HIV/AIDS
treatment to three million people by the end of 2005) and the new
South African program (designed to provide drug regimens free of
charge) are of course directed at alleviating this lack of access.44
(finding another 610,000 deaths before age fifteen in 2002).
35 See AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2003, supra note 4, at 5 (dividing AIDS
statistics by region).
36 Wren, supra note 33, at A4.
37 Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 6, 16, 44.
38 See AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2003, supra note 4, at 3 (citing five mil-
lion as the number of people newly infected with IV in 2003). For earlier statis-
tics, see Cowley, supra note 7, at 41 (citing 15,000 as the number of people con-
tracting HIV daily).
39 AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2003, supra note 4, at 5.
40 Report of Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 29 (providing statistics for the
first six months of 2001).
41 Gautam Naik, Uganda AIDS Study Suggests Education Stems Spread of HIV,
WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at A14.
42 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Plan to Battle AIDS Overseas is Foundering, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 28, 2004, at Al. (citing WHO statistics). For a general discussion in
this regards, see Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 22-23, 28-29, 32 (dis-
cussing difficulties by region).
43 Salih Booker & William Minter, AIDS in Africa: Is the World Concerned
Enough?, in GREAT DEcisioNs 71, 73 (2002); see also Helen Epstein & Lincoln Chen,
Can AIDS Be Stopped?, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Mar. 14, 2002, at 29, 29-30 (discussing
AIDS drugs in developed countries).
44 In regard to the "3 by 5 initiative," see WHO, The 3 by 5 Initiative, at
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Yet even if these programs prove to be successful, they must con-
tinually adapt to a variety of different strains of the disease includ-
ing those that mutate into drug-resistant forms.45 As a result, these
drugs must be taken pursuant to a strict daily regimen without
which the efficacy of the drugs will plummet,46 the patient's health
will be further damaged, and more powerful strains will be cre-
ated.47 The ability to constantly monitor a patient's regimen be-
comes critical, along with the ability to provide ongoing clinical
care for the treatment of opportunistic infections and a variety of
drug-related side effects.48 Unfortunately, poor countries lack both
the financial resources and the medical and physical infrastruc-
tures that are necessary to carry out these distributional and moni-
toring functions.
Although the transmission of HIV occurs primarily through
sexual intercourse, it may also occur through the use of unsteril-
ized needles by intravenous drug users and by 'collectors' of blood
bought off the street from impoverished donors. 49 It also occurs by
means of blood transfusions which have been prescribed as a form
of "pick me up"5 0 and "dispensed like Tylenol"5' in some nations
http://www.who.int/3by5/en/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). In regard to South Af-
rica's new program, see Mark Schoofs, South Africa Reverses Course on AIDS Drugs,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2003, at B1. For older estimates in regard to lack of access,
see Chinua Akukwe & Melvin Foote, HIV/AIDS in Africa: Time to Stop the Killing
Fields, 6 FOREIGN POL'Y IN Focus 1 (2001).
45 Sharon Begley, AIDS at 20, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 2001, at 34, 36 ("Susceptible
strains mutate into drug-resistant strains.").
46 Mark Schoofs, African Gold Giant Finds History Impedes a Fight Against AIDS,
WALL ST. J., June 26, 2001, at Al, A10 (citing a study "that suggested that the effi-
cacy of AIDS drugs plummets in patients who miss more than five of every 100
doses").
47 Tim Collie, AIDS in Haiti: Losing the Battle, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINAL, reprinted
in HARTFORD COURANT, June 18, 2001, at Al, A7.
48 Epstein & Chen, supra note 43, at 31.
49 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Seems Uncertain About Dealing Openly With
AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A3 (discussing China's slow response to
HIV/AIDS and noting how peasants in Henan province were infected by selling
their blood); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Blood and Tears: A Chinese Family's Ordeal in a Na-
tion in Denial of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A25 (discussing one family's
struggle); and Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Now Facing an AIDS Epidemic, A Top Aid
Admits, N.Y. TIMEs, August 24, 2001, at Al (discussing China's slow response to
HV/ AIDS).
50 Donald G. McNeil Jr., Romania's AIDS Children: A Lifeline Lost, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2001, at Al.
51 Rosenthal, Blood and Tears, supra note 49, at A25 (referring specifically to
China).
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using unscreened and contaminated blood collected in violation of
acceptable medical standards.
52
The spread of the disease may also be vertical in nature in the
form of MTCT. In 2003, an estimated 700,000 children became in-
fected with HIV and over 90% of those were babies who acquired
the virus at birth or through their mother's breast milk.53 At the
beginning of the decade, 24% of pregnant women in South Africa
were HIV positive,54 and the median HIV prevalence among preg-
nant women in urban areas in Botswana was nearly 45%.55 Most
children who are infected at birth or through breastfeeding will die
of AIDS before their fifth birthday,56 and the fact that interventive
antiretroviral treatments can reduce MTCT by 50-90%57 shows
these mortality figures to be truly unacceptable.
The transmission of the HIV virus must also be viewed in
terms of the economic, social, and cultural factors that play a sub-
stantial role in its spread. The existence of poverty, for example,
not only affects the ability to receive treatment; it also influences
the type of behavior in which individuals engage. When more
than a billion people live on less than one dollar a day,5 8 the sale of
one's blood, the purchase of cheap but ultimately contaminated
blood, and the existence of prostitution become more understand-
able.59 When costs place any hope of treatment beyond reach, the
incentive for being tested for the disease is substantially reduced.
60
52 Id.
53 AVERT, supra note 6; see also Alan Berkman, Confronting Global AIDS: Pre-
vention and Treatment, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 1348, 1349 (2001) (discussing trans-
mission of AIDS to nursing babies).
54 Treatment Action Campaign v. Minister of Health, 2002 (4) BCLR 356, 359
(T) (S. Afr.).
55 Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 23.
56 Id. at 46.
57 Berkman, supra note 53, at 1349.
58 Report on Global HIVIAIDS, supra note 3, at 19.
59 See Rachel Zimmerman & Mark Schoofs, World AIDS Experts Debate Treat-
ment vs. Prevention, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2002, at B1 (explaining that as AIDS strikes
rural families, less able-bodied people are around to work the land and this leads
people to make drastic choices); Rosenthal, China Now Facing an AIDS Epidemic, A
Top Aid Admits, supra note 49, at A10 (noting how poor farmers could give blood
several times a month for a fee of about five dollars).
60 See Chinua Akukwe & Melvin Foote, HIV/AIDS Global Trust Fund: Need for
an Equitable and Efficient Governance Structure, FOREIGN POL'Y IN Focus, June 2001,
at 1-2 (discussing passive solutions); Booker & Minter, supra note 43, at 74, 77 (dis-
cussing remaining obstacles).
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While the cost of antiretroviral cocktails has dropped substantially
- dropping to 38 cents a day in some African and Caribbean
countries61 - treatment, diagnostics, and monitoring are still be-
yond reach for many of those infected around the world. Such a
realization often leads to despair, suspicion, resignation, and low
expectations of survival, all of which increase the likelihood of
risky behavior such as drug use and unprotected sexual promiscu-
ity. 62
As a corollary to poverty, the subservience or powerlessness of
women in many countries also substantially contributes to the
spread of the HIV virus. As the Joint United Nations Programme
on HIV/AIDS ("UNAIDS") has noted, the low economic and social
status of women limits their power to refuse sex with an infected
husband or other partner, to discuss issues of fidelity with these
partners, to negotiate the use of a condom, or to leave risky rela-
tionships. 63 Lack of education and employment opportunities,
coupled with a variety of socio-cultural norms and practices, have
resulted in an economic dependence on men that extinguishes the
sexual and reproductive rights of women.64 Gender stereotypes,
inequalities, lack of legal capacity, and harmful traditional prac-
tices often result in physical abuse, sexual violence, and the traf-
ficking of women and girls. 65 Where women are viewed as prop-
erty of their family, where their rights are vested in male
relatives, 66 and where wife inheritance is permitted,67 it is not sur-
61 Julia Flynn & Mark Schoofs, Glaxo, Boeringer to Let Africa Make More Gener-
ics for AIDS, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2003, at D4.
62 See Lynette Clemetson, Our House Is On Fire!, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 2001, at
50 (discussing the difficulty of solving the AIDS problem in impoverished com-
munities); Epstein & Chen, supra note 43, at 31 (noting that what some countries
seem to need even more than AIDS drugs is "the alleviation of the loneliness,
poverty, and despair that are likely to motivate risky sexual behavior"); Douglas
Frantz, Drug Use Begetting AIDS in Central Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, at A6
(connecting drugs and AIDS).
63 Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 65.
64 Id.; see also Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3, para. 62 (noting lack of
gender equality in family matters).
65 See Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3, paras. 47, 61 (noting that
women's rights are essential to fighting AIDS); A Human Rights Based Approach to
HIVIAIDs, supra note 3, paras. 12-13 ("States should devote particular attention to
the human rights of children and women .....
66 Epstein, supra note 4, at 20.
67 Jennifer Steinhauer, U.N. Redefines AIDS as Issue of Rights and Peril to Poor,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001, at Al.
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prising that men determine the nature of sexual behavior. 68 As a
result of these social vulnerabilities, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS
among teenage girls in some countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, for
example, rose to five times higher than that of teenage boys.69 Sex-
ual coercion, both inside and outside of marriage, has left an unde-
niable legacy.
Additionally, rape and other forms of sexual abuse are now be-
ing employed as fundamental "weapons of war."70 The Bosnian
Ministry of the Interior, for example, has estimated that Serbian
soldiers raped 50,000 women and girls.71 It was also estimated that
"virtually every woman who survived the Rwandan genocide was
raped" and that at least 250,000 rapes occurred during the 1971
war of independence in Bangladesh.72 The threat of HIV/AIDS
transmission has made these crimes all the more horrific.
While poverty and the lack of empowerment of women are
leading contributors to the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, a
variety of other social and historical factors play a role as well. For
example, those infected with the virus are often stigmatized and
ostracized by their society. Such a stigma may extend to their fam-
fly, to their business, to their farm, and even to their village or re-
gion. Victims fear for their jobs, for their ability to generate income
and support their dependents, and for sustained acceptance within
the community. As a result, those who suspect that they are in-
fected often refuse to be tested, and those who know that they are
infected often refuse needed treatment. The discrimination that ac-
companies the disease actually shortens the lives of those infected
and fuels its transmission to others.73
68 See Mark Schoofs & Rachel Zimmerman, Sexual Politics Drives AIDS Epi-
demic, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2002, at D4 (citing a report "from the London-based
Panos Institute, which is working with [UNAIDS], on how to encourage men to
change their behavior").
69 Report on Global HIVIAIDS, supra note 3, at 65.
70 Id. at 66.
71 Eisner, supra note 21, at 218.
72 Epstein, supra note 4, at 19.
73 See A Human Right-Based Approach to HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, para. 2 (not-
ing that the stigma decreases the likelihood of treatment); Declaration of Commit-
ment, supra note 3, para. 13 (noting that the stigma undermines prevention); Re-
port on Global HIVIAIDS, supra note 3, at 67 (noting problems associated with
discrimination); Collie, supra note 47, at A7 (discussing the incidence of particular
stigma in Haiti); Dafna Linzer, AIDS Forum Draws Thousands, HARTFORD COURANT,
June 26, 2001, at A2 (describing complaints from AIDS activists); Rosenthal, Blood
and Tears, supra note 49, at 27 (noting stigma in China); Rosenthal, China Now Fac-
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Denial of the disease can also be found at the political level.
The largest problem in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to a health
commissioner in Nigeria, was that "people still refuse to believe
the disease exists." 74 South African President Thabo Mbeki, for ex-
ample, received substantial criticism for his former stance on the
AIDS epidemic in South Africa after he allegedly questioned the
extent of the problem, the use of antiretrovirals in light of their cost
and safety issues, and whether AIDS was actually caused by the
HIV virus.75 Similarly, a member of the South African Parliament
apparently argued that South Africans could not be used as
"guinea pigs" for dangerous antiretrovirals that could be used to
"exterminate" patients and could "lead to genocide." 76 "HIV? It
doesn't exist," he concluded.77 HIV was thought to be a fiction cre-
ated by multinational pharmaceutical companies hoping to boost
profits.78 In the fall of 2003, however, both President Mbeki and
the South African cabinet dramatically shifted their AIDS policy
and indicated that South Africa would undertake the world's larg-
est AIDS treatment program.79
Indefensible positions that some have taken on the HIV/AIDS
crisis reflect historical suspicions on the part of the Third World
toward the more industrialized powers. Colonialism, political and
economic suppression, apartheid, and even medical experimenta-
tion 80 have been unfortunate realities in human history. Unfortu-
nately, healing such wounds and developing a trust between rich
and poor nations will take additional time.
Finally, the risk of both exposure and transmission of the dis-
ing an AIDS Epidemic, A Top Aid Admits, supra note 49, at A10 (noting China's re-
luctance to admit AIDS problems).
74 Linzer, supra note 73, at A2 (citing Dr. Ben Anyene, Health Commissioner
in southeastern Nigeria's Anambra state).
75 John Aubuchon, South Africa's Millennium Recovery Program, Introduc-
tory Remarks at the National Press Club Luncheon with South African President
Thabo Mbeki 3 (June 27, 2001) (transcript available from Federal News Service,
Inc.); see also President Thabo Mbeki, id. at 12-14 (claiming alternative causes of
AIDS).
76 Rachel L. Swarns, An AIDS Skeptic in South Africa Feeds Simmering Doubts,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, at A4.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Schoofs, supra note 44, at B1.
80 See Swarns, supra note 76 (" [T]he white government long abused science to
oppress the black majority.").
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ease is increased by the displacement of individuals, whether in
the form of refugees destabilized by armed conflict, by natural dis-
aster,81 or in the form of migrant workers detached from family
structure. UNAIDS has noted, for example, that the likelihood that
individuals will hire commercial sex workers clearly increases
when large numbers of single migrant men live together. 82 Mining
communities, established as a result of a "complex interplay of
economics and history,"83 provide unfortunate testimony to such a
fact, as low-skilled workers live in company-owned barracks hun-
dreds of miles from home.84 In 2001, for example, AngloGold es-
timated that of its forty-four thousand mineworkers, nearly one-
third were infected with the virus.85 It has also been estimated that
migrant workers as a whole are almost two and one half times as
likely to have HIV as are non-migrant workers.86 These figures not
only reflect the loneliness and despair of many of these individu-
als, but also a cultural resistance to sex education, discourse re-
garding sexual relations, and condom use.
87
Whatever the particular cause, there is no question that the
HIV/AIDS epidemic is destroying the social, economic, and politi-
cal fabric of many nations. Families are being broken apart as
mothers and fathers succumb to the disease. By the end of 2001,
for example, fourteen million children under the age of fourteen
had already lost either one or both of their parents to AIDS,88 and it
is estimated that by 2011 there will be forty million AIDS orphans
in Africa.89 In its Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002,
81 See Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3, para. 75 (discussing problems
of displaced persons).
82 Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, para. 25.
83 Id.
84 Schoofs, supra note 46, at Al.
85 Id.
86 Id. at A10 (citing a study by Mark Lurie, an AIDS researcher with South
Africa's Medical Research Council).
87 See Booker & Minter, supra note 43, at 74 (discussing Africans' aversion to
sexual discourse and resistance to using condoms); Collie, supra note 47, at A7
(discussing difficulties in Haiti); Frantz, supra note 62 (discussing regional atti-
tudes toward sex as a hindrance to open dialogue); Steinhauer, supra note 67 (dis-
cussing the United Nations' assessment of AIDS threat).
88 Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 8. The term "children or-
phaned" is defined as "children aged 0-14, as of end of 2001, who have lost one or
both parents to AIDS." Id.
89 Akukwe & Foote, supra note 44, at 1; Begley, supra note 45, at 36.
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UNAIDS described how the epidemic dissolves the household,
stripping the family of both its income earners and its productive
assets. UNAIDS further reported that HIV/AIDS redirects ener-
gies from income producing activities to caretaking, which de-
pletes savings and increases debt, driving extended families fur-
ther into poverty. As a result, farms are abandoned, food
production falls, and hunger escalates.90
From an economic growth and development perspective, the
AIDS epidemic has had the effect of lowering GDP growth and in-
creasing the risks for foreign investors. 91 Productivity has contin-
ued to fall as absenteeism and turnover have continued to rise.
The workforce has experienced a loss of valuable skills and know-
how, and limited resources have been diverted to new recruitment,
training, and higher health care costs. 92 In South Africa, for exam-
ple, it has been estimated that 23% of the skilled workforce will be
HIV-positive by 2005. 93 In light of such forecasts, foreign invest-
ments will be further inhibited, thereby compounding both the rise
in individual and governmental debt and the fall in overall market
demand.
As life expectancies are diminished and educational systems
abridged,94 the effects on economic development, social cohesion
and political stability may be felt for generations. 95 Unfortunately,
the destruction of a nation's fabric also gives rise to immediate in-
ternational security concerns. Poverty, hunger, and despair often
serve to ignite internal strife and political vacuum. The result can
be civil war, cross-border and regional conflicts, the suppression of
human rights, and mass migration. Internal struggles quickly ex-
pand to international struggles with substantial peace and security
consequences. As the United Nations Security Council recognized
in Resolution 1308,96 the HIV/AIDS pandemic may have "a
uniquely devastating impact on all sectors and levels of society...
on social instability and emergency situations," and if unchecked it
90 Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 47-50, 52-53.
91 Id. at 56-57.
92 Id. at 54.
93 Id. at 58 (citing an ING Barings study).
94 See id. at 44-45 (discussing the demographic effect of the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic).
95 See id. at 23 (discussing the scale of AIDS crisis); Declaration of Commitment,
supra note 3, para. 8 (noting that AIDS in Africa threatens development).
96 U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4172d mtg. at 159, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1308 (2000).
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"may pose a risk to stability and security." 97
In light of the above, the $7-$10 billion annual budget re-
quested by Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the purpose of fight-
ing this epidemic98 seems like a wise investment in both humani-
tarian and economic terms. As UNAIDS has pointed out, such an
amount would represent only a fraction of the $300 billion that was
spent on agriculture subsidies in 2001 alone by the world's high-
income nations.99
2.2. HIV/AIDS as an Issue of Human Rights
The HIV/AIDS epidemic gives rise to a variety of human rights
issues, including the right to gender equality, the right to equality
of those infected, and -in light of the fact that the virus dispropor-
tionately affects both Africans and African-Americans 00- the right
of racial equality as well. The epidemic also gives rise to issues re-
garding discrimination in the workplace, in education, and in re-
ceiving medical care. The right to be free from unlawful isolation
or detention, the right to be free from cruel or degrading treatment,
and the rights to privacy, information, association, movement, and
even life itself are all involved in addressing the impact of the dis-
ease.101
This Article, however, will focus on the fundamental right of
every individual to the highest attainable standard of health, in-
cluding the right of access to both treatment and prevention meas-
ures. In doing so, this Article will examine these rights not simply
in terms of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") from which the "highest attainable
9 Id.
98 The $7-$10 billion figure for the Global Fund for AIDS and Health also in-
cludes the fight against malaria and tuberculosis.
99 Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 19.
100 See id. at 40 ("African-Americans ... make up only 13% of the population
of the United States, but accounted for an estimated 54% of new HIV infections in
2000.").
101 See Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3 (discussing broadly the effects
of HIV/AIDS globally); A Human-Rights Based Approach to HIV/AIDS, supra note 3
(looking at HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue); Handbook for Legislators, supra note
3 (suggesting legislation to confront the HIV/AIDS pandemic); International
Guidelines, supra note 3 (discussing the relationship between HIV/AIDS and hu-
man rights); Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR World Con-
ference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration] (declaring these and other human rights).
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standard" language is drawn,102 but in terms of both customary
law and principles of jus cogens that are applicable to all States irre-
spective of whether they are parties to any particular covenant. It
will also examine these rights in light of the rights of self-
determination and development, the right to share in the benefits
of scientific advancement, and the indivisibility of civil and politi-
cal rights with economic, social, and cultural rights. Because these
issues will be examined in more detail in Sections 5 and 6 of this
Article-which will explore both the duties imposed by domestic
and international law regarding the protection and fulfillment of
these rights and the constitutionalization of these duties-this sec-
tion will be limited to providing a background for that discussion.
2.2.1. The U.N. Special Session
"In a world of AIDS, the lack of human rights protection can
become a matter of life and death." 10 3 As a result, the sanctity of
these rights must be universally established in order to curb the
spread of this disease and to allow those infected not only to ex-
tend their lives but to live their lives in dignity as well.
In recognition of such a fact, the United Nations Special Session
on HIV/AIDS, held during the summer of 2001, transformed a
medical crisis into an issue of basic human rights. In
"[riecognizing that the full realization of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all is an essential element in a global response
to the HIV/AIDS pandemic," 10 4 the Special Session's Declaration of
Commitment on HIV/AIDS ("Declaration of Commitment")
stressed the need for equality and the empowerment of women in
reducing vulnerability 05 as well as the need for abolishing the
myriad of discriminatory practices and stigma that undermine
prevention and treatment efforts. 06 It also linked both the epi-
102 See ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 12.1 ("The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health.").
103 Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 62.
104 Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3, para. 16; see also id. para. 20 (em-
phasizing the respect of all human rights and fundamental freedoms while fight-
ing the HIV/AIDS pandemic).
105 See id. paras. 14, 47, 59-61 (stressing gender equality and female empow-
erment).
106 See, e.g., id. paras. 13 (stigma, silence, discrimination, denial, and lack of
confidentiality), 58 (stigma and social exclusion).
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demic and the enjoyment of human rights to a variety of other so-
cioeconomic issues including poverty, illiteracy, armed conflict, fu-
ture social and economic development, and the need for technol-
ogy transfer. 0 7
The Declaration of Commitment also specifically addressed the
fact that access to pharmaceuticals in the context of pandemics is
one of the fundamental elements in progressively achieving the
"right of everyone" to the highest attainable standard of health.108
It acknowledged the fact that the lack of affordable drugs and
health infrastructure continued to hinder effective responses, and
that non-discriminatory access (at reduced costs) must be pro-
vided. 09
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ech-
oed each of these sentiments. After noting the inseparability of the
epidemic and the lack of respect for fundamental human rights, 0
the High Commissioner for Human Rights recalled the obligations
of States under international law to "respect, protect and fulfil the
right to the highest attainable standard of health""' and to ensure
the accessibility and affordability of essential drugs.112 Since acces-
sibility is "a fundamental element to achieving the full realization
of the right to health," 13 no lesser obligation can be demanded of
States. Additionally, "[t]he right to the highest attainable standard
of health should inform the implementation of States' obligations
under other relevant international agreements[,]"114 including the
obligation to exercise the flexibility inherent in the TRIPS Agree-
ment.115
107 See, e.g., id. paras. 2, 5, 8, 11, 62, 68, 69, 73, 78, 87 (discussing these and
other issues).
108 Id. para. 15; see also id. para. 37 (listing means to combat these problems).
109 See id. paras. 23-25 (discussing problems in confronting HIV/AIDS related
to medical care).
110 See A Human Rights-Based Approach to HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, paras. 1-3
("Human rights are inextricably linked with the spread and impact of HIV/ AIDS
.... 1).
111 Id. para. 9.
112 See id. paras. 9-10 (discussing the right to the highest attainable standard
of health).
113 Id. para. 10.
114 Id. para. 11.
115 See id. ("The High Commissioner... encourages States to implement the
flexibility within the TRIPS Agreement in line with their concurrent obligations
under the right to health.").
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2.2.2. A Human Rights Foundation
The human right to health (or to the highest attainable standard
of health) has been recognized in a substantial number of interna-
tional instruments. Both the ICESCR116 and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child ("CRC")" 7 specifically employ "the right.., to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health" lan-
guage, while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Univer-
sal Declaration")," 8 the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW")," 9 and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination ("ICERD")120 speak in such terms as the right to the
protection of health, the right to health and well-being, the right to
health care, and the right to security in the event of sickness. Addi-
tionally, the right to health has been incorporated in several re-
gional agreements 121 and consistently recognized by the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. 22 As will be discussed in more de-
tail later, there are also a wide variety of other international agree-
ments that unquestionably support, although from different per-
spectives, the right to the highest attainable health.
It can certainly be argued that U.N. resolutions and declara-
tions are not legally binding and that covenants and conventions
are only binding on those states that are actually parties to those
agreements. As a result, the United States, not being a party to any
covenant embracing the 'right to health' or 'highest attainable
standard of health' language, would arguably owe no legal duties
116 ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 12.1.
117 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Annex, Supp. No. 49, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) art. 24.1 [hereinafter CRC].
118 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
119 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1979) [hereinafter
CEDAW].
120 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1965) [hereinafter
ICERD].
121 For a listing in this regard, see Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 2.
122 -See, e.g., Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics Such as HIV/AIDS,
RES.2001/33, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, 71st mtg., pmbl., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2001/33 (2001) [hereinafter Access to Medication] ("Reaffirming also
that the right of everyone . . . of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health is a human right....").
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in such a regard. As will be demonstrated in Sections 5 and 6,
however, such a position is absolutely without merit in the context
of epidemics such as HIV/AIDS.
All human rights are in fact derived from the inherent "dignity
and worth" of the individual person.123 With such a recognition as
a core value, the international community has long taken the posi-
tion "that all human rights and fundamental freedoms are univer-
sal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated." 24 It is therefore
not surprising that both the ICESCR (to which the United States is
not a party) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") (to which the United States is a party) link the
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights to the enjoyment
of civil and political rights. While the ICESCR indicates that "free-
dom from fear and want" can only be achieved when individuals
enjoy not only economic, social, and cultural rights, but civil and
political rights as well, the latter indicates that "civil and political
freedom" can only be achieved when individuals enjoy not only
civil and political rights, but also economic, social, and cultural
rights. 25 Additionally, both of these Covenants link their respec-
tive rights to the common bonds of inherent dignity and the requi-
sites for international peace and security.126
Perhaps in recognition of this indivisibility, U.N. Resolution
2001/33 reaffirmed that the "right of everyone to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard" of health is indeed a "human
right."127 The use of such language clearly implies that such a right
is not contractual in nature and is not limited to those living in na-
tions that are parties to the ICESCR. The resolution thereafter calls
on all nations to pursue policies that will promote the availability
123 Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, pmbl.; see also Universal Declaration, su-
pra note 118, pmbl (recognizing the inherent dignity of individuals).
124 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, supra note 1, pmbl.;
see also Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 5 ("All hurhan rights are universal,
indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated.").
125 See ICESCR, supra note 23, pmbl.; International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, pmbl., 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entry into force on March
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Recognizing that, in accordance with the Univer-
sal Declaration, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and
want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy
his economic, social and cultural rights as well as his civil and political rights.")
126 See ICESCR, supra note 23, pmbl. ("Recognizing that these rights derive
from the inherent dignity of the human person.").
127 Access to Medication, supra note 122, pmbl.
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and affordability of pharmaceuticals and will refrain from taking
measures that would deny or limit access.128 Similarly, the Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has taken the posi-
tion that "[h]ealth is a fundamental human right indispensable for
the exercise of other human rights" 129 and that the right to health
must embrace a "wide range of socio-economic factors."130
The interdependence of rights, as well as the interdependence
of various covenants and customary norms, is further highlighted
by the "inalienable" rights to development 31  and self-
determination. 32 The right to development has been defined as "a
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process"
which is designed to continually improve the well-being of both
individuals and entire populations. 133 The collateral right of self-
determination, contrary to traditional (and limiting) notions of de-
colonialization, encompasses not only the freedom to determine
political status, but the freedom to pursue economic, social, and
cultural development as well. This broader definition of self-
determination, which is incorporated into both the ICESCR and the
ICCPR,134 helps to bridge the theoretical gap between the negative
obligations surrounding civil and political rights and the more
positive obligations surrounding economic, social and cultural
rights.
As noted earlier, 135 the HIV/ AIDS epidemic continues to have a
devastating effect on the social and cultural fabric of many nations.
It inhibits economic growth and development, it creates social and
political instability, and it threatens the actual existence of a num-
ber of nations. In such a context, it is not difficult to argue that a
voluntary denial of access to either preventative measures or
128 See id. paras. 2-4.
129 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 1.
130 Id. para. 4.
131 DRD, supra note 25, art. 1.1; see also Vienna Declaration, supra note 101,
para. 10 (reaffirming the right to development as universal and inalienable).
132 Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 2.
133 DRD, supra note 25, pmbl.; see also id. art. 1.1 ("The right to development is
an inalienable human right.").
134 ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 1.1; ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 1.1; see also
DRD, supra note 25, pmbl. (discussing various rights related to development); Vi-
enna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 2 (declaring the right of self-determination).
135 See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (discussing the social and
cultural effects of HIV/AIDS).
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treatment would in fact constitute a denial of the rights to devel-
opment and self-determination under a variety of circumstances.
In advancing such an argument, it should be noted that it is the in-
dividual person, and not the State, that is in fact "the central sub-
ject of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 136 As a result,
the concepts of development and self-determination, while cer-
tainly applicable to the relationships among States, may be equally
applicable to the relationships between a State and its own citizens.
The Declaration on the Right to Development ("DRD"), for exam-
ple, expressly recognizes the distinction between 'individuals' and
'peoples' by noting that the right to development is an "inalienable
human right" by which "every human person," as well as all "peo-
ples," are entitled to participate. 37 Under such an approach, a pol-
icy of a nation that has the effect of denying prevention and treat-
ment to the citizens of that nation (whether such a policy takes the
form of domestic law or the ratification of an international agree-
ment)138 would constitute a violation of this right. Additionally, a
policy of a foreign nation that interfered with the domestic obliga-
tions of another State (or that breached a contractual duty to pro-
mote development or to aid in the progressive realization of that
right)139 would similarly constitute a violation.
In such a light, it is becoming increasingly difficult for a nation
to extol the values of one set of human rights while denying re-
sponsibility or recognition of another. It is impossible to achieve
the benefits of 'freedoms' when the conditions necessary to realize
those freedoms are lacking. As a result, the totality of international
law must be used to impose complimentary duties on individual
States. Certainly, the Covenants noted above impose substantial
duties on States that are parties to those agreements and many na-
tions have pledged to provide their citizens with a progressive re-
alization of the highest attainable standard of health. Additionally,
these agreements increasingly impose a variety of "immediate" le-
gal obligations140 as the concept of progressive realization contin-
136 Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, pmbl.
137 DRD, supra note 25, art. 1.1 (emphasis added).
138 In regard to the ratification of international agreements that may inhibit
access to prevention or treatment, see, e.g., Access to Medication, supra note 122,
para. 4(b) and Substantive Issues, supra note 3, paras. 39, 50.
139 Such contractual duties, along with a variety of others, will be discussed
in detail in Section 5 of this Article.
140 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 30.
2004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
ues to develop an actual, substantive identity.' 41
In the absence of binding covenants, a variety of international
norms have developed that impose similar sets of duties. While
this issue will be addressed in Section 6 of this Article, it may be
briefly noted that the Universal Declaration, for example, has been
consistently viewed as the "common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations." 42 It represents the "veritable Magna
Carta" of human rights,143 "backed by the authority" of the United
Nations,'" and accepted as authoritative not only by States that
have become parties to the ICCPR or ICESCR, but by States that
have not ratified or acceded to either of these Covenants. 145 Its
principles have been employed by the U.N. General Assembly and
Security Council; they have served as the basis for a number of
other human rights instruments and national constitutions; they
have been invoked by the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and
national tribunals;146 and they have affirmed the rights of individu-
als "regardless of whether or not governments have formally ...
accepted" such principles. 147 As a result, the Universal Declara-
tion's recognition that economic, social, and cultural rights are in-
dispensable for the dignity of humanity' 48- and its recognition that
all people have the right to medical care, to a standard of living
adequate for their health and well-being,149 and to the benefits of
scientific advancement'50 - establishes a dimension far beyond con-
tractual relationships.
This is not to imply that developed countries have the duty to
141 See, e.g., id. paras. 30-52 (describing the States parties' legal obligations and
illustrating violations of those obligations); Treatment Action Campaign v. Minis-
ter of Health, 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) (S. Afr.) (holding that the Ministry must ex-
tend its plan to dispense Nevirapine and provide other services for the prevention
of mother-to-child transmission of HIV from the original eighteen designated sites
to a comprehensive national program).
142 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, pmbl.
143 Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, OHCHR,
June 1996, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm (last visited Sept.
23, 2004).
144 Id. at 3.
145 Id. at 10.
146 Id. at 11.
147 Id. at 10.
148 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, art. 22.
149 Id. art. 25.1.
150 Id. art. 27.1.
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provide free health care or pharmaceuticals to their less fortunate
neighbors. If such an argument was to prevail, it could be logically
argued that developed countries have the duty to provide housing,
education, and clothing as well. Such a scenario, of course, is sim-
ply not realistic. What is being argued, on the contrary, is that all
nations have the duty to their own citizens to protect and fulfill the
right to health, and that a failure to take all conceivable actions to
achieve that goal (within the bounds of legality and available re-
sources) would be a violation of that right. Such an obligation goes
far beyond the Declaration on TRIPS'S' which reaffirms the right of
nations to exercise the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement, but does
not require those nations to do so.
The actual recognition and imposition of such a duty, however,
will result in an inherent conflict between the fulfillment of human
rights and the benefits derived from the protection of the Western
notion of intellectual property. Such a conflict can only be resolved
by an admission of its absolute inevitability. Only then can practi-
cal steps be taken, in the context of a progressive global constitu-
tionalism, to protect both the creators of intellectual property and
those in need of its benefits.
3. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DEBATE
3.1. The Lack of Historical Consensus
The term "intellectual property rights" is often accepted as a
given among much of the Westernized world. It is a phrase that is
often authoritatively (and perhaps cavalierly) used to define a
whole set of creative endeavors that deserve protection under the
laws of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. Such a phrase, how-
ever, is far from innocuous. The use of the words "property" and
"rights" carries substantial, ideological flavor that may or may not
be shared by other nations of the world.
The concept of property, for example, implies the ability to
'own' and thus the ability to exclude others from interfering with
or usurping that ownership. As Ronald Corbett has noted, indi-
vidual ownership in intangibles such as intellectual property,
while recognized in Western nations, may not be recognized in de-
151 Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 28.
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veloping countries.152 Cultural norms may conflict with notions of
individual ownership,153 societies may be based on the value of col-
lectivism rather than individualism, 5 4 and nations may assume
positions that simply reflect the needs of their own citizenry.
These factors, and the fact that the developing world is a net con-
sumer1 55of products protected by theories of intellectual property,
serve to reinforce a continued resistance to Western claims of own-
ership and exclusivity.
Similarly, the protection afforded to intellectual property has
somehow become a natural right. Under such an umbrella, protec-
tion is no longer granted as a reward for creative productivity or as
an inducement to invent, but as a recognition of a fundamental
human entitlement. 5 6 Intellectual property rights are no longer
viewed as a mere reflection of positive law 5 7 or as a reflection of
the economic, social, and political interactions that give rise to that
positive law. Instead, they have been elevated to a higher realm
and attached to man as a human being15 8 much like equal protec-
tion, equality, and self-determination. In this process, these rights
have been placed on a moral plane and removed from political and
ideological challenge. 5 9 After all, a fundamental right of man can-
not be limited by territorial boundaries, and all nations (irrespec-
tive of wealth, history, culture, or need) must award universal ac-
ceptance. Despite its suspicious origin and questionable rationale,
this notion of the rights of creators and disseminators of knowl-
edge had a substantial impact on the development of the TRIPS
Agreement. 160
152 Ronald J.T. Corbett, Protecting and Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in
Developing Countries, 35 INT'L LAW. 1083, 1085, 1092 (2001).
153 Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 376.
154 See id. at 377-78 (describing the conflicts that may occur when "national
norms place unselfish contribution to overall social welfare above individual self-
interest").
155 Id. at 344.
156 See Oddi, supra note 29, at 418-20, 426, 433 (discussing the history of patent
justifications).
157 Id. at 426-27.
158 See id. at 426-27 (discussing the natural rights aspects of intellectual prop-
erty).
159 Weissman, supra note 29, at 1087; see also Oddi, supra note 29, at 432-33
("[The natural rights theory] of intellectual property has had great rhetorical
power.").
160 Professor Oddi has argued that "the patent portion of TRIPS implements,
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It can be argued that the protection of intellectual property is
not borne from a natural right but merely represents a conscious
governmental decision regarding the means for maximizing social
welfare. Much like the right to create a separate business entity or
the right to drive an automobile, the protection of intellectual
property may represent nothing more than a "product of govern-
ment" 161 or a "creation of the state."162 As Weissman has noted, the
entire intellectual property debate (and presumably its outcome)
would be altered if intellectual property were to be viewed in
terms of governmental "grants," "licenses," or "privileges,
" 163
which could then be conditioned or even refused. Such a positive
law perspective would certainly undercut the basic universality
approach of the TRIPS Agreement.
Recognizing this fact, some have argued that the owners of in-
tellectual property have tried "to stretch their qualified grants into
a more absolute form of control" and have "skewed the original le-
gal and cultural meaning" of intellectual property even when the
result is somewhat puzzling. 64 As Oddi has observed, if protec-
tion was truly a natural right, why would it be subject to govern-
mental approval or be limited in duration, by territory, and to the
first inventor to file (thus depriving other independent creators of
the same invention of their natural rights)?165 Despite these logical
inconsistencies, the proponents of a natural rights theory appar-
ently gained control during the Uruguay Round and prevailed in
the privilege/entitlement debate. 66
The fact that the entitlement approach has prevailed should not
lead to the conclusion that some form of theoretical truism has fi-
in significant provisions, a natural property rights theory of patents." Oddi, supra
note 29, at 426. For a discussion in this regard, see id. at 426-40 (discussing the
foundations of a natural rights based patent system).
161 Abbott, The W/TO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, supra
note 29, at 386 ("To some, IPRs are a right of nature .... To others, IPRs are purely
the product of government.").
162 Weissman, supra note 29, at 1087.
163 Id. at 1087 n.107.
164 Amy Harmon, In the 'Idea Wars,' a Fight to Control a New World Currency,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 2001, § 3, at 1.
165 See Oddi, supra note 29, at 420-23, 429-31 (describing how legal develop-
ments of the 19th century do not indicate a trend toward the natural rights theory
of intellectual property law and the inherent failures in the current entitlement
system).
166 Id. at 423, 433.
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nally been discovered. Whether rightly or wrongly, it is undeni-
able that this approach was adopted because it represented the po-
sition of more powerful nations. Issues regarding the proper bal-
ance between private property and public domain, between market
efficiency and guaranteed access to medical care, between indi-
vidualism and collectivism, and between personal and societal
ownership of knowledge were all preempted by the elevation of
intellectual property in the hierarchy of rights.167 Such a preemp-
tion should not disguise the fact that there are a wide variety of
other conceivable patent regimes that could be employed,168 and
that intellectual property protection has historically been left to the
national policymaking of individual countries169 precisely because
substantial cultural, normative, and economic differences exist
among nations.
Confucianism, for example, emphasizes the importance of
maintaining social order and of exhibiting obedience to the family,
whether that family be defined in terms of the natural family, the
corporate family, or the nation itself.170 While both the influence
and application of Confucian thought may vary from nation to na-
tion-and may be shaped by both domestic needs and external
forces over time-a desire for social order may produce a more
group-oriented identity that values harmony and loyalty,171 en-
courages nationalism, 72 views knowledge as an improper subject
167 See Ackermann, supra note 29, at 497-98 ("One view is that certain kinds of
idea-based property are, or should be, pure public goods .... [and resultingly,] that
knowledge, and its products should be used for the 'benefit of all mankind."') (ci-
tation omitted); Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 337 (noting that disagreement re-
mains as to "whether economic market efficiency and wealth maximization
should yield to other conflicting values, such as guaranteed access to basic needs,
natural rights of IP creators or even the inappropriateness of individual incentives
within a communitarian perspective of the human enterprise."); Harmon, supra
note 164, at BU1 ("[Critics of 'intellectual capitalism'] complain ... that property
rights are regularly trumping social values like... public health.").
168 See Weissman, supra note 29, at 1071-75 (discussing various patent policy
options available for balancing competing interests).
169 Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 343.
170 See Richard G. Linowes, The Japanese Manager's Traumatic Entry into the
United States: Understanding the American-Japanese Cultural Divide, EXEcUTIvE, Nov.
1993, at 24, 32 (discussing Japanese corporate norms); ARTHUR WHITEHILL,
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT: TRADITION AND TRANSITION 6-7 (1991) (discussing the his-
tory behind Japanese corporate culture).
171 See Linowes, supra note 170, at 27 (noting the interpersonal network of
professional relationships essential to Japanese management success).
172 See WHITEHILL, supra note 170, at 99 (describing Japanese pride since the
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of ownership or control,173 or views the creation of ideas as contri-
butions to a "common heritage" and therefore "freely accessible to
all." 174 Similarly, nations may occupy different points along an in-
dividualism/groupism continuum, and some States may actually
measure the success of an individual by the success of the group. 75
Likewise, some societies may allow communal development con-
cerns to preempt individual intellectual property rights1 76 or
choose to deemphasize the concept of self-interest and find the in-
centive to invent in the desire to improve the "common good." 77
Despite these normative differences, the proponents of stronger
intellectual property protection have been quite successful in fram-
ing the debate in terms favorable to their position. Unlike many of
the rights contained in the Universal Declaration or the ICESCR,
intellectual property protection has been considered a trade is-
sue.178 As a result, the debate was placed within the negotiating
arena of the Uruguay Round, where substantial economic and po-
litical power was employed to reach the result desired by the most
powerful nations. One might rightly question why certain natural
rights are in fact trade-related while others are not. Additionally,
the use of such metaphors as 'property,' 'right,' 'ownership,' 'pi-
racy,' 'theft,' and 'infringement' has had the effect of transforming
a discussion regarding cultural and historical perspective into an
overly simplistic moral dichotomy.179 Since engaging in immoral
post-war era).
173 Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agree-
ment, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 735, 766 (1996).
174 Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 376 (citing WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A
BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 8-29 (1995)).
175 WHITEHILL, supra note 170, at 117-18. For a discussion in this regard, see
Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Internationalizing Our Views Toward Recoupment and Market
Power: Attacking the Antidumping/Antitrust Dichotomy Through W/TO-Consistent
Global Welfare Theory, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69, 158-62 (1996).
176 Ford, supra note 29, at 963 n.113 (citing Robert J. Gutowski, Comment, The
Marriage of Intellectual Property and International Trade in the TRIPS Agreement:
Strange Bedfellows of a Match Made in Heaven?, 47 BuFF. L. REV. 713, 747, 749 (1999)).
177 Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 377.
178 See Elizabeth Henderson, TRIPS and the Third World: The Example of Phar-
maceutical Patents in India, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 651, 651-52 (1997) (discussing
the inclusion of IPR in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") ne-
gotiations); Oddi, supra note 29, at 426 (writing intellectual property's fundamen-
tal acquisition of trade-related aspects); Weissman, supra note 29, at 1075-85 (de-
scribing intellectual property's evolution into a trade issue as a pharmaceutical
industry offensive).
179 Oddi, supra note 29, at 432; Weissman, supra note 29, at 1070, 1086-91; see
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conduct tends to engender more universal condemnation, other-
wise legitimate arguments have become substantially less viable.
The issue of morality, of course, is an elusive concept. As will
be discussed in the next Section of this Article, there are a number
of very credible arguments that support the protection of intellec-
tual property. Any attempt to summarily dismiss such arguments
would not only be intellectually inept, but would reflect nothing
more than the advancement of utopian liberalism. While arguing
the absolute or definitive correctness of any given theory is a re-
warding academic experience, the realities of self-interest and con-
frontation demand more compromising and concrete solutions.
For example, legitimate arguments in favor of intellectual
property protection must be viewed in light of the millions of peo-
ple who have died of AIDS, the millions of people currently living
with AIDS, and the millions of people who will be infected with
AIDS in the future. Western notions regarding the rights of crea-
tors should also be viewed in light of 'Western' responses to their
own recent emergencies. Both the United States and Canada, for
example, appeared quite ready to bypass Bayer's patent on Cipro
(and purchase millions of generic doses) when confronted by the
threat of anthrax.180 Such actions were averted only when Bayer
agreed to slash its prices by nearly 50%.181 While such a stance
may have been totally justified in light of national security con-
cerns, the threat to the security of nations facing the HIV/AIDS
pandemic is certainly no less dramatic.
Additionally, the desire to impose a set of minimum intellec-
tual property standards on the developing world must be viewed
in light of the fact that the protection of pharmaceuticals in indus-
trialized nations is a relatively recent phenomenon. 82 For exam-
also Henderson, supra note 178, at 660 (describing how a legitimate industry for
generic products in the Third World is considered piracy or theft from an Ameri-
can perspective).
180 See Keith Bradsher, Bayer Agrees to Charge Government a Lower Price for An-
thrax Medicine, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 2001, at B8 (linking Bayer's price reduction to
threats to generic brand Cipro); Harmon, supra note 164, at 1 (noting hypocritical
behavior by the United States); Joseph Kahn, Trade Deal Near for Broad Access to
Cut-Rate Drugs, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2001, at A3 (citing the United States' actions
regarding Cipro as an example of a possible public health exception to IPR); An-
drew Pollack, Drug Makers Wrestle With World's New Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21,
2001, at B3 (discussing the Cipro care in terms of national security).
181 Bradsher, supra note 180, at B8.
182 See Henderson, supra note 178, at 660 ("[Miany Western nations only be-
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ple, it has been argued that "many industrialized countries devel-
oped pharmaceutical industries in the absence of patent protec-
tion."183  Moreover, "virtually every industrialized country
adopted strong patent laws after developing their technological in-
frastructure, in significant part through copying strategies." 184 If
we are to mandate a different pattern of historical development for
less-developed nations, some compromises are necessary.
The TRIPS Agreement's mandate to broaden the scope of pat-
entable subject matter to include any invention, whether a product
or process, in all fields of technology185 should be compared to the
lack of protection afforded 'traditional knowledge' under the
Agreement. Traditional knowledge, developed by indigenous
populations over the course of generations, often serves as the ba-
sis for the discovery of patentable pharmaceutical products.
86
Nevertheless, this knowledge may remain outside the scope of the
TRIPS Agreement's protection since it is not "new," does not in-
volve an "inventive step," and lacks an identifiable connection
with one person or small group of persons. The result is that the
TRIPS framework does not ordain compensation for the substantial
contributions to scientific advancement by poorer nations. This
lack of compensation for the use of traditional knowledge and the
appropriation of genetic resources has led to credible claims of
biopiracy.18
7
ginning to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals in the last 20 to 40
years.") (citing Julio Nogues, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding the
Pressures on Developing Countries, 24 J. WORLD TRADE L. 81, 82 (1990)); Weissman,
supra note 29, at 1119 ("Many of the most industrialized countries have only per-
mitted patents on pharmaceuticals in the last couple of decades.") (citations omit-
ted).
183 Weissman, supra note 29, at 1123.
184 Id. at 1119 (citations omitted).
185 Provided it is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of industrial
application. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 27.1.
186 See Gana, supra note 173, at 751-52 ("The use of cultural knowledge to fa-
cilitate the innovative process has recently been documented.").
187 For a substantial discussion regarding traditional knowledge, biopiracy,
misappropriation, etc., see Carlos M. Correa, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual
Property: Issues and Options Surrounding the Protection of Traditional Knowledge
(2001) (discussion paper) (describing the development of pharmaceutical patent-
ing in the industrial world), available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/
pdf/tkcol3.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2004). See also Gana, supra note 173, at 749-52
(discussing the impact of the TRIPS Agreement's "new" requirement on tradi-
tional knowledge); S.K. Verma, TRIPs and Plant Variety Protection in Developing
Countries, 6 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 281, 287-88 (1995) (highlighting cases where
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The requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, however, cannot be
isolated from other international obligations. For example, a fun-
damental tenet of international law is that nations have complete
sovereignty over all of their natural wealth and resources. Such a
right has been recognized in a variety of international agreements
including both the ICCPR and the ICESCR.188 More particularly,
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD"),189 to which
183 nations are parties, reaffirmed the fact that States have sover-
eign rights over their biological resources (including their genetic
resources) and that the governments of those states retain the au-
thority to grant access to those resources. 190 Additionally, the CBD
recognizes the need to promote a "fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources" 191 and
indigenous knowledge. 192 In doing so, the CBD aims to stimulate
access on behalf of countries that are in a position to utilize and
commercialize these resources.193 In return, the CBD is also de-
signed to promote the "sharing in a fair and equitable way the re-
sults of research and development and the benefits arising from the
commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Con-
tracting Party providing such resources." 194 Countries supplying
resources should also be given "access to and transfer of [the]
technology which makes use of those resources" 195 and should be
given the opportunity to participate in the biotechnological re-
developed countries patent new forms of indigenous materials from developing
countries while pointing out that the indigenous people receive no reward for
their knowledge and work that preserved the properties of these now coveted ma-
terials); Weissman, supra note 29, at 1089-93 (discussing the industrialized nations'
manipulative patenting of Third World biological resources).
188 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 47; ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 25;
DRD, supra note 25, pmbl., art. 1, para. 2 (recalling sovereignty over natural re-
sources); Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, supra note 1,
pmbl. (stressing that prime responsibility of protecting human rights are on the
states).
189 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 142 [here-
inafter CBD].
190 Id. pmbl., art. 15, para. 1.
191 Id. art. 1.
192 Id. art. 8(j).
193 See id. art. 15 (explaining the utilization of power in relation to the access
to genetic resources).
194 Id. art. 15, para. 7.
195 Id. art. 16, para. 3; see also id. art. 1 (articulating the "fair and equitable
sharing" philosophy).
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search activities undertaken in their regard.
96 By recognizing that
the authority to grant access may reside in one country while the
technological capacity for commercialization may reside in an-
other, the CBD attempts to balance the rights and obligations of
each country, subject to mutually agreeable terms.
97 It would
therefore be inconsistent to argue that access to traditional knowl-
edge and genetic material should be free, while access to the result-
ing scientific advancement should be subject to royalty payments.
Finally, the protection of intellectual property cannot be iso-
lated from the fact that the transfer of technology and the sharing
of the benefits of scientific advancement are principle mechanisms
for accelerating the economic development of poorer nations and
for stimulating the protection of human rights.
98 As the United
Nations has observed, scientific and technological developments
should be used for "the welfare of man,"
199 for the purpose of
"strengthening international peace and security," 200 and for "the
realization of human rights and freedoms."
201 As will be discussed
shortly, it can be argued that stronger intellectual property protec-
tion ultimately encourages the transfer of technology, thus eco-
nomic and social development, by reducing the risks of informa-
tion sharing. Despite this argument, it is beyond a doubt that the
AIDS epidemic imposes an immediate threat both to individuals
and to international security, and that the most affected of nations
lack the capacity to take advantage of technology transfer. As a re-
sult, any debate surrounding the need for intellectual property pro-
tection (as well as any attempt to interpret the law of the TRIPS
Agreement) cannot escape the complexities of immediacy, interna-
tional security, self-determination, and the property rights-human
rights distinction. While denying such a perspective may serve a
useful political purpose, it has no place in the environment of the
HIV/ AIDS crisis.
196 Id. art. 19, para. 1.
197 See generally, id. art. 19.
198 See Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Inter-
ests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind, G.A. Res. 3384, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
2400th mtg., at 86, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3384 (1975) [hereinafter Declaration on
the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress] (considering the benefits of technol-
ogy improvements in developing countries).
199 Id.
200 Id. para. 1.
201 Id.; see also id. paras. 5, 7 (describing what the states must do to advance
the social and economic rights).
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3.2. The Need for Patent Protection
The patent system, at least according to traditional thought,
represents a balancing of interests that is designed to maximize so-
cial welfare. A patentee receives exclusive rights over his or her
creation for a limited period of time in exchange for a complete,
public disclosure of the knowledge upon which the invention is
based. Not only may the public use this knowledge upon the pat-
ent term's expiration, but also the knowledge may serve (even dur-
ing the patent term itself) as the foundation for further advance-
ment of science and technology in a variety of fields. In addition to
this general dissemination, the monopoly that is granted serves to
encourage the patentee to license the discovery so that the inven-
tion can be commercialized, technology can be transferred, and
other products can be developed for the benefit of society. By en-
suring protection for creative efforts, the patent system also pro-
vides the necessary incentive for inventiveness since creators will
be able to profit from their R&D investments. Each of these di-
mensions are reflected in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, which
notes that the protection of intellectual property rights will pro-
mote both technological innovation and the transfer and dissemi-
nation of technology "to the mutual advantage of producers and
users ... in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare." 202
202 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 7. For brief notations regarding these
various dimensions, see, e.g., Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 28, para. 3
(recognizing the importance of intellectual property for development of new
medicines and the concerns about its effects on prices); WTO Ministerial
Conference, 4th Sess., Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 17
(Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration] (stressing interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement as supportive of public health), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/mino1e/mindecle.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2004); EU's Paper, supra note 29, para. 17; Developing Country Group's Paper,
supra note 29, para. 4; WTO, Governments Share Interpretations on TRIPS and Public
Health, § 1, para. 1 (June 20, 2001) (explaining the consensus that the TRIPS
agreement can help governments handle public health), at http://www.wto.org/
english/news e/news0le/trips drugs 010620 e.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004);
WTO, TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents, at 1 (Apr. 2001) (articulating TRIPS
attempt to balance long and short term goals), at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/tripse/tripsfactsheet__pharma e.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004); WTO,
Pharmaceutical Patents and the TRIPS Agreement, at 1, 2, 6 (July 11, 2000) (examining
the tension between creating incentives for new drug research and quickly
providing drugs that already exist), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
trips-e/pharma-ato186_e.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004); P. Boulet et al., Patent
Situation of HIV/AIDS-Related Drugs in 80 Countries 4 (2000) (explaining the
implications of patent protection of HIV/AIDS drugs on countries with saturated
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3.2.1. Providing Incentives for Innovation
According to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America ("PhRMA"), R&D is "the key to pharmaceutical inno-
vation."203 The pharmaceutical industry is the most research-
intensive major industry in the United States, and PhRMA member
companies invested an estimated $33.2 billion in R&D in 2003 as
compared to slightly less than $2 billion in 1980.20
4 This $33.2 bil-
lion figure represented a 7.1% increase in R&D expenditures over
the previous year 205 and an estimated 15.6% of total sales.
206
In the pharmaceutical industry, R&D is a "long, risky and ex-
pensive" process, with the average cost of developing a new drug
now exceeding $800 million compared to only $231 million in
1987.207 It is also estimated that it takes ten to fifteen years to de-
velop a drug from the laboratory to Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approval, with an average time period of 14.2 years dur-
ing the 1990s. 20 8 Researching more complex, chronic, and degen-
erative diseases, complying with more demanding developmental
requirements, and handling longer clinical trials with more par-
ticipating patients all increase the cost of both capital and R&D.
209
HIV-infected populations), at http://www.who.int/medicines/library/par/
hivrelatedocs/patentshivdrugs.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2004); Chiappetta, supra
note 29, at 362 (contrasting U.S. intellectual property law exhaustion outcomes to
copyright and patent exhaustion conclusions); Henderson, supra note 178, at 654-
57 (contending that patent protection in developing countries, unlike Western
countries, will not be beneficial); Weissman, supra note 29, at 1071-72 (describing
the rationale underlying patent policy).
203 PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA,
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2002, at 12 (2002) [hereinafter PHRMA PRO-
FILE].
204 PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA,
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2004, at 39 tbl.1 (2004) [hereinafter PHRMA
PROFILE 2004].
205 Id.
206 Id. at 40 tbl.2.
207 PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 12, 20-21 fig.2-11 (citing DiMasi et al., J.
HEALTH ECON., 10: 107-42 (1991) and Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Develop-
ment (2001)); see also PHRMA PROFILE 2004, supra note 204, at 2 ("On average it...
costs more than $800 million to advance a potential new medicine... ").
208 PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 18-19, fig.2-7 (citing JOSEPH A. DiMASI,
New Drug Development in U.S. 1963-1999, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOCY & THERAPY,
May 2001); see also id. at 69-70 ("On average, it takes more than 14 years and costs
$802 million to develop a new medicine."). In 2001, FDA approval alone took an
average of 16.4 months. Id. at 18-19, fig.2-8.
209 PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 12, 22-23.
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Nevertheless, the average period of effective patent life in the
pharmaceutical industry has been substantially shorter than that of
other industries. For example, new medicines introduced in the
early to mid-1990s have had an effective patent life (even with pat-
ent term restoration) of eleven to twelve years compared to the 18.5
year patent life in industries that do not receive regulatory ap-
proval before bringing a product to market.210
These substantial investments of both time and money must
also be viewed in light of the high failure rates that are involved in
pharmaceutical R&D. For example, only 250 of 5,000 - 10,000
screened compounds actually enter preclinical testing and only
five of those go on to clinical testing.21 Only one of these is ulti-
mately approved by the FDA as a new medicine212 and it is often
seven to nine years into the process before a company knows
whether a drug will prove successful.213 In light of these failure
rates which are highest when researching complex diseases about
which little is known,214 pharmaceutical companies "must rely on a
limited number of highly successful products to finance their con-
tinuing R&D."215
Accordingly, it can be strongly argued that intellectual prop-
erty protection must be granted for those research efforts that ulti-
mately prove successful. Such protection diminishes some of the
risks associated with R&D and thereby encourages private invest-
ment in innovative activities. Without potential reward, incentives
210 Id. at 30-31, fig.3-1 (citing Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents
for Increased Generic Competition in the U.S.: The Waxman-Hatch Act After One Dec-
ade, 10 PHARMACOECON., Supp. 2, at 110-23 (1996); Hearing on H.R. 673 and H.R. 400
Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property (1997) (statement of
Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, The American Intellectual Property Law As-
sociation)); see also PHRMA PROFILE 2004, supra note 204, at 31, fig.4.2 (charting the
effective patent life of Rx drugs and non-Rx products).
211 PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 20 fig.2-9 (citing PhRMA, based on
data from the Center for the Study of Drug Development, Tufts University, 1995).
212 Id.
213 Making Contact: 24-01 "Cost of Living: AIDS and Pharmaceutical Companies"
(National Radio Project radio broadcast, June 13, 2001) [hereinafter Making Con-
tact] (comment by Jeff Truitt, available at http://www.radioproject.org (last visited
Oct. 14, 2004).
214 See PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 22-23 (discussing chronic and de-
generative diseases).
215 Id. at 20; see also PHRMA PROFILE 2004, supra note 204, at 31 fig.4.1 (com-
paring marketed drugs' revenue with average R&D costs).
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for investing private capital would be substantially lacking.
216 Ad-
ditionally, a credible argument can be made that in light of the dis-
proportionately high level of both investment and risk -as well as
the tremendous social benefits resulting from the introduction of
an important new medicine -society should err on the side of
"over-incenting" R&D in the pharmaceutical industry. 217
The need to preserve incentive has given rise to a number of al-
legations regarding the "rampant" and often "unfettered" piracy of
intellectual property in many developing countries
218 that result in
billions of dollars in losses to a variety of American industries.
219
In specific regard to the pharmaceutical industry, Corbett has indi-
cated that patented drugs are "particularly vulnerable" to piracy
since generic versions can be produced by using methods disclosed
"in the patent itself or... [through] the development of alternative
synthetic routes" by reverse engineering.
220 As a result, while pat-
ented pharmaceuticals are extremely costly and time-consuming to
create, they are relatively easy and inexpensive to copy.
221 In addi-
tion to billions of dollars in lost sales, however, global piracy has
also reduced pharmaceutical R&D investment by hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars each year.222 At least in theory, it could be argued
that if all pirating producers were made to share in the burdens of
R&D (by means of royalty payments), not only could the level of
R&D be enhanced, but global prices could be reduced.
As of 2002, more than one thousand new medicines were under
216 See Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing
Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 492-93 (1997) (explaining how legal tools can encourage in-
vestment by reducing the risk).
217 Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 363.
218 Corbett, supra note 152, at 1084.
219 See id. at 1084-85 (discussing piracy rates in several world regions and
countries). For additional discussion in this regard, see Weissman, supra note 29,
at 1085-86 (discussing an industry study finding high costs for the United States
resulting from inadequate intellectual property protection).
220 Corbett, supra note 152, at 1085.
221 See Henderson, supra note 178, at 660 (discussing the high cost of pharma-
ceuticals development and the low cost of copying existing pharmaceutical prod-
ucts); Int'l Fed'n of Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n ("IFPMA"), GATT TRIPS and the Pharma-
ceutical Industry: A Review, PAT. WORLD, Sept. 1995, at 29 ("The medically
innovative products are increasingly difficult to invent, but frequently straight-
forward and inexpensive to copy.").
222 See PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 36 ("[Tihe U.S. International Trade
Commission found that global patent piracy reduces pharmaceutical R&D in-
vestment by $720-$900 million annually.").
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development, either in human clinical trials or awaiting FDA ap-
proval, including thirty-eight AIDS antivirals, fifteen drugs aimed
at AIDS-related cancers, and fourteen AIDS vaccines.223 The poten-
tial benefits of these drugs for suffering individuals around the
world cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, companies simply can-
not make these types of investments when their successes can be
copied and sold at reduced prices by competitors who need not re-
cover R&D expenses.224 PhRMA maintains that without intellec-
tual property protection, there would be no research-based phar-
maceutical industry (at least as we know it), no generic
pharmaceutical industry (since there would be no new drugs to
copy), and a greatly diminished flow of life-saving medicines. 225
Additionally, any reduction in protection would first be felt by
those with diseases that afflict smaller numbers of individuals or
those with diseases that primarily afflict the poor.226
There are a number of arguments that have been advanced to
counter, although only in part, the positions taken by the pharma-
ceutical industry. It has been argued, for example, that the level of
R&D expenditure and the level of income resulting from a pat-
ented drug are not necessarily directly correlated.22 7 It has been
noted, for example, that the AIDS drug Norvir was developed with
a $3.2 million grant and generated $41 million in sales during the
first half of 1997.228 Similarly, the pharmaceutical company that ul-
timately acquired exclusive control over AZT, which had in fact
been developed in federal government laboratories, actually con-
tributed little in the way of funding for the development of the
drug.229 It has also been argued that the figures cited by the indus-
try regarding the costs of R&D are "inflated230 and do not reflect
223 Id. at 2, 3 fig.1-1.
224 Id. at 30.
225 Id. at 30, 36, 70.
226 See Kahn, supra note 180, at A3 (articulating the debate surrounding the
public health exception to patent rules).
227 See ACCESS TO MEDICINES, supra note 29, at 40-41 ("[Tlhere is no direct cor-
relation between the income that is obtained on the basis of a patent and the
amount of R&D undertaken.").
22 Making Contact, supra note 213, at 6 (comment by Babich) (citing the Bos-
ton Globe).
229 Weissman, supra note 29, at 1092 n.135 (citing Chris Lewis, Public Assets,
Private Profits: Federal R&D and Corporate Graft, MULTINAT'L MONITOR, Jan./Feb.
1993, at 8).
230 Making Contact, supra note 213, at 6 (comment by Babich) (citing Jamie
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the fact that the industry receives substantial subsidies from the
federal government to aid in the development process.231 In addi-
tion to large subsidies, the industry is also the beneficiary of sub-
stantial tax credits for the development of drugs that treat "orphan
diseases" affecting fewer than 200,000 people.
232
In response to such allegations, PhRMA has taken the position
that any contention that the government pays for most of the re-
search for top-selling prescription drugs is simply false and that
only a small portion of those drugs have been developed through
technologies created with NIH funding.233 Additionally, the bene-
fits accruing to the U.S. economy have far exceeded any subsidies
borne by the nation's taxpayers. 234 In particular regard to orphan
drugs, it is argued that ten to twenty million Americans suffer
from thousands of orphan diseases and that tax credits (making
R&D more "commercially feasible") have helped to develop more
than 220 drugs and biological products aimed at these diseases
over the last two decades.
235
Some critics also believe that the patent system, and particu-
larly the granting of patents in the pharmaceutical sector, can actu-
ally frustrate both innovation and the competition upon which it is
based. In 2000, for example, approximately 6800 biotechnology
patents were granted in the U.S. alone, representing a 400% in-
crease over the last decade. 236 When thousands of ideas, products,
Love of the Consumer Project on Technology).
231 See id. (stating that the industry's figures do not "take into account public
subsidies"); ACCESS TO MEDICINES, supra note 29, at 7 ("It is well-known that U.S.-
based pharmaceutical companies benefit substantially from research supported by
federal government funding and that many important new drugs were developed
with material subsidies from the government."); Weissman, supra note 29, at 1069
(discussing the pharmaceutical industry in the United States as "the beneficiary of
massive subsidies").
232 See PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 17 (describing the Orphan Drug
Act, which provides for, inter alia, "orphan drug" research); Making Contact, supra
note 213, at 5 (comment by Lopez) ("Because they are targeting a 'small' portion
of the population, drug companies are eligible for tax credits of 50% for costs as-
sociated with clinical trials.").
233 PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 14. In regard to NIH funding, see
PHRIiMA PROFILE 2004, supra note 204, at 5.
234 PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 15 (citing a U.S. Congressional Joint
Economic Committee conclusion that benefits to taxpayers exceed funds spent by
the NIH).
235 Id. at 17.
236 Geeta Anand, Negative Result: Why Rapid HIV Tests Widely Sold Overseas
Have Eluded the U.S., WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2001, at Al, A6.
20041
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
and processes are being monopolized each year, building on the
ideas of others becomes substantially more difficult when "a li-
cense must be negotiated to use any existing sliver of innova-
tion."237 As a result, potential competition is held at bay and both
the incentive and the ability to pursue incremental scientific ad-
vancement are considerably reduced. The fact that many patents
lie unexploited by their owners and exist solely for the purpose of
guarding against competitive imports, or protecting the commer-
cial viability of older products, provides support for those ques-
tioning the current regime.238 Additionally, any benefits of the pat-
ent system must also be viewed in light of a number of expenses
that include the resources wasted in attempting to 'invent around'
the patent rights of others,239 the market inefficiencies caused by
monopoly abuse,240 the innovation that would have occurred even
in the absence of patent protection, 241 and the losses incurred when
multiple inventors, only one of whom will be rewarded, are pursu-
ing identical creations.242
Finally, the need for incentive argument loses some of its credi-
bility when applied to pharmaceutical patent protection in poor
countries. Patent-driven research is primarily supported by profits
derived from the lucrative Western markets and not by any antici-
pated profits in impoverished nations.243 Enforcing patent protec-
tion in those nations or engaging in futile attempts to exact sub-
stantial rewards are not prerequisites for the creation of incentive.
A decision to undertake a particular R&D project, for example, is
237 Harmon, supra note 164, at 1. Bristol-Myers Squibb, for example, has indi-
cated that "its researchers cannot pursue at least 50 promising approaches to
fighting cancer because of patents accumulated by others." Id. at 7; see also Oddi,
supra note 29, at 448-49 (discussing how broad patent protection may retard the
improvement and evolution of a particular technology).
238 See Henderson, supra note 178, at 656 ("[M]ost foreign owned patents are
unexploited, which preserves a protected import market and obstructs potential
competition."); see also Anand, supra note 236, at Al, A6 (discussing patent-
holder's refusal to license a patent in order to protect existing products).
239 Henderson, supra note 178, at 655.
240 See id. (discussing how royalties must be paid to foreign companies in or-
der to legally use the patent).
241 Oddi, supra note 29, at 441-45 (explaining that competitive market pres-
sures would also lead to the creation of inventions).
242 Id. at 446 (discussing rent dissipation theory).
243 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 32, at 1890 (stating that "the entire
African pharmaceutical market, at 1.1% of the global whole, is commercially neg-
ligible").
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not dependent upon anticipated African sales. In all fairness, how-
ever, proponents of such an argument should also recognize that
competition from the legitimate generic drug industry has already
increased substantially and that proposals for price differentiation
must be accompanied by an ability to successfully engage in geo-
graphic market segmentation. 244
3.2.2. Providing Incentive for Development
In mandating minimum intellectual property standards, the
TRIPS Agreement reflects the traditional arguments that IPR pro-
tection will spur technology transfer, increase the level of foreign
investment, and stimulate economic and social development
within the Third World.
245
In regard to technology transfer, it would appear logical that
knowledge-holders would be reluctant to license their technology
in a jurisdiction where IPR protection was inadequate. Where pro-
tection and/or enforcement is lacking, a licensee would be free to
breach the licensing agreement without consequence, misappro-
priate the knowledge without compensation, and even sell that
knowledge to other potential pirates. Under such a circumstance,
all knowledge becomes (in a sense) nothing more than a set of
trade secrets that must be scrupulously guarded. As IPR protec-
tion gains acceptance, however, these risks are correspondingly re-
duced and technology transfer becomes a more rational business
decision making option as potential benefits begin to outweigh po-
244 Since 1984, "the generic industry's share of the prescription drug market
has jumped from less than 20% to almost 50% today." PHRMA PROFILE, supra note
203, at 31-33.
245 For a discussion regarding various aspects of these traditional arguments
see, e.g., PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 34 (foreign investment, economic and
social development); Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic De-
velopment, supra note 29, at 390-93 (technology transfer and economic develop-
ment); Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 344, 358 (technology transfer and economic
development); Corbett, supra note 152, at 1093 (economic development); Jamie
Eisenfeld & Franiois Serres, African Legal Developments in the United States and Sub-
Saharan Africa, 35 INt'L LAW. 869, 871 (social and economic development);
Harmon, supra note 164 (economic development); Henderson, supra note 178, at
656-57 (technology transfer, foreign investment, and economic development);
IFPMA, supra note 221, at 33 (foreign investment and economic development);
Oddi, supra note 29, at 459-60, 467-69 (technology transfer and industrialization);
Sherwood, supra note 216, at 502-11 (technology transfer, foreign investment, and
economic and social development); Weissman, supra note 29, at 1086, 1121-24 (for-
eign investment and economic and social development).
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tential costs. Similarly, foreign investment rises as licenses are
granted, production facilities are financed, joint ventures are cre-
ated, and workers are hired and trained.
In addition to spurring an infusion of foreign-based technology
and capital, IPR protection would theoretically encourage more
domestic innovation and internal development. Potential innova-
tors, as well as those capable of commercializing those innovations,
would tend to increase their domestic activities if their government
provided an adequate reward system. Domestic risk capital would
be enhanced, facilities would be constructed, skilled workers and
scientists would be domestically retained (and could build upon
protected technology transfer),246 and more products would be
produced that were aimed specifically at local needs.247 Wealth
creation and the provision of new or improved products would ac-
crue to the benefit of society as a whole.
Unfortunately, many poor nations lack the financial, educa-
tional, physical, and human infrastructure that is necessary to
transform these theories into reality.248 A substantial amount of
domestic risk capital, for example, will not be forthcoming when it
simply does not exist. As a result, the benefits envisioned by the
TRIPS Agreement will vary dramatically from country to country.
These variations will reflect different levels of domestic education
and expertise, available natural and capital resources, and adminis-
trative and judicial capabilities. They will also reflect historical re-
lationships with industrialized nations, the general attractiveness
of the domestic market, the immediacy of societal needs, and the
cultural propensity to employ creative mechanisms for interpreting
the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement in terms of domestic agen-
246 See Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development,
supra note 29, at 390 (" [Ilf developing countries do not adopt high levels of [intel-
lectual property rights protection], their scientists and other innovators will leave
because they will not be adequately rewarded for their innovation .... ); Sher-
wood, supra note 216, at 504 (discussing how better IPR protection can lead com-
panies to invest in employee skills improvements).
247 See Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 344 (describing how low protection ar-
guably leads to an under-supply of goods and services tailored to local needs).
248 See Henderson, supra note 178, at 654 (discussing the different circum-
stances between developing countries and developed countries while still in de-
velopment); Oddi, supra note 29, at 459 (arguing that developing countries need
technology transfer to benefit from the TRIPS Agreement); Weissman, supra note
29, at 1122-24 (supporting the notion that developing countries may not have the
domestic capability to undertake research and development to solve local prob-
lems).
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das.249 With such variations in mind, it has been argued that there
is in fact no dispositive evidence that the Agreement will result in
increased economic development, increased domestic R&D and
innovation, or increased foreign investment in poorer nations.
250
As a result, any attempt to apply universal truths in such a diverse
global environment must be subject to considerable scrutiny.
3.2.3. Placing Patent Protection in Perspective
The need to preserve a viable and increasingly innovative
pharmaceutical industry and the need to effectively respond to the
growing HIV/AIDS epidemic and other global public health con-
cerns are in the process of colliding. In light of the duties that na-
tions owe to their citizens and to other nations, however, such a
collision serves as an opportunity to pursue a new approach to in-
ternational relations based upon an inevitable progression toward
a global constitutionalization of human rights.
The existence of such a collision should not be interpreted as an
allegation that the HIV/AIDS crisis is a consequence of intellectual
property protection. The fact that AIDS drugs are proprietary
should not be equated (as a truism) with their lack of accessibility.
In a controversial study conducted by Attaran and Gillespie-White,
for example, the patent status of fifteen antiretroviral drugs in fifty-
three African nations (yielding 795 data points) was examined. 251
With the exception of South Africa (where a comparatively large
number of antiretrovirals were patented), the authors found that
these drugs were patented in few African countries and that in
countries where patents did exist only a small subset of antiretrovi-
249 See, e.g., Abbott, The IATO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Develop-
ment, supra note 29, at 391-93 (explaining that while there are economic advan-
tages to the TRIPS Agreement, there remains considerable uncertainty as to the
extent of those advantages); Sherwood, supra note 216, at 493-511 (discussing the
benefits and costs of TRIPS Agreement compliance for developing countries at the
macroeconomic level).
25 See Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development,
supra note 29, at 390-91 (citing a U.N. study that found no correlation between
high levels of IPR protection and foreign investment); Corbett, supra note 152, at
1093 (discussing the theory that IPR protection spurs development); Harmon, su-
pra note 164, at 7 (discussing IPR protection taking priorities over social issues);
Weissman, supra note 29, at 1122-23 (citing a study by J. Davidson Frame which
found that countries with low IPR protection have larger scientific and techno-
logical capacities than other developing countries).
251 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 32.
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rals were protected.252 Of 795 possible instances of patent protec-
tion, only 172 (21.6%) actually existed. 253 Additionally, geographic
patent coverage did not appear to correlate with access to antiret-
roviral treatment and no evidence was identified that treatment
was more accessible in countries with few or no antiretroviral pat-
ents.254 Both brand name and generic sources of drugs were avail-
able at substantially reduced prices -generally 90% less than those
sold in the United States.255 As a result, it was suggested that pat-
ent protection for antiretroviral drugs in Africa was not extensive
and was not a major barrier to access.256 Instead, such a barrier
may be found in the "extreme dearth of international aid fi-
nance."257
Critics have argued that the study ignores the basic fact that
prices have been reduced as a result of the three-year battle over
the costs of antiretrovirals, that the drugs most aggressively pat-
ented are those made by generic manufacturers in India, and that
most patents have been taken out in the richer African countries or
those in which Indian companies have offices.258 Additionally, the
authors of the study recognize that their results should not be in-
terpreted to mean that patents never affect access to medicines in
general, nor should the results be used to reach any conclusions
regarding the patenting of future antiretroviral drugs.259
More importantly, the ability to acquire access to new life-
252 Id. at 1886-88.
253 Id. at 1887.
254 Id. at 1889-90.
255 Id. at 1891. Additionally, "[w]hile patents do limit the use of some highly
active antiretroviral therapy regimens . . . the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services ("DHHS") clinical guidelines list several 'strongly recom-
mended' regimens for which there are encouraging clinical trials and which are
unpatented in up to 52 of 53 African countries." Id. at 1887. For a listing of anti-
infective and antiretroviral drugs, their patent owner, expiration dates, etc., see
BOULET, supra note 202, at 11-16.
256 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 32, at 1886-87; see also Attaran & Gil-
lespie-White, supra note 32, at 1890 ("[lit is doubtful that patents are to blame for
the lack of access to antiretroviral drug treatment in most African countries.").
257 Id. at 1891.
258 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Patents or Poverty? New Debate Over Lack of AIDS
Care in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at A6.
259 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 32, at 1890 (discussing access to
medicines); id. at 1889 (stating that "current antiretroviral drugs will remain
largely unpatented in Africa," but that future antiretroviral drugs "may be an-
other matter").
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saving drugs may be altered dramatically in 2005. While the Dec-
laration on TRIPS granted least-developed countries an extended
transition period for pharmaceutical products (until January 1,
2016), such an extension may prove to be of questionable value
since the major generic suppliers must comply with the TRIPS
Agreement a decade earlier. Perhaps the new TRIPS Council Deci-
sion regarding the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declara-
tion on TRIPS -which is designed to make it easier for poor coun-
tries lacking domestic capacity to import cheaper generic drugs by
means of allowing producing countries to export generic copies to
eligible nations under compulsory licenses 260 - will partially allevi-
ate the problem of future access. As will be discussed in Section 4,
this decision is not without problems of its own.
It is undeniable that the HIV/AIDS crisis is linked to a wide
variety of economic, social, cultural, and political factors that have
developed, at least in some cases, over the course of centuries. As
discussed earlier,261 the existence of poverty, the lack of empower-
ment of women, and the imposition of stigma have, among other
factors, all contributed to the spread of the disease. Attempts at
treatment are not only hampered by the cost of antiretrovirals
(even when sold at substantially discounted prices), but by the lack
of a medical and physical infrastructure, unfavorable regulatory
environments, inadequate capacity for monitoring and regime-
setting, nonexistent distribution and delivery systems, an absence
of political will, and a scarcity of international funding.262 Adding
to these difficulties is the fact that a substantial portion of the drugs
in developing countries may be counterfeit. 263 The fact that these
drugs may be contaminated, mislabeled, or lacking in essential ac-
260 See WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Decla-
ration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doc. No. 03-4582 WT/L/540 (Sept.
2, 2003) [hereinafter Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on TRIPS] (set-
ting forth the guidelines by which Members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could make effective use of compulsory
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement).
261 See supra notes 32-99 and accompanying text (discussing a variety of fac-
tors that have impeded HIV/AIDS prevention efforts).
262 See Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 32, at 1886, 1890 (analyzing the
theory that patents are to blame for keeping drugs inaccessible); see also PhRMA
Profile, supra note 203, at 36 (disputing patent theory by pointing to poverty and
other conditions within impoverished nations).
263 PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 38 (citing World Health Organization,
Counterfeit Drugs: Fact Sheet (Geneva: WHO, May 2000)).
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tive ingredients not only undermines patient confidence in the in-
tegrity of medicines, but also encourages the development of drug-
resistant strains.264
As a result, rational solutions to the HIV/AIDS crisis cannot be
based on attempts to blame pharmaceutical companies. Not only
would such an approach be simplistic, it would fail to encourage a
progressive global constitutionalism in the area of public health
that can be spawned by the HIV/AIDS crisis. An accurate under-
standing of the crisis should include a recognition that the phar-
maceutical industry has in fact taken steps to make their medicines
more available in poor countries. Whether based on altruism or
substantial public pressure, companies have provided AIDS drugs
to these nations at severely discounted prices and, at least in a
number of instances, at prices that are at or below their costs. 265
Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Abbot, for example, have low-
ered their prices for antiretrovirals to levels that are at their stated
costs of production and distribution,266 and Videx and Zerit have
been offered to African countries at 93% below their North Ameri-
can price. 267  GlaxoSmithKline and Boeringer Ingelheim have
agreed to allow more generic versions of their patented AIDS
drugs to be produced in South Africa and other Sub-Saharan na-
tions, and Glaxo has agreed not only to cap its royalty fees, but to
allow generic licensees to export these drugs to forty-seven other
poor nations.268 Similarly, Merck has indicated that it would cut
the price of its once-a-day AIDS pill, Stocrin, in the most severely
affected nations, resulting in a price that is actually lower than a
number of generics. 269 Boeringer Ingelheim has also offered to
supply Nevirapine (which significantly reduces MTCT) free of
charge to the public health authorities in South Africa for five
years.270 Additionally, the industry as a whole has been involved
264 Id. at 37-39.
265 Id. at 7, 36.
266 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 32, at 1891.
267 Geoff Winestock, Bristol-Myers Says AIDS Drugs Ran Out in Kenya, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 11, 2002, at D8.
268 Julia Flynn & Mark Schoofs, supra note 61, at D4. In regard to price cut-
ting, see Rachel Zimmerman & Mark Schoofs, Merck to Cut Cost of AIDS Drug In
Poorest Nations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2002, at A2.
269 Zimmerman & Schoofs, supra note 268, at A2.
270 See Treatment Action Campaign v. Minister of Health, 2002 (4) BCLR 356,
360 (T) (S. Afr.) (ruling that respondents were to make Nevirapine available).
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in such undertakings as the Academic Alliance for AIDS Care and
Prevention in Africa, as well as a variety of programs designed to
enhance community outreach, education, and research. It has also
donated antiretroviral medicines (as well as millions of dollars) for
work with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in Botswana.
271
Despite these efforts, and irrespective of the motives upon
which they may be based, the economic, social, political, and infra-
structural problems surrounding the HIV/AIDS crisis will remain.
Even if patented or generic drugs were to be made consistently
available at slightly over cost (and then added to the costs of medi-
cal personnel, distribution, monitoring, testing, and education), ef-
fective prevention and treatment would still be beyond reach in
many nations. In some African countries, for example, annual
health budgets have been as meager as $8 or less per person.
272
Additionally, while differential pricing will certainly play an im-
portant role in combating the AIDS epidemic, it is a mechanism
that is burdened with its own set of complexities. Questions will
persist regarding the most effective means for market segmenta-
tion, the manner in which differential prices should be determined,
the role to be played by competition law and the effects of con-
straints imposed by international agreements. Questions will also
remain regarding the political ramifications resulting from sub-
stantial price differentials between poor and more affluent nations
and the manner in which middle-income developing countries (as
well as wealthy citizens within poor countries) will be treated.
273
Further, if higher prices in one set of nations are used to subsidize
lower prices in others, the need to ensure the rights of the poor liv-
ing in wealthier nations will become even more critical.
Issues will also persist regarding the effect of intellectual prop-
271 PHRMA PROFILE, supra note 203, at 7. Additionally, former President Bill
Clinton's foundation recently reached an agreement with five leading medical
companies to cut the price of two critical HIV diagnostic tests. Mark Schoofs, HIV
Test Makers Agree to Discounts for Poorer Nations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2004, at B1.
272 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 32, at 1891 ("Countries such as
Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania have annual national health budgets of $8 or less
per capita." (referring to Amir Attaran & Jeffrey Sachs, Defining and Refining Inter-
national Donor Support for Combating the AIDS Pandemic, 357 LANCET 57, 57-61
(2001)).
273 World Trade Organization, Final Report Released of WHO-WTO Secretariat's
Workshop on Drug Pricing (May 30, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news -e/news01_e/drug-workshopifinrep_29mayOle.htm (last visited
Sept. 23, 2004).
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erty protection on pharmaceutical prices in general, whether those
pharmaceuticals are directed at HIV/AIDS or other diseases that
will infect the poor in years to come. While acknowledging the
importance of intellectual property protection, the Declaration on
TRIPS specifically recognized substantial concerns regarding its ef-
fects on prices, 274 and simple logic supports the proposition that
monopoly power tends to raise pharmaceutical prices while com-
petition from generics produces the opposite effect.275 As a result,
while this Article will not attempt to decipher the motives behind
current price reductions, it should be noted that generic drugs are
in fact available from suppliers in India and Brazil at similar price
levels. If the charitable actions taken by the pharmaceutical com-
panies reflect nothing more than the realities of generic competi-
tion, substantial concern must be expressed regarding the indus-
try's stance in the event of a dramatic erosion in generic supply.
As developing countries exhaust their transition periods and begin
to implement patent protection for pharmaceutical products (in-
cluding those in the mailbox pipeline),27 6 the incentive to lower
prices on patented drugs, at least from a business perspective, will
be correspondingly reduced.
The position of this Article is that even when the TRIPS
Agreement is fully implemented, substantial downward pressure
on prices can continue to exist if nations actually fulfill their do-
mestic and international obligations. As will be argued, all con-
suming nations have the duty (and all producing nations have the
right) to exercise the substantial flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement
to ensure the progressive realization of the right to the highest at-
tainable standard of health. Anything less would represent a viola-
tion of both domestic and international law. Such a model,
whether directed at the current AIDS crisis or at future public
health concerns, will therefore view the conflict between intellec-
tual property protection and the right to health not as an obstacle,
but as a mechanism for stimulating a new international relations
274 Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 28, para. 3.
275 See COMPULSORY LICENSING, supra note 29, at 9, 16-17 (describing how
compulsory licensing can reduce the adverse effects that patents have on price
and availability).
276 See id. at 9 ("The decrease will accelerate when on January 1, 2005, devel-
oping countries are required to implement pharmaceutical product patent protec-
tion, and grant patents as appropriate to pharmaceuticals in the mailbox pipe-
line.").
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paradigm.
4. THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
4.1. Objectives and Principles
Subject to a variety of transition periods, members of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") have the duty to implement the
TRIPS Agreement and adhere to its mandates. Such a duty is in no
way synonymous with a guarantee to protect all intellectual prop-
erty or to honor all notions of patent-holder rights. Because the
Agreement contains a number of both limited and broad-based ex-
ceptions, as well as a variety of subjective provisions that are open
to differing interpretations, a nation's promise to be bound by the
Agreement cannot be equated with a promise to enforce Western
approaches to intellectual property rights. As a result, it can be ar-
gued that intellectual property protection (at least the form ex-
pressed in the TRIPS Agreement) and the provision of greater ac-
cess to pharmaceuticals need not conflict as a matter of law.
Individuals affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, for example, need
not ask their governments to 'breach' the TRIPS Agreement. Such
individuals must merely demand that their governments exercise
the flexibility contained therein.
The TRIPS Agreement specifically recognizes the "special
needs" of less developed countries in regard to maximum flexibil-
ity in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations.277 As
will be argued shortly, the Agreement provides substantial flexibil-
ity in such areas as compulsory licensing, exhaustion, public
health, patentability, the use of limited exceptions, the protection of
essential security interests, and the interpretation of such terms as
'abuse' and 'unreasonable.' It is within such a light that develop-
ing countries have argued that Members must have the right to
formulate and implement their own public health policies and to
implement the TRIPS Agreement "in ways that best accommodate"
those policies.278 The Agreement should not be used to undermine
this discretion and patent protection should not be viewed as
paramount to fundamental public health needs.279 After all, the in-
277 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, pmbl.
278 Developing Country Group's Paper, supra note 29, para. 38.
279 Id. paras. 2, 3, 15.
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corporation of this "room to manoeuvre" served to accommodate
the different positions of the WTO Membership at the time of. the
original negotiations. 280
Such an approach was apparently endorsed at the WTO Minis-
terial Conference in Doha and later reaffirmed by the TRIPS Coun-
cil Decision regarding the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Declaration on TRIPS. The Ministerial Declaration stressed the
importance of implementing and interpreting the TRIPS Agree-
ment "in a manner supportive of public health" 281 and reiterated
the fact that "special and differential treatment" for developing
and least-developed countries is "an integral part of the WTO
Agreements." 282 More particularly, in the accompanying Declara-
tion on TRIPS, the Members specifically recognized the gravity of
the current HIV/AIDS epidemic.283 In doing so, the Members reaf-
firmed the fact that the Agreement "does not and should not pre-
vent Members from taking measures to protect public health" and
that the Agreement "should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO Members' right.., to promote access
to medicines for all." 284 The Declaration also reaffirmed the right
of each Member "to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose,"285 includ-
ing the right to grant compulsory licenses and to determine the
grounds upon which they are granted, the right to determine what
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme
urgency (with the understanding that public health crises such as
the HIV/AIDS epidemic have achieved such a status), and the
right to establish individual regimes for the exhaustion of intellec-
tual property rights without challenge.
286
The Declaration on TRIPS also recognized that each provision
of the TRIPS Agreement must be interpreted in light of the Agree-
ment's objectives and principles28 7 as is mandated by Article 31 of
280 Id. para. 5.
281 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 202, para. 17.
282 Id. para. 44; see also id. para. 50 (noting several WTO provisions that offer
special treatment for developing and less-developed countries).
283 Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 28, para. 1.
284 Id. para. 4.
285 Id.
286 Id. para. 5.
287 Id. para. 5(a).
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 288 The objectives of
the TRIPS Agreement, as outlined in Article 7, reflect far more than
merely the protection of intellectual property rights. Instead, Arti-
cle 7 speaks in terms of protecting intellectual property in a way
that creates a "mutual advantage" for producers and consumers,
that establishes a "balance of rights and obligations" and that is
applied "in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare."289
As a result, developing countries have taken the position that intel-
lectual property rights "do not exist in a vacuum,"290 and when
pharmaceutical patents "are not exercised in a way that meets the
objectives of Article 7," nations may take measures (such as the
granting of compulsory licenses) to ensure that those objectives are
achieved.291
In light of the fact that many nations are not in a position to de-
velop their own patented products or even take advantage of po-
tential technology transfer, it can be argued that only one side of
the TRIPS bargain (namely the protection of intellectual property
for patent producers) is being met. If the objectives of balancing
rights and obligations and of creating mutual advantages among
nations are not being fulfilled, one may question whether develop-
ing countries actually remain bound by the terms of the Agree-
ment.292 Similarly, the economic and social destruction resulting
from the HIV/AIDS epidemic should also be placed within the
context of the TRIPS Agreement's objectives. Setting aside non-
patent variables such as distributional and infrastructural prob-
lems, it can be argued that any patent-induced price increase or
any patent-induced impediment to access would run contrary to
288 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, para. 1,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
289 Article 7 reads:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the trans-
fer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of produc-
ers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 7.
290 Developing Country Group's Paper, supra note 29, para. 18.
291 Id. para. 19.
292 See ACCESS TO MEDICINES, supra note 29, at 24 ("Developing Members
might choose to challenge the continued enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement or
specific provisions on grounds that it is not meeting its stated objectives.").
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the economic and social welfare objective of Article 7. As a result,
all provisions of the TRIPS Agreement must be viewed in terms of
a bargained-for exchange, and the protection of intellectual prop-
erty must be seen not merely as a static set of rules, but as a man-
dated "process" ultimately leading to a series of mandated bene-
fits.
The principles of the TRIPS Agreement are established in Arti-
cle 8, which states that "Members may, in formulating or amend-
ing their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technologi-
cal development, provided that such measures are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement." 293 Several brief comments can
be made in regard to the selection of this language.
First, this provision actually provides two separate grounds
upon which measures may be taken to combat the HIV/AIDS cri-
sis. In addition to condoning measures that are adopted for the
protection of "public health," Article 8 again recognizes the fact
that the TRIPS Agreement has a strong socio-economic/develop-
mental component. The effects of the AIDS crisis on the labor mar-
ket, the training and retention of employees, the cost of doing
business, the level of both productivity and consumer demand, the
production and availability of adequate food supplies, and the in-
ternational competitiveness of domestic industries could easily
support the imposition of measures designed to promote the pub-
lic interest in a variety of vital industrial and farming sectors.
Second, the use of the term "necessary," as opposed to the lan-
guage "it considers necessary" employed in the Article 73 security
exception, would seem to indicate that the imposition of these
measures are not within the absolute discretion of the invoking
Member, but are instead subject to potential WTO review in regard
to their validity. In light of both the Declaration on TRIPS and the
TRIPS Council Decision it would appear that substantial latitude
would be granted to a Member in the midst of a health crisis.
Finally, it can be argued that the phrase "provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of the Agreement" is
substantially more restrictive than the General Exceptions found in
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") 1994, which allows measures that would otherwise be
293 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 8.1.
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inconsistent with the GATT Agreement. 294 It should be remem-
bered, however, that Article 8 was not meant to be an exception
but rather a guiding principle upon which all other provisions of
the Agreement must be read. Additionally, it is the position of this
Article that the flexibility provided by Articles 27, 30, 31, and 73 al-
low nations to take public health and developmental measures
pursuant to Article 8 that are in fact absolutely consistent with the
Agreement.
Article 8 also allows nations to take measures, provided they
are consistent with the Agreement, to prevent the "abuse" of intel-
lectual property rights or to prevent practices that "unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of tech-
nology."295 It would be pretentious to assume that such terms as
"abuse," "unreasonable restraints on trade," and "adversely affect"
have acquired some sort of universal definition or that some global
truism has been discovered in their regard. Instead, these terms
reflect a substantial subjectivity that can easily accommodate a va-
riety of differing cultural and economic approaches to their inter-
pretation. The developing countries, for example, have indicated
that an "abuse" of intellectual property rights could include the
charging of excessively high prices for patented pharmaceuticals,
the selling of pharmaceuticals at prices beyond "reasonable" profit
margins, or the failure to offer products in quantities sufficient to
meet market demand.296
Similarly, the interpretation and enforcement of antitrust law in
general will continue to be dynamic. While these laws adapt to
changes in economic thinking, they also respond to changes in the
needs of society and they traditionally reflect particular stages of
economic development. Concepts such as market power, the rule
of reason, the importance of efficiencies, the relative unimportance
of vertical activity, and the existence and effect of strategic behav-
ior have been dramatically altered over the years as antitrust en-
forcers changed their focus from producer to consumer welfare. In
the absence of a global antitrust code, poorer nations will therefore
be free to develop their own views toward the "abuse" of intellec-
294 For a discussion in this regard, see COMPULSORY LICENSING, supra note 29,
at 51 (discussing changes to Article 8.1 to enhance the consistency of safeguard
clauses); ACCESS TO MEDICINES, supra note 29, at 24-25 (calling for changes in the
context of a longer term review of the TRIPS Agreement).
295 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 8.2.
296 Developing Country Group's Paper, supra note 29, para. 23.
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tual property rights, the "abuse" of market power, the "unreason-
ableness" of particular trade restraints, and the relationship be-
tween the use of traditional knowledge and the duty of technology
transfer.
4.2. Patentable Subject Matter
Article 27 provides that "patents shall be available for any in-
ventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are ca-
pable of industrial application." 297 While this article substantially
broadens the scope of patentable subject matter-and arguably re-
flects both a "natural rights" approach and a "western standard" of
patentability 298 -considerable room for flexibility nevertheless re-
mains. As Frederick M. Abbott has noted, Article 27 only estab-
lishes general rules regarding the criteria to be applied when judg-
ing patentability, and these criteria can be interpreted flexibly in
order to limit the number of pharmaceutical patents that must be
granted.299 As a result, developing nations can administer their
patent systems "in a manner suited to their specific interests"
300
and could, for example, require that patents be granted only for
new drugs that represent "breakthrough" developments rather
than mere lower level improvements.301
Similarly, Professor Ruth L. Gana has highlighted the fact that
developing countries have no body of jurisprudence and no ad-
ministrative or judicial history that provides actual content to
terms such as 'new,' 'inventive step,' or 'industrial application.' 302
The lack of a universal rule regarding 'novelty,' as well as the exis-
tence of issues surrounding the relationship between 'new' and
'traditional knowledge' and between 'non-obviousness' and more
'trivial' inventions303 provide the opportunity for developing coun-
tries to define the content of the standards imposed by Article 27
297 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 27.1.
298 Oddi, supra note 29, at 434-37, 440 (discussing natural rights philosophy);
Id. at 465 ("Article 27... imposes a Western standard for patentability.").
299 ACCESS TO MEDICINES, supra note 29, at 25.
300 Id. at 26.
301 Id.
302 Gana, supra note 173, at 748.
303 Id. at 749-50.
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and to develop a jurisprudence that benefits their own societies.30 4
In short, the TRIPS Agreement imposes a set of minimum intellec-
tual property standards, but it does not impose the judicial history
of the western world.
While not without limitation, Article 27 also provides for a
public health exclusion. Nations are allowed to exclude from pat-
entability "inventions, the prevention within their territory of the
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre pub-
lic or morality, including to protect human, animal, or plant life or
health .. ."305 The use of such language, at least according to S. K.
Verma, transforms health-related concerns into "moral and public
order issues" (to be judged by local patent officials) and thus in-
corporates "overriding social, ethical, and moral considerations"
into the "patent regime."306 Additionally, ordre public and morality
are imprecise terms to say the least, and neither the TRIPS Agree-
ment nor international usage provide adequate definitions in re-
gard to their application.307 As a result, Article 27.2 arguably per-
mits a nation to deny patent protection to one or more
pharmaceutical products if there is a legitimate health reason to
prevent their commercial exploitation within that nation.308
As both Weissman and Ackermann correctly point out, the de-
nial of patentability must be accompanied by the denial of any
commercial exploitation of the invention within that country. 309
Domestic corporations would not be allowed to produce generic
drugs for profit or to engage in profit making compulsory licensing
schemes since both of those strategies would represent commercial
exploitation.310 On the other hand, a credible argument can be
304 Id. at 757.
305 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 27.2.
306 Verma, supra note 187, at 281.
307 See Ackerman, supra note 29, at 491, 494, 497 (noting the lack of specificity
of the terms used in the TRIPS Agreement).
308 See Weissman, supra note 29, at 1099-1100 (noting that the term "commer-
cial" usually refers to a for-profit sale).
309 Id. at 1100 ("[Article 27.21 requires the denial of patentability to be linked
to a denial of commercial exploitation of the invention."); Ackermann, supra note
29, at 496 (explaining that if a "state must exclude the invention from patentability
in order to prevent commercial exploitation, then the state may do so" to protect
the ordre public or morality).
310 Weissmann, supra note 29, at 1100; see also Ackermann, supra note 29, at
508-09 (noting that if a country excludes an area of technology from patentability
then domestic for-profit operations in that area amount to commercial exploita-
tion).
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made that a country, after denying patentability, could neverthe-
less produce and distribute the product non-commercially through
either a state-owned enterprise or private non-profit manufac-
turer. 31' Such an action, while certainly constituting an exploita-
tion, would not constitute a 'commercial' exploitation of the inven-
tion.312  As a result, if a nation takes the position that the
prevention and treatment of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is necessary
to protect the ordre public, the TRIPS Agreement would apparently
allow that nation to deny patent protection to relevant pharmaceu-
ticals and then distribute those products, assuming they are attain-
able, on a non-profit, non-commercial basis.313 Since there could be
no discrimination between the rights of foreign and domestic pro-
ducers, as neither would be allowed to engage in commercial ex-
ploitation, such a strategy would appear consistent with the terms
of the TRIPS Agreement.
Finally, it can be queried whether the 'necessary' and 'least-
trade restrictive' tests would be applied to Article 27.314 In address-
ing this issue, Weissman correctly observes that the jurisprudence
surrounding Article XX of GATT 1994 would arguably not apply to
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement since the latter is one of the
"core provisions" of the Agreement and "part of the very defini-
tion of patentable subject matter."315 Article XX, in contrast, pro-
vides a series of limited and conditional exceptions to the Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO
Agreement") (allowing measures that would otherwise be incon-
sistent with that Agreement) and should therefore be viewed -
along with the criteria employed for its application - in an entirely
different context.316 Additionally, the mere reviewability of an ex-
311 Weissmann, supra note 29, at 1100-01.
312 Ackermann, supra note 29, at 509 (defining non-profit sales as not consti-
tuting commercial exploitation); see also Weissman, supra note 29, at 1101 (explain-
ing that a nation may adopt a policy of domestic, non-commercial exploitation).
313 See Ackermann, supra note 29, at 509 (describing how non-profit sales do
not constitute commercial exploitation).
314 For a discussion of this matter, see id. at 507-08 (discussing the GATF in-
terpretation of the term "necessary"). See also Weissman, supra note 29, at 1101-07
(discussing the "necessary" and "least-trade-restrictive" tests).
315 Weissman, supra note 29, at 1107.
316 See id. Weissman notes that "the term 'necessary' in Article 27 should not
be given the intrusive interpretation it has been in Article XX GATT Panel deci-
sions. A less stringent reading of 'necessary'- something closer to important, and
with little or no attention to available alternatives- is more appropriate in this
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ercise of Article 27.2 rights should never be equated with the inva-
lidity of a measure. In light of the national emergencies being cre-
ated by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and in light of the lack of funds
available to purchase patented pharmaceuticals, GATT Panels
would be hard pressed to deny any concept of necessity. Unless
pharmaceuticals are supplied at the lowest conceivable price, any
measure designed to acquire those products more cheaply would
appear to be justified.
4.3. Exceptions
In addition to the flexibility inherent in the subjective language
of Articles 7, 8, and 27, the TRIPS Agreement also provides more
formal exceptions under Articles 30, 31, and 73. In light of the fact
that other authors have addressed the limited exceptions found in
Article 30 and the compulsory licensing exception found in Article
31, this Section will only briefly outline those provisions. After do-
ing so, attention will be turned to the security exception, which, al-
though fundamentally universal in nature, has been substantially
overlooked.
4.3.1. The Limited Exceptions
Article 30 allows members to "provide limited exceptions to
the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such ex-
ceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate inter-
ests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests
of third parties." This Article does not restrict the purposes for
which a nation may establish such an exception 317 and it may re-
flect the compromise318 that resulted from the inability of negotia-
tors to agree on a more specific list of exceptions. It provides abso-
lutely no guidance regarding the meaning of limited exceptions,
unreasonable conflict or prejudice, normal exploitation, legitimate
interests, or even the nature or scope of third parties. It also fails to
address either the procedures to be employed when granting an
exception or the issue of remuneration.
319
context." Id.
317 Id. at 1108.
318 COMPULSORY LICENSING, supra note 29, at 41.
319 Id. at 36.
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As a result, Weissman has argued that Article 30 represents a
balancing process between the rights of patent holders and third
parties, including those citizens of the Third World, that specifi-
cally allows for the prejudicing, although not the unreasonable
prejudicing, of patent holder rights.320 Such a balancing process, of
course, is inherently subjective and incapable of precise boundary.
In the Canadian Pharmaceuticals case,321 for example, the WTO Panel
refused to equate the "legitimate interests" of third parties with
their mere "legal interests." 322  Instead, "legitimate interests"
would be defined as "a normative claim calling for protection of
interests that are 'justifiable' in the sense that they are supported
by relevant public policies or other social norms."323 By clearly dif-
ferentiating between "legal" and "legitimate" interests, the Panel
provided substantial room for the consideration of economic, so-
cial, political, and security concerns. As a result, as the HIV/AIDS
crisis continues to reach pandemic proportions, it is certainly argu-
able that a limited exception has become considerably more justifi-
able.
The use of the term "normal exploitation" also provides sub-
stantial flexibility for the development of responsive health poli-
cies. This language generally refers to the commercial activity by
which patent holders "extract economic value from their patent."324
If poor nations are not in a position to be consumers of high-priced
patented pharmaceutical products, one may question the economic
value that such markets possess. If sales in these markets are in-
deed negligible, minimal economic value would be lost (assuming
there was no diversion of these products to wealthier nations) if
generic producers were to supply low-cost alternatives.325
Similarly, the relationship between the non-discrimination
clause of Article 27.1 and the ability to grant limited exceptions
under Article 30 is far from transparent. While recognizing that
320 Weissman, supra note 29, at 1110-11 (arguing that the third limitation in
Article 30 calls for a balancing process).
321 WTO Panel Report on Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Prod-
ucts, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canadian Pharmaceuticals],
available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2004).
322 Id. paras. 7.68-7.73.
323 Id. para. 7.69.
324 Id. para. 7.54.
325 See COMPULSORY LICENSING, supra note 29, at 38, 45 (questioning the logic
of wealthy nations wanting to preserve their patents while not profiting globally).
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Article 30's very existence indicates that patent rights "would need
certain adjustments," 326 the Panel in Canadian Pharmaceuticals noted
that Article 30 was not designed to bring about a renegotiation of
the basic balance of the TRIPS Agreement. 327 As a result, the Panel
held that the "limited" exception should be more narrowly de-
fined, that it should not be used as a substantial curtailment of ex-
clusionary rights, and that it should be subject to the "field of tech-
nology" anti-discrimination requirement of Article 27.1.328 More
particularly, an Article 30 exception cannot be made 'limited' by
simply 'limiting' it to one field of technology since Article 30 ex-
ceptions must not discriminate as to the field of technology.
329
The Panel went on to note that "it is not true that Article 27 re-
quires all Article 30 exceptions to be applied to all products" and
"does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that
may exist only in certain product areas." 330 Even if Article 30
would not allow a limited exception to be directed at the entire
pharmaceutical industry (a position that is still open to substantial
doubt),331 it can be argued that an exception could be made for
those particular pharmaceuticals aimed at the prevention and
treatment of HIV/AIDS. The apparent distinction between a 'field
of technology' and a 'certain product area' would justify the impo-
sition of such an exception.
Whether based upon its subjectivity or the mere confusion to
which it gives rise, Article 30 may provide a substantial means for
delivering low-cost generic pharmaceuticals. Medicines Sans Fron-
tieres (along with a variety of other organizations) have suggested,
for example, that Article 30 be interpreted to allow Members to
provide an exception to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent
326 Canadian Pharmaceutical, supra note 321, para. 7.26.
327 Id.
328 Id. paras. 7.30-7.36, 7.44, 7.91, 7.93.
329 Id. paras. 7.92-7.93.
330 Id. para. 7.92.
331 See, e.g., ACCESS TO MEDICINES, supra note 29, at 23 ("A developing Member
might therefore adopt regulatory measures affecting pharmaceutical patents that
do not also affect software patents if there is a sound basis for the differential
treatment .... [T]he express text of Article 30 does not indicate that it is limited
by Article 27:1 .... [Tihe panel's decision ... is not entirely persuasive .... De-
veloping Members might consider proposing an interpretation of Article 30 of the
TRIPS Agreement establishing that it is not subject to Article 27:1, since exceptions
allowed by Article 30 are defined to be limited, and limited exceptions may be
addressed to particular fields of technology.").
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that would permit a nation to produce and export patented prod-
ucts to another nation when the product is either not patented, or a
compulsory license has been granted in the importing nation.332 If
such an activity was deemed to be protected by the Article 30 ex-
ception, there would be no patent infringement by the exporting
country and thus no need for that country to acquire patent-holder
permission or render compensation. 333 The patent owner would
receive compensation in the country where the products were con-
sumed, but only if patent protection had been acquired in that ju-
risdiction.334 Such a strategy would allow poor nations that lack
the resources to engage in local production and have not yet ex-
hausted their transition periods to import necessary medicines at
the lowest possible cost.335
Abbott has similarly argued that Article 30 allows Members to
authorize the production and export of patented pharmaceuticals
(without the consent of the patent owners) to address the neglected
health needs of nations that lack the resources to provide access to
their citizens.336 He suggests that such actions would indeed con-
stitute a limited exception, and that they would not conflict with
normal exploitation if limited to financially constrained nations.
Abbott further suggests that they would not prejudice the legiti-
mate interests of patent holders if not directed at developed mar-
kets and if systematic diversion could be prevented.337 In support
of his argument, Abbott believes that the Ministers, in light of the
Declaration on TRIPS, have "clearly acknowledged that the phar-
maceutical sector may be treated differently than other sectors re-
garding the enjoyment of patent protection." 338
4.3.2. Compulsory Licensing and the Implementation of the
Declaration on TRIPS
Since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, one of the most
332 Joint Letter, supra note 29 (presenting the author organizations' views on
the exportation of medical technologies under the WTO TRIPS rules for patents).
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 See id. (listing the advantages of the Article 30 approach).
336 COMPULSORY LICENSING, supra note 29, at 5-6.
337 Id. at 5-6; see also id. at 33-45 (analyzing the meaning of "limited excep-
tions").
338 Id. at 50.
[Vol. 25:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss3/1
ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS
contentious issues regarding its interpretation has been the right of
compulsory licensing.339 Subject to the requirements found in Arti-
cle 31 of the Agreement, governments have the right to issue com-
pulsory licenses to allow companies to produce a patented prod-
uct, or to use a patented process, without the permission of the
patent owner. Unfortunately, Article 31(f) provides that such a li-
cense shall be authorized "predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use," thus limit-
ing the amount of the product that can be exported under the li-
cense.340 As a result, less-developed countries that lacked the ac-
tual capacity to manufacture pharmaceuticals domestically were
substantially restricted in their ability to import cheaper generics
from drug-producing nations where pharmaceuticals were under
patent.
In response to Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on TRIPS,341 the
General Council approved a decision immediately prior to the
Ministerial Conference in Cancun that was designed to make it eas-
ier for poor countries that lack domestic capacity to import cheaper
generics produced under compulsory licenses.342 The decision
takes the form of an interim waiver of Article 31(f), to be applicable
until the TRIPS Agreement is formally amended, that allows any
Member country that produces generic copies of patented pharma-
ceuticals under a compulsory license to export these products to
eligible importing countries. 343 According to the accompanying
Statement by the General Council's Chairperson ("Chairperson's
Statement"), such a waiver system should be used "in good faith to
339 For articles dealing with the issue of compulsory licensing, see supra note
29 (dealing with the issue of compulsory licensing).
34o TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 31(f).
341 Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 28, para. 6 ("We recognize that WTO
Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical
sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing un-
der the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expedi-
tious solution to this problem ... ").
342 Press Release, WTO, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap
Drugs, Press/350/Rev.1 (Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release: Final Patent
Obstacle], available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
343 Id.; see also Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on TRIPS, supra
note 260, para. 2 ("The obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f)
shall be waived ...."); id. para. 1(b) (defining an eligible importing Member as
"any least-developed country Member and any other Member that has made a
notification ... of its intention to use the [waiver] system as an importer" (foot-
note omitted)).
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protect public health" and not as an "instrument to pursue indus-
trial or commercial policy objectives." 344
The Decision requires an eligible importing Member to make a
notification to the Council for TRIPS that specifies the names and
expected quantities of the products to be imported and confirms (if
not a "least-developed" country) that the importing Member "has
established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities
in the pharmaceutical sector" for those products.345 The compul-
sory license issued by the exporting Member must indicate that
only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the importing
country will be manufactured under the license and that the en-
tirety of this production will be exported to the eligible Member.346
Additionally, "adequate remuneration" shall be paid in the export-
ing Member to the patent holder taking into account the "economic
value to the importing Member of the use that has been author-
ized." 347 All Members are directed to take reasonable measures to
prevent the re-exportation of the products produced under these
licenses, 348 and to ensure effective legal means for the prevention of
diversion.349
In characterizing the decision to waive Article 31(f) and to al-
low compulsory licenses to be issued for the purpose of exporting
pharmaceuticals, Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi indi-
cated that "[t]his is a historic agreement for the WTO" that allows
poorer nations "to make full use of the flexibilities in the WTO's in-
tellectual property rules in order to deal with the diseases that rav-
age their people."350 Unfortunately, a variety of constituencies
have expressed substantially more skepticism toward this Decision
and have questioned the prospects of its practical application as
well as its ability to spur the provision of low cost generic drugs to
nations in need. 351
344 Press Release, WTO, The General Council Chairperson's Statement (Aug.
30, 2003) [hereinafter Chairperson's Statement], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/news03_e/trips stat 28aug03 e.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
345 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 260,
para. 2(a).
346 Id. para. 2(b)(i).
347 Id. para. 3.
348 Id. para. 4.
349 Id. para. 5.
350 Press Release: Final Patent Obstacle, supra note 342, at 1.
351 For comments in such regards, see, e.g., Economics Section, Brazilian Em-
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Such a skepticism is based upon a variety of related concerns.
First, there are doubts regarding whether the Decision will actually
alter current conduct. It is feared that importing nations, despite
the health problems being experienced, will come under external
political pressure to refrain from exercising the system that is pro-
vided in the Decision.352 Similarly, exporting nations will have to
be persuaded to suspend the relevant patent protection and issue a
license to a local company to produce and export the product. Few
exporting governments may be willing to do so if they face the
possibility of retaliation by powerful nations with powerful lob-
bies.3
53
Second, concerns have been raised regarding the Decision's
creation of complicated procedures and bureaucratic obstacles that
may actually frustrate the trade of generic drugs. 354 For example,
bassy in London, TRIPS and Public Health -A Brazilian Perspective: Implementation
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration Regarding TRIPS and Public Health [hereinafter
Brazilian Embassy in London] (expressing concerns about international political
pressure and bureaucratic obstacles to the system), available at http://
www.brazil.org.uk/page.php?cid=1753 (last visited Sept. 7, 2004); WATO Gives Fi-
nal Approval to Cheap Drugs Deal, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 2003 (noting criticism of
the agreement by groups campaigning to give poor people better access to neces-
sary drugs), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-08-30-wto-
drugs x.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004); Africa Action, Africa: Contested Compromise
on Generic Drugs (Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Africa Action] (reporting doubts of
activists in the agreement), at http://www.africaaction.org/docs03/acc0309.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2004); Brook K. Baker, Health GAP, The Incredible Shrinking
Doha Declaration (Aug. 26, 2003) (discussing the efforts of the United States to
minimalize the effect of the Declaration on TRIPS), available at http://
www.africaaction.org/docs03/accO3O9.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004); Cecilia Oh,
The New "Deal" on TRIPS and Drugs: What Does It Mean for Access to Medicines
(providing an analysis of progress and history of the Declaration on TRIPS), avail-
able at http:// www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/cancun/Briefings/02.asp (last vis-
ited Sept. 7, 2004); James Love, CPTech Statement on WTO Deal on Exports of Medi-
cines (Aug. 30, 2003) (commenting on the implementation of paragraph 6 of the
Declaration on TRIPS), available at http://www.africaaction.org/docs03/
acc0309.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004); Oxfam, WTO Patent Rules Will Still Deny
Medicines to the Poor (Aug. 30, 2003) (discussing the great probability that the Dec-
laration on TRIPS will not achieve much progress for those poor countries it seeks
to help), available at http://www.africaaction.org/docs03/acc0309.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 7, 2004).
352 See Brazilian Embassy in London, supra note 351 (addressing concerns ex-
pressed at Doha regarding the Decision's overall effect).
353 See Oxfam, supra note 351 (providing further reasons for the difficulties
poor nations will face in spite of the Decision).
354 See Brazilian Embassy in London, supra note 351 (discussing the opposi-
tion to breaking down patents in other countries); Africa Action, supra note 351
(discussing the financial resources needed from wealthy nations); Oxfam, supra
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some have argued that the government of the exporting country
will be obligated to issue compulsory licenses for each individual
product and will need to provide information to the Council in or-
der to establish the good faith of their transactions.355 Such proce-
dures "could weigh heavily" on potential importers and exporters
and could effectively constitute "hidden barriers to trade."356 Ad-
ditionally, the total costs of producing generic pharmaceuticals will
be raised not only by these "hidden barriers," but by the use of
such "overly stringent" anti-diversion mechanisms as distinguish-
ing size, shape, color, and packaging.35 7
Third, the costs, or the risks, to exporting nations are also ar-
guably increased by some of the uncertainties that surround the
implementation of the Decision. The Decision states that an im-
porter's notification to use the system does not need to be ap-
proved by any WTO body,358 and that Members shall not challenge
any measures taken in conformity with the Decision's waiver pro-
visions under §§ 1(b) or 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994.359 On
the other hand, the Decision does not define such terms as "insuffi-
cient" capacity or "good faith," and the Chairperson's Statement
(regarding the understanding of the Members) indicates that
"[any Member may bring any matter related to the interpretation
or implementation of the Decision ... to the TRIPS Council for ex-
peditious review, with a view to taking appropriate action." 360 As
a result, while the Decision appears to place the initial use of the
system into the discretionary hands of importing nations, the
Chairperson's Statement appears to provide legal recourse to
Members that wish to challenge the legitimacy of that use.361 Such
uncertainty may serve to dampen the willingness of nations to take
note 351 ("But thanks to the intransigence of the [United States] and pharmaceuti-
cal giants, poor countries would still not have the same legal rights to affordable
medicines as industrialized countries.").
355 Brazilian Embassy in London, supra note 351.
356 Id.
357 Baker, supra note 351.
358 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 260, at
2 n.2.
359 Id. para. 10.
360 Chairperson's Statement, supra note 344.
361 See Oh, supra note 351 (discussing the hindering effect of the Chairper-
son's Statement).
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advantage of the waivers being provided.362
Perhaps the most fundamental issue, however, involves the
questionable economic impetus for private companies to produce
and export pharmaceuticals under such a license, given these risks
and uncertainties. As Baker has argued, such an impetus has been
diminished by the Decision and the Chairperson's Statement from
both a "demand" and a "supply" perspective.
363 From the demand
side, twenty-three developed nations have already agreed not to
use the system as importers, ten Eastern European nations have
agreed that they will opt out of the waiver system upon accession
to the European Union, and a number of other nations have agreed
to use the system only in situations of national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency. 364 The result, of course, is to
substantially reduce the potential market for generic drugs and to
exclude markets "with meaningful and stable purchasing
power." 365 From the supply side, Baker notes that increased risks,
uncertainties and costs, as well as both shrinking markets and the
possibility of WTO review, all combine to reduce the incentive of
would-be suppliers. 366 As the potential for profit declines, the will-
ingness to produce tends to evaporate as well. Additionally, Oh
has posited that as a worse case scenario, the Chairperson's indica-
tion that the system cannot be used for "industrial or commercial
policy objectives" could conceivably prevent the use of waivers if
they were "to result in a [sic] expansion of the generic drugs indus-
try or if the generic manufacturers were to make any profit."
367
The implementation of the Decision over time will ultimately
determine whether these concerns are justified. In any event, the
global community will have to address the resource issues that
would accompany the use of this system. Such issues would in-
volve the ability of stricken nations to purchase these generic
drugs, even at discounted prices, the capacity to strictly monitor
362 See id. ("Whilst it is not clear what the legal implications are, it is feared
that these elements would have a 'chill effect' on countries in their use of the Deci-
sion.")
363 Baker, supra note 351.
364 Id.; Chairperson's Statement, supra note 344; Implementation of Paragraph 6
of the Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 260, para. 1(b) n.3 (discussing nations that
have agreed to limit their use of the system).
365 Baker, supra note 351.
366 Id.
367 Oh, supra note 351.
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their use, and the creation of an infrastructure that could effec-
tively administer both prevention and treatment programs.
4.3.3. The Security Exception
Article 73 states that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall
prevent a Member from taking any action "which it considers nec-
essary for the protection of its essential security interests ... taken
in time of war or other emergency in international relations."368 It
also provides that no party shall be prevented from "taking any ac-
tion in pursuance of its obligations under the U.N. Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security." 369 These excep-
tions, which are basically identical to those found in Article XXI of
the GATT Agreement, 70 are 'universal' in nature and thus serve,
when exercised, to relieve a party from virtually all of its substan-
tive obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.3 71
368 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 73(b)(iii).
369 Id. art. 73(c). Article 73 states that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require a Member to furnish any information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent a Member from taking any action which it considers neces-
sary for the protection of its essential security interests;
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they
are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military estab-
lishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international rela-
tions; or
(c) to prevent a Member from taking any action in pursuance of its obli-
gations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security.
370 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XXI [hereinafter GATT]. This agreement was
incorporated into the GATT by way of the WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, para. 1(a).
LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 26, at 17.
371 See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 537-38 (1969)
(detailing three groups of universal exceptions that apply to any GATT obliga-
tion).
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4.3.3.1. The Breadth of the Exception
In order to appreciate the potential breadth of the Article 73 ex-
ception, it is useful to examine the position that has been taken by
intellectual property-generating nations regarding the identical se-
curity exception found in Article XXI of GATT. Article XXI has, in
fact, served as an implicit basis -although generally unspoken and
uncited -for the unilateral imposition of restrictive trade measures
for non-economic purposes. These measures, which have often
been imposed without identifiable standards and without any ac-
countability or effective retaliatory remedy, have reflected nothing
more than a power-based approach to international relations.
372
Actions allegedly taken for security purposes have often been only
tangentially aimed at protecting essential security interests. They
have been primarily directed at the subordination of sovereign
rights and at the coercion of nations in regard to their foreign poli-
cies, their domestic policies, or their established trading relation-
ships.373 Additionally, such actions have often reflected an inten-
tional 'blurring' of a nation's essential security interests with its
foreign/domestic policy agenda.
374
While the "General Exceptions" found in Article XX of GATT
are limited by prohibitions against both arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination and disguised restrictions on trade (and are often
further limited by an additional 'necessary' requirement), many
nations believe that the Article XXI security exception is indeed
quite boundless. Sweden, for example, invoked Article XXI in or-
der to establish a global import system designed to protect its inef-
ficient footwear industry and to give that industry time to remedy
its difficulties.375 In citing increased imports and high domestic
production costs, Sweden indicated that the decrease in domestic
footwear production had become a "critical threat" and that the
maintenance of such a vital industry was indispensable "in case of
372 Cann, supra note 14, at 414.
373 Id. at 440; see also id. at 439-42 (explaining that international actors are ob-
ligated not to interfere in the free decisions of sovereign states, but that "there is
no clear prohibition against the use of economic sanctions for political and ideo-
logical purposes").
374 See id. at 420, 432-35 (explaining the concept of "security-based" economic
coercion and "exploring the blurring of the line"). Also, for a list of citations re-
garding various aspects of Article XXI, see id. at 416 n.10.
375 Sweden - Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, Nov. 17, 1975, GATT
Doc. L/4250 [hereinafter Swedish Footwear].
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war or other emergency in international relations."376 Addition-
ally, nations have invoked Article XXI in response to "risks of po-
litical instability" in a region and its "potentially destabilizing con-
sequences elsewhere,377 in response to "potential" danger arising
out of a threat to the peace,378 and as a show of support to the for-
eign policies of another nation.379
The United States, based upon the argument of protecting its
essential security interests, has chosen to intervene in the affairs of
another State for reasons involving "the domestic policies of that
country, its ideology... or the direction of its foreign policy." 380 It
has also exercised the security interest rationale for the purpose of
encouraging the ouster of one regime and the establishment of an-
other; for the purpose of requiring a transition to a particular po-
litical or economic system or for affecting political realignment;
and for the purpose of coercing other nations into supporting vari-
ous U.S. policies.381 In passing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 ("Helms-Burton Act"),382 the
protection of essential security interests was used to create a civil
cause of action against European and Canadian defendants, to ex-
clude corporate spouses and children from the United States, and
to designate the operation of an unsafe nuclear power plant as an
act of aggression.383 Additionally, the U.S. Trade Expansion Act384
376 Id. para. 4.
377 Trade Measures Taken by the European Community Against the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1, Dec. 2, 1991, GATT Doc. L/6948.
378 WTO, GATr ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 600
(6th ed. 1995) (citing Summary Record of the Twelfth Session 196, Dec. 21, 1961,
GATr Doc. SR. 19/12).
379 For a discussion in these regards, see Cann, supra note 14, at 424-25. See,
e.g., Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-economic Reasons,
May 18, 1982, GATT Doc. L/5319/Rev. 1 (stating that the European community,
Australia, and Canada, in light of the invasion of the Falkland Islands, have taken
certain measures against Argentina on the basis of "their inherent rights" in Arti-
cle XXI).
380 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 109
Uune 27).
381 Cann, supra note 14, at 440 n.188.
382 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity ("LIBERTAD") Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1997)) [hereinafter
Helms-Burton Act].
383 See Cann, supra note 14, at notes 127-35 and accompanying text (describing
the Helms-Burton Act as a means of economic manipulation rather than national
security).
384 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified in
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specifically linked the concept of national security to a variety of
'vital industry' concerns such as the levels of domestic production,
capacity, and growth.385 It also linked security to levels of unem-
ployment and foreign competition, to losses in government reve-
nues, and to the general "economic welfare of the Nation."
386
Finally, Article XXI encompasses substantially more than actual
threats to a nation's security interests. It can also include 'poten-
tial' threats to those interests and, in light of the fact that a nation's
security is dependent (at least in part) upon the security of its al-
lies, both actual and potential threats to the security interests of an-
other nation.
387
4.3.3.2. The Issue of a Self-Defining Nature
This Author has argued elsewhere 88 that the security exception
is not self-defining, that its exercise should be subject to external
review, and that its scope is not without boundaries. Nevertheless,
it is beyond question that most economically powerful nations
have taken the position that security interests are indeed self-
defining and that the 'validity' of an action taken for security rea-
sons is solely within the discretion of the party taking that action.
As a result, motivation becomes irrelevant, justification and ap-
proval become unnecessary, and any foreign interference becomes
absolutely unacceptable. In effect, it is simply "impossible for a na-
tion to violate Article XXI."389
In defending this position, most industrialized countries have
adopted the view that because the GATT Agreement is a 'trade'
agreement (and the World Trade Organization is a 'trade' organi-
zation), matters concerning national security and foreign policy
should not be placed within their reach. Such nations as the
United States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the
European Union have been unified in their belief that the WTO has
no power, competence, or experience to resolve such issues.
390 As a
scattered sections of titles 18 and 19 of the United States Code).
385 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (1994).
386 Id.
387 Cann, supra note 14, at 425, 463-65.
388 See id. at 413-85 (concerning the creation of standards and accountability
for the security exception).
389 Id. at 415-16. For citations to international perspectives on the self-
defining nature of Article XXI, see id. at 416 nn.9, 10.
390 Id. at 417, 430.
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result, it has often been stated that every nation "must have the last
resort"391 or must be the "sole judge" in regard to questions involv-
ing its essential security interests.3 92
Additionally, the distinction between the "necessary" language
often employed in Article XX exceptions 393 and the "it considers
necessary" language used in Article XXI (and in Article 73 of the
TRIPS Agreement) has certainly not been ignored. By employing
the term "necessary" -and by prohibiting arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination and disguised restrictions on trade -Article XX im-
plies that an objective, measurable, and reviewable standard
should be applied to measures taken thereunder. In contrast, Arti-
cles XXI of GATT and 73 of the TRIPS Agreement allow a nation to
take any action that "it considers necessary" to protect its essential
security interests. By doing so, at least according to the industrial-
ized world, the decision to invoke the security exception is both
subjective in nature and within the total discretion of the nation
exercising the exception. As a result, invoking nations have simply
concluded that they are, by definition, 'always right' and economi-
cally powerful States have been allowed to proceed with impu-
nity.
394
4.3.3.3. A Time for Role Reversal
If Article XXI of GATT and Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement
are indeed self-defining, HIV/AIDS-inflicted nations are free to ex-
ercise the security exception with impunity. Even if these articles
were to develop boundaries -and were therefore subject to some
391 Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting 7, GATT Doc. CP.3/
SR.22 (June 8, 1949).
392 Summary Record of the Twelfth Session 196, GATT Doc. SR.19/12 (Dec.
21, 1961).
393 GATT, supra note 370, art. XX(a), (b), (d), (i).
394 Cann, supra note 14, at 416. Despite the very vocal positions expressed by
various nations, the contracting parties have never decided whether Article XXI is
self-defining. See GATT Secretariat, Panel Report on United States - Trade Measures
Affecting Nicaragua, paras. 5.3, 5.17, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986), 1986 WL 363154 (un-
adopted) (questioning how the Contracting Parties can ensure that the general ex-
ception is not "invoked excessively or for purposes other than those set out" if the
contracting party has an exclusive right to interpret Article XXI); Michael J. Hahn,
Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: an Analysis of GATT's Security Exception, 12
MICH. J. INT'L. L. 558, 595 (1991) (stating that the contracting parties have "ex-
pressed neither tacit nor express consent" for the proposition that Article
XXI(b)(iii) "leaves it completely to" the contracting party decide when to act).
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form of external review-their exercise in light of the HIV/AIDS
crisis would be beyond reproach. There is absolutely no question
that this crisis has created a national emergency in a substantial
number of nations. There is also no question that this crisis has
given rise to an "emergency in international relations" under Arti-
cle 73(b)(iii), that it constitutes an 'external' threat to the security of
all nations, and that it threatens "the maintenance of international
peace and security" under Article 73(c). Of equal importance,
however, is the fact that the Article 73 security exception can be in-
voked under these criteria by both HIV/AIDS-infected consuming
nations and by non-infected pharmaceutical-producing nations.
As indicated earlier,395 the HIV/AIDS epidemic is destroying
the social, economic, and political structures of many nations. The
family unit is being torn apart, farming and industrial productivity
is being curtailed, the medical and educational communities are
being attacked, and refugee populations are being created. When
governments cannot provide adequate social services, the legiti-
macy of those governments is questioned, fledgling democracies
are jeopardized, state institutions and the rule of law are weak-
ened, and civil unrest and regional instability result.
396 Each of
these, in turn, threatens economic growth and development, life
expectancy, food security, military defense capabilities, govern-
mental revenues and resources, and the provision of essential ser-
vices. 397 In such a light, the 'security' concerns expressed by the
United States in its Trade Expansion Act-regarding the need to
protect its vital industries and the general economic welfare of the
nation 398-seem absolutely dwarfed by the very real possibility
that entire nations, as well as entire regions, may indeed collapse.
The Declaration on TRIPS stated that every Member "has the
right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency" and it specifically recognized
that public health crises (including the HIV/AIDS epidemic) can,
395 See supra notes 32-48, 88-99 and accompanying text (detailing the devastat-
ing effects of HIV/AIDS and the lack of access to medicine that would help miti-
gate those effects).
396 Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 58.
397 Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3, paras. 8, 68.
398 See supra notes 384-86 and accompanying text (expressing the purpose of
strengthening free international trade and of preventing "communist economic
penetration").
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in fact, constitute such an emergency or circumstance.399 Neverthe-
less, the exercise of the security exception has been traditionally
linked not merely to the existence of a national emergency, but to
the existence of an 'external' threat. As indicated by the discussion
above, the ambiguity surrounding the security exception has re-
sulted in the use of a boundless potpourri of actual and potential
external threats. In light of the fact that the U.N. Security Council
has now formally recognized that the HIV/AIDS epidemic can
pose a threat to both global stability and international security,400
there should be no difficulty -on the part of either a pharmaceuti-
cal-consurning or a pharmaceutical-producing nation-in estab-
lishing the existence of a credible external threat.
A consuming nation that is experiencing a high incidence of
HIV/AIDS infection, for example, could argue that a variety of fac-
tors are either constituting an external threat or are giving rise to a
potential external threat. Certainly the destruction of the social,
economic, political, and military structure of a nation substantially
increases its vulnerability to outside influence. Most dramatic of
these influences, of course, would be a military invasion by a hos-
tile neighbor which could result in a loss of sovereignty or, at a
minimum, an exacerbation of the HIV/AIDS crisis, which gener-
ally accompanies an armed conflict.401 Internal weakness may at-
tract foreign subversives into the country for the purpose of ignit-
ing civil unrest or advocating the overthrow of the government.
Foreign buyers may refuse to enter into purchasing relationships in
light of the uncertainties surrounding production capabilities and
foreign sellers may cut essential supplies in light of an inability to
pay. As foreign investment is withheld and diverted to more sta-
ble markets, a nation's vulnerability is further increased.
Additionally, it can be argued that the HIV/AIDS crisis gener-
ally breeds regional, rather than merely national, instability. Ex-
ternal threats from neighboring States are therefore heightened as
399 Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 28, para. 5(c).
400 See S.C. Res. 1308, U.N. SCOR, 4172d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1308 (2000)
(stressing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, given its possible growing impact on so-
cial instability and emergency situations, may pose a risk to stability and security
if unchecked); see also Report on Global HIVIAIDS, supra note 3, at 58 (stating that
"the U.N. Security Council made history in January 2000, when, for the first time,
it debated a health issue" and "by subsequently adopting Resolution 1308 (2000),
it highlighted the potential threat the epidemic poses for international security").
401 See, e.g., Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3, paras. 75-78 (addressing
concerns over the spread of HIV/AIDS in conflict and disaster affected regions).
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those States experience similar breakdowns in their social, eco-
nomic, and political systems. It can also be argued that diseases
"are easily transmissible beyond the frontiers of a State," 402 and
that the incidence of an HIV/AIDS crisis in one nation may be
viewed as an external threat to another. Further, the potential for
mass migration of refugees from one crisis-country to another-
perhaps because the later is experiencing a slightly less degree of
incidence or possesses more resources with which to cope-can
similarly constitute a recognizable external threat to a nation's se-
curity.
In light of the increased vulnerability of HIV/AIDS-stricken
States, it is simply impossible to deny either the existence of an ex-
ternal threat or the availability of the security exception. To com-
pare the severity of these threats to a potential increase in foreign
competition4 3 or to a decrease in the domestic production of foot-
wear in Sweden 4 4 would be ludicrous.
In addition to the availability of the Article 73 security excep-
tion, many States currently facing an HIV/AIDS crisis are not obli-
gated, at least with respect to pharmaceutical products, to imple-
ment the TRIPS Agreement until January 1, 2016.405 Many of these
States, however, lack the capacity to domestically produce the
pharmaceuticals that they need. As a result, it is absolutely critical
that pharmaceutical-producing nations, even though they are not
experiencing an HIV/AIDS crisis within their own borders, be
similarly entitled to exercise the security exception. By invoking
Article 73, these nations would then be free to both produce ge-
neric pharmaceuticals and export those products to stricken na-
tions. Without such a source of supply, the availability of the secu-
rity exception to consuming nations would be of little value.
In establishing the existence of an external threat to their essen-
tial security interests, producing nations may argue many of the
same concerns expressed above. From a broad perspective, pro-
ducing nations may note that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has indeed
402 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 40.
403 See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (1994)) (regarding the impact of foreign competi-
tion on domestic industries).
404 See Swedish Footwear, supra note 375 (instituting trade restrictions de-
signed to bolster Swedish footwear production).
405 See Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 28, para. 7 (regarding the proper rela-
tionship between the TRIPS Agreement and public health concerns).
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been found to constitute "a global emergency" 406 and a potential
"risk to stability and security." 407 As members of the international
community, producers should be allowed to help alleviate these
concerns. Producers may similarly argue that the HIV/AIDS virus
may be imported into their country from foreign sources, that a
mass migration of refugees into their country would drain eco-
nomic resources, that regional instability endangers the global
peace, and that the loss of critical consumers and suppliers can
threaten their own economic viability. Additionally, it can be ar-
gued that a nation's security is dependent, at least in part, upon the
security of its allies and other friendly nations. As a result, the ex-
ception must encompass not only threats to the invoking nation it-
self, but threats to other (consuming) nations as well.
In weighing the credibility of these arguments, it is interesting
to note that the National Intelligence Council on AIDS, which ad-
vises the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, has indicated that the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in five nations (Russia, Ethiopia, China, Nige-
ria, and India) poses a potential security threat not only to their re-
spective regions, but to the United States as well.408 In coming to
such a conclusion, the report cited the fact that the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic is likely to shape how Russia emerges in the post-Soviet era
and that the political tensions generated by the epidemic in Nigeria
could affect its status as a major oil producer and U.N. peacekeeper
in Africa.40 9 According to the New York Times, the United States
has, in fact "declared the global epidemic of AIDS a national secu-
rity threat."410 Applying a similar rationale, such nations as India
and Brazil could exercise their right to invoke Article 73 (to meet
such external threats) and continue to produce and export generic
pharmaceuticals even after their transition periods have elapsed.
It has also been held that "massive and systematic violations of
human rights may constitute a 'threat to peace' under Article 39"
of the U.N. Charter.411 Not only did the United States advance
such an argument in support of its Helms-Burton Act,4 12 a variety
406 Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3, para. 2.
407 S.C. Res. 1308, supra note 400, pmbl.
408 Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS in 5 Nations Called Security Threat, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2002, at A12.
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 Helms-Burton Act, § 2(24) (1997).
412 Id.
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of fundamental international instruments have consistently linked
the enjoyment of human rights (as well as the creation of a social
and international order in which those rights may be realized) with
the achievement of international peace and the promotion of
friendly relations among nations.413 Since the HIV/AIDS crisis is
often a symptom of human rights violations,414 the invocation of
Article 73 may indeed represent a legitimate response. The ab-
sence of human rights often gives rise to the epidemic, the denial of
human rights often accompanies infection, and the achievement of
human rights could certainly aid in its cure. Under such circum-
stances, pharmaceutical-producing States could credibly argue that
the human rights condition in many stricken nations represents a
threat to the peace and therefore a threat to their essential security
interests.
Finally, Article 73(c) recognizes the right of a Member to take
"any action in pursuance of its obligations under the U.N. Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security." In such a
regard, it is worth noting that the basic purposes of the U.N. Char-
ter are to affirm our faith in fundamental human rights and the
dignity of the person,415 to maintain international peace and secu-
rity (and to take collective measures for the prevention and re-
moval of threats to that peace and security),416 and to cooperate in
solving global problems of an economic, social, cultural, or hu-
manitarian character.417 It is also worth noting that Article 55 of
the U.N. Charter recognizes that one of the primary goals of the
United Nations is to create the "conditions of stability and well-
being" that are "necessary" for securing international peace.418 The
"conditions" specifically enumerated in Article 55 include higher
413 See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 118, pmbl., art. 28 (providing that
everyone has the right to a "social and international" which protects the rights
and freedoms of individuals); ICESCR, supra note 23, pmbl. (asserting that the
"equal and inalienable" human rights of individuals is the "foundation of free-
dom, justice and peace in the world"); ICCPR, supra note 125, pmbl. (guaranteeing
all citizens basic human and political rights).
414 See supra notes 100-151 and accompanying text (regarding the relationship
between social rights and the HIV/ AIDS pandemic).
415 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, pmbl., art. 1.3 (stating that the purpose of the U.N.
is international problem solving).
416 See id., pmbl., arts. 1.1, 1.2, 24.1, 33-51 (identifying that the development of
friendly relations and peaceful dispute resolution as purposes of the U.N.).
417 Id. art. 1.3.
418 Id. art. 55.
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standards of living, economic and social development, universal
respect for human rights, and the solution of health-related prob-
lems.419 As a result, it can be argued that the deplorable standards
of living in HIV/AIDS-stricken countries -as well as the abridge-
ment of human rights and the total breakdown of economic, social,
and political systems -pose a substantial threat to the peace by en-
dangering the stability and well-being that are necessary to main-
tain that peace. Since all Members have the duty to promote the
purposes of the U.N. Charter (and to fulfill their obligations under
that Charter),420 it would seem logical that pharmaceutical-
producing nations would have the right to exercise Article 73(c) of
the TRIPS Agreement in such a regard. By exporting generic
medicines to stricken States, producing countries would be meet-
ing their responsibility to promote the necessary conditions for in-
ternational peace and security.
4.4. Miscellaneous Sources of Flexibility
In addition to the substantial flexibility provided by the Arti-
cles examined above, there are a number of other mechanisms that
may prove helpful in addressing the issue of high-priced patented
pharmaceuticals. Some of these mechanisms are found within the
body of the TRIPS Agreement, while others are based upon the fact
that the Agreement is silent in their regard.
Weissman has noted, for example, that a nation can seek to
limit pharmaceutical prices by instituting a system of price con-
trols. 42 1 As long as that system is nondiscriminatory between for-
eign and domestic producers, price controls are not precluded by
the terms of the TRIPS Agreement. 422 While such controls are cer-
tainly no panacea -since they are difficult to administer, are often
more costly to consumers than alternative schemes, and do not ac-
crue to the benefit of domestic producers-they may in fact be
used to encourage the licensing of technology.423 By providing
419 Id. art. 55(a)-(c).
420 See, e.g., id. art. 2.2 (stating that "all Members... shall fulfill in good faith
the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter"); id. art.
56 (stating that "all Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55").
421 Weissman, supra note 29, at 1074, 1098, 1099, 1114-16.
422 Id. at 1098-99, 1114-15.
423 Id. at 1099, 1115.
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waiver incentives, patent holders could be given the choice of ei-
ther submitting their products and processes to a price control re-
gime or granting non-exclusive licenses to all domestic produc-
ers.424
Similarly, Abbott has indicated that the TRIPS Agreement does
not require that intellectual property protection be granted on a
tax-free basis. 425 While of course subject to the requirement of na-
tional treatment, taxes are "an ordinary incidence of property
ownership" and are not precluded by the terms of the Agree-
ment.426 Since a preponderance of intellectual property is owned
by firms in industrialized nations (and thus any taxation of that
property would fall disproportionately on those firms), some trans-
fer of wealth to consuming States may result.427 Additionally, since
different products may be subject to different tax rates,
428 an opti-
mal tax regime could conceivably be created by taking into consid-
eration the hierarchy of consumer needs and the ability (or lack
thereof) to pass taxation on to the consuming public. The revenues
generated by such a regime could be used to spur domestic in-
vestment in pharmaceutical production or to offset, at least in part,
the cost of importation and distribution of HIV/AIDS-related
products.
It can also be argued that the TRIPS Agreement imposes limita-
tions on the ability of a nation (on behalf of its intellectual property
owners) to seek relief through the WTO dispute settlement process.
'Non-violation' complaints, for example, are designed to provide
relief to a complaining party despite the fact that the measure be-
ing challenged is absolutely consistent with the terms of the TRIPS
Agreement.429 In effect, these complaints recognize the fact that
even lawful activity may nullify or impair the benefits accruing to
424 Id. at 1115.
425 Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, supra
note 29, at 401.
426 Id. at 401 n.41.
427 See id. at 401-02.
428 Id. at 402; see also Weissman, supra note 29, at 1074, 1098-99 (regarding the
ability to impose a tax regime).
429 GATT, supra note 370, art. XXIII, para. 1(b); see also Understanding Regard-
ing Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, Nov. 28,
1979, GATYF B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 216 (1980) (describing procedures for a party
to file a complaint against a measure which does not conflict with the provisions
of GATT).
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a Member 430 and that some form of adjustment may therefore be
mandated. As a result, a bona fide exercise of the security excep-
tion (or any other legitimate exception found in the Agreement)
may nevertheless give rise to a variety of adverse consequences
based upon the nullification and impairment rationale. Article 64
of the TRIPS Agreement, however, specifically prohibited Mem-
bers from instituting non-violation complaints for a period of five
years from the date of its entry into force 431 and this prohibition has
now been extended by a ministerial decision at Doha.432
Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement is also of particular impor-
tance to developing countries. For the purposes of dispute settle-
ment, this Article provides that nothing in the Agreement shall be
used to address the issue of 'exhaustion' of intellectual property
rights. 433 The effect of this provision is to grant each nation the ab-
solute right to choose its own exhaustion policy without external
interference. If a nation chooses to adopt a 'national exhaustion'
policy, the exclusive rights of patent holders will be enhanced and
parallel importing will be foreclosed. On the other hand, the adop-
tion of an 'international exhaustion' policy will quite arguably en-
courage the practice of parallel importing and thus lower domestic
pharmaceutical prices. Additionally, the mere existence of this
right to choose may exert considerable pressure on international
pricing regimes. 434
Finally, it must be emphasized that the TRIPS Agreement
represents only one of a number of legal obligations undertaken by
Member States. As a result, the Agreement must always be placed
within the context of other treaties, customary law, and domestic
responsibilities. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, for example, recognizes that "a fundamental change of
circumstances" not foreseen by the parties at the time of the con-
clusion of a treaty, may constitute grounds for terminating that
treaty, withdrawing from that treaty, or suspending the operation
430 See JACKSON, supra note 371, at 181-82 (discussing the necessity of injury to
a Contracting Party if Article XXIII is invoked).
431 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 64.2.
432 Decision, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, art. 11.1,
WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001).
433 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 6. This article, of course, is subject to
the requirements of both national and most-favored-nation treatment.
434 For a discussion of exhaustion and parallel importing, see ACCESS TO
MEDICINES, supra note 29, at 17-22 and Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 340-92.
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of that treaty.435 Certainly the absence of a crippling pandemic, the
absence of severely destructive social, political, and economic forces
and the absence of a threat to the actual sovereignty of a nation all
served as an "essential basis of the consent of the parties to be
bound" by the TRIPS Agreement.436 As a result, it can be argued
that the effect of the subsequent evolution of these circumstances
"is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be per-
formed." 437 While the obligations under the Agreement may have
remained constant over time, the effect of fulfilling those obliga-
tions certainly has not. Article 62 could therefore serve as a basis
for the renegotiation of the TRIPS Agreement by HIV/AIDS-
stricken countries. For without some adjustment in obligation-
whether in the form of a formal recognition of the flexibility of the
Agreement or a massive infusion of pharmaceutical products irre-
spective of the terms of the Agreement-some signatory nations
may simply cease to exist.
Such interplay of international instruments, as well as the crea-
tion of obligations under both customary and domestic law, sub-
stantially detract from the importance that Western nations have
placed on the protection of intellectual property. When one exam-
ines these duties in their totality, IPR's protection acquires a per-
spective quite different than that proposed in the TRIPS Agree-
ment. Conflicts are created, hierarchies are developed, and
compromise becomes both essential and constitutive.
5. THE DUTY TO EXERCISE THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT
5.1. Introduction
Every nation has the duty to exercise the flexibility of the TRIPS
Agreement in meeting its public health needs. Such a duty exists
despite traditional arguments regarding the non-justiciability of
social issues, the non-self-executing nature of most international
agreements, the difficulty of enforcing positive rights, and the
'available resources' limitation to the progressive realization doc-
trine. Those arguments find credence only when viewed in isola-
435 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 288, art. 62.
436 Id.
437 Id. For a discussion of "changed circumstances" and a possible "waiver
approach," see ACCESS TO MEDICINES, supra note 29, at 30-32.
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tion -when simplistic norms of sovereignty, non-intervention, and
internal supremacy are advanced in an attempt to retard the inevi-
table evolution of international relations.
In contrast, the duty to provide the highest attainable standard
of health -and thus the duty to exercise the flexibility of the TRIPS
Agreement in a continuous progression toward that goal -is a re-
sult of a complex web of global treaties and conventions, regional
charters, domestic constitutional and statutory mandates, and cus-
tomary norms that have altered the responsibilities of governments
to both their citizens and other States. This duty is also the result
of the recognition that individuals are subjects of international law,
that the welfare of a State's citizens is no longer a purely domestic
matter,438 and that international agreements may be directed to-
ward the conditions of persons rather than merely the relation-
ships between nations.439 Such a perspective has served to solidify
the basic premise that a State, if it is to be viewed as legitimate,
must "protect, promote and implement all human rights and fun-
damental freedoms" 440 and must ensure not only the territorial in-
tegrity of the State, but the security of its people as well. As both a
recognized human right441 and a substantial determinant of na-
tional and international security, 442 the right to enjoy the highest
attainable standard of health can no longer be assigned a secon-
dary status.
The duty of a State to protect this human right to health is fur-
ther enhanced by an increasing recognition of the interdependence
of economic, social, and cultural rights, civil and political rights,
and the inalienable rights to development and self-
determination.443 As a result, the substantial body of international
438 For various discussions of humanitarian intervention into the domestic
affairs of a nation, see supra note 21.
439 See Jo L. Southard, Human Rights Provisions of the U.N. Charter: The History
in U.S. Courts, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41, 43 (1995) (describing the post World
War I exploration of "human rights as a new subject matter for treaties").
440 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, supra note 1, art. 2.1.
441 See, e.g., The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Stan-
dard of Physical and Mental Health, Comm'n on Human Rights, 58th Sess., 19th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/31 (2002) (reaffirming this right on the basis of the inher-
ent dignity of the human person).
442 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1308, supra note 400, at 2 (stressing how the HIV/AIDS
pandemic may pose a risk to security).
443 See, e.g., DRD, supra note 25, art. 1 (explaining the universally recognized
right to development).
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law regarding each of these rights-and the accompanying legal
obligations that have been imposed on all States - must be incorpo-
rated in the analysis of the right to health, particularly in the con-
text of pandemics such as HIV/ AIDS. It is often impossible to seg-
regate, for example, the right to health from the concepts of
equality, non-discrimination, equal protection, due process, and
human dignity. Similarly, the progressive realization of the right
to health is a fundamental determinant of the rights to life, social
order and security, development, and self-determination. These
rights impose universal duties on States irrespective of interna-
tional treaty. Additionally, agreements regarding education, the
sharing of the benefits of scientific advancement, the raising of
standards of living, and the eradication of poverty provide further
dimension to the duties placed on States regarding the right to
health.
As a result, the right to the highest attainable standard of
health cannot be reduced to the provisions found in such agree-
ments as the ICESCR,444 the CRC,445 and the CEDAW.446 While
these agreements are extremely important, they form only a part of
an elaborate patchwork of global, regional, and normative relation-
ships that encompass a wide variety of interlocking rights. When
viewed in such a light, these rights become substantially more en-
forceable by means of a similar patchwork of individual claims, in-
terstate complaints, and monitoring mechanisms. With such a
premise in mind, this Section will first examine the international
and domestic settings of the right to the highest attainable standard
of health. It will then explore a variety of issues surrounding the
scope of this right, the nature of progressive realization, and the re-
lationship between the right to health and civil and political rights.
It will then conclude with a look at some of the potential means for
enforcing a State's duty in this regard.
5.2. The International Setting
The ICESCR, to which 147 nations have now become legally
bound, states that all Parties "recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and men-
444 ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 12.
445 CRC, supra note 117, art. 24.
446 CEDAW, supra note 119, arts. 11.1(f), 12.
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tal health."447 The Covenant goes on to state that the steps to be
taken by the Parties to achieve the full realization of this right shall
include those necessary "for the healthy development of the child,"
for the creation of conditions that would assure to everyone
"medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness,"
and for the "prevention, treatment and control of epidemic... and
other diseases."448 Unlike the rights guaranteed in the ICCPR,
these rights are qualified by the concept of progressive realization
found in Article 2.1. In addressing the duties of States under the
Covenant, this article indicates that each Party "undertakes to take
steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means."449
While the broad socio-economic nature of the right to health
will be discussed later in this Section, some preliminary observa-
tions should be made regarding the basic definitional approach to
the duties of States under the ICESCR. First, both the Commission
on Human Rights and the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights-having taken the position that the right to health
is a fundamental human right-have adopted a framework by
which States have the obligation to "respect, protect and fulfil" the
right to the highest attainable standard of health.450 Under such a
framework, parties to the Covenant must refrain from interfering
with the enjoyment of the right to health; they must take measures
to prevent third parties from interfering with the right to health;
and they must take positive action to "facilitate," "provide," and
"promote" the full realization of the right to health for all indi-
viduals and communities.451
This framework also imposes on States the obligation to en-
sure - subject to progressive realization - that health-care facilities,
goods, and services are "available in sufficient quantity," are of
"good quality," and are both "accessible" and "affordable" to all.45 2
447 ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 12.1.
448 Id. art. 12.2(a), (d), (c).
449 Id. art. 2.1.
450 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 33; see also A Human Rights-Based Ap-
proach to HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, para. 9 (recalling this tripartite obligation).
451 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, paras. 33-37.
452 Id. para. 12; see A Human Rights-Based Approach to HIV/AIDS, supra note 3,
paras. 9, 10 (restating certain of these obligations).
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More particularly, "affordable access to essential medicines" 453 and
"access to medication in the context of pandemics such as
HIV/AIDS" 4 4 are viewed as fundamental elements for achieving
progressive realization. Similarly, the provision of "equal and
timely access to preventive, curative, [and] rehabilitative health
services" 455 and the taking of measures "to prevent, treat and con-
trol epidemic and endemic diseases" 456 are seen as essential obliga-
tions on the part of the State.
Second, it should be recognized that while the ICESCR pro-
vides for progressive realization and acknowledges limitations
based on available resources, it does impose on States a variety of
obligations "which are of immediate effect." 457 In specific regard to
the right to health, States are obligated, for example, to take "delib-
erate, concrete, and targeted" steps toward the full realization of
Article 12.458 As a result, progressive realization is viewed not as a
defense, but as a continuum on which each State must "use all the
means at its disposal to give effect to the rights recognized in the
Covenant."459 Additionally, the norms reflected in the ICESCR
must be recognized within the "domestic legal order" of each State
and, when necessary, a State's legal order must be modified to give
effect to (and become compliant with) the State's treaty obliga-
tions.460
Third, the ICESCR (including its provisions regarding the right
to health) not only creates rights and duties between a State and its
citizens, but also establishes rights, duties, and relationships
among nations as well. For example, all Parties are under the obli-
gation to respect and protect the right to health in other countries 461
453 A Human Rights-Based Approach to HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, para. 10 (em-
phasis deleted); see Substantive Issues, supra note 3, paras. 12(a), 12(b)(iii), 43(d) (es-
tablishing a duty to affordably provide essential drugs and referring to WHO au-
thority to define "essential drugs").
454 Access to Medication, supra note 122, para. 1.
455 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 17.
456 Id. para. 44(c).
457 Id. para. 30.
458 Id.
459 Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Econ., Soc., and
Cultural Rights, 19th Sess., 51st mtg. para. 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998)
[hereinafter Substantive Issues (1998)].
460 Id. paras. 2, 3.
461 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 39.
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and to refrain from limiting or interfering with that right. Subject
to available resources, States are also "called upon" to "facilitate
access" in other nations to health facilities, services, and medicines
and to provide financial aid whenever possible.462 Collaterally, all
nations are directed to consider the right to health when imple-
menting or negotiating international agreements and to ensure that
such agreements do not adversely impact the right to health in any
nation.463 The recognition of these interstate relationships can be of
particular import in light of the fact that pharmaceutical-producing
nations such as Germany, France, India, and Brazil are all parties to
the ICESCR.
Finally, it should be reiterated that States are in fact sovereign
for the purpose of entering into international agreements that limit
their sovereignty. 464 As a result, all of the parties to the ICESCR
have chosen to internationalize a variety of issues (including the
right to health) that have been traditionally viewed as matters of
domestic policy. Having done so, the relationships between a
Party and its citizens -and the duty of a Party to engage in the
level of progressive realization suitable to its circumstance -are no
longer beyond international scrutiny.
While the ICESCR has been traditionally viewed as the core of
the right to the highest attainable standard of health, a variety of
other international instruments clearly acknowledge this right as
well. In the CRC,4 65 for example, the Parties recognize "the right of
the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health and to facilities for the treatment of illness." 466 Although
subject to the "maximum extent of their available resources" lan-
guage,467 192 Parties agreed that they "shall pursue full implemen-
tation of this right" and "shall take appropriate measures" to re-
duce infant and child mortality, ensure necessary medical
assistance and health care, combat disease through readily avail-
462 Id.
463 See id. (discussing the obligation of States to the promotion and facilitation
of the right to health in other countries); see also Access to Medication, supra note
122, para. 4(b) (stating that international agreements should support broad access
to "the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health").
464 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 131
(June 27).
465 CRC, supra note 117.
466 Id. art. 24.1.
467 Id. art. 4.
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able technology, and ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal
health care for mothers. 468 Additionally, the 192 Member States of
WHO have formally recognized that "the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of
every human being"469 and 174 nations have recognized the par-
ticular right of women to health care under the CEDAW.470
These global conventions are supplemented by a variety of re-
gional agreements recognizing the right to health. The Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Protocol of San Salva-
dor),471 for example, indicates that "[e]veryone shall have the right
to health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of
physical, mental and social well-being." 472 In order to ensure this
right, the Parties further agreed to adopt measures to provide pri-
mary health care and services to all individuals, to prevent and
treat endemic and other diseases, and to satisfy the health needs of
those in the "highest risk groups" and those "whose poverty
makes them the most vulnerable." 473 Similarly, the African Charter
on Human and People's Rights, 474 which is of particular import to
the HIV/AIDS crisis, states that "[e]very individual shall have the
right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental
health" and that the Parties shall take the necessary measures "to
protect the health of their people" and to ensure medical attention
for the sick.475 Fifty-two African nations have ratified this Charter
and have agreed "to adopt legislative or other measures to give ef-
fect" to the rights contained therein.476 It is interesting to note (and
468 Id. art. 24.2(a)-(d) (emphasis added).
469 Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946,62 Stat. 2679,
pmbl., 14 U.N.T.S. 185, reprinted in BASIc DOCUMENTS 1 (40th ed., 1994).
470 CEDAW, supra note 119, art. 12.
471 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 156 [here-
inafter Protocol of San Salvador], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 69 (1996).
472 Id. art. 10.1.
473 Id. art. 10.2(f).
474 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter].
475 Id. art. 16. For a brief discussion of regional agreements, see The Right of
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health: Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 59th Sess., paras. 15-19, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58 (2003) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur].
2004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
quite reflective of the patchwork of international instruments giv-
ing rise to the right to health) that South Africa, while not a Party
to the ICESCR, is in fact a Party to the African Charter as well as to
both the CRC and WHO.
The international setting becomes substantially more intricate if
one accepts the proposition that the right to health is a fundamen-
tal human right and that the HIV/AIDS crisis is a human rights is-
sue. Under such a circumstance, there is ample evidence that all
nations have the duty -even in the absence of the contractual
agreements discussed above -to respect and promote the right to
health.477 It must be admitted that the duty to 'respect' primarily
represents a negative obligation to refrain from interfering with a
human right and the duty to 'promote' tends to be both subjective
and aspirational in nature. Similarly, the duty to 'protect' that is
incorporated into some human rights agreements, 478 fails to estab-
lish the type of positive right that is essential for creating tangible
and enforceable duties on the part of the State.
In contrast, there are a variety of human rights instruments that
clearly recognize the existence of positive rights and corresponding
duties. The U.N. General Assembly, for example, has taken the
position that all States have the duty not only to protect and pro-
mote, but to "implement" all human rights, and that States are also
obligated to take the steps necessary to create the social, economic,
political, and legal conditions that are requisite for the enjoyment
of those rights.479  Similarly, the Universal Declaration-
476 African Charter, supra note 474, art. 1.
477 See, e.g., Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, pmbl., paras. 1-2 (reaffirming
the commitment of U.N. States to promote universal protection of "all human
rights and fundamental freedoms .... "); Universal Declaration, supra note 118,
pmbl. (proclaiming the Vienna Declaration as a standard of achievement for all
people and all nations to strive for in order to secure the universal observance of
human rights); ICCPR, supra note 125, pmbl. (confirming the duty of individuals
to observe universally recognized rights); U.N. CHARTER, art. 1 para. 3. (setting
out, in various terms, the fundamental nature of certain rights, including in each
case, by later language, the right to health).
478 See, e.g., Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 5 (declaring that "all hu-
man rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent" and that it is the duty of
States to promote and protect them); Universal Declaration, supra note 118, pmbl.
(declaring that it is the goal of Member States to protect fundamental rights); Dec-
laration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, supra note 1, pmbl., art. 2.1 (as-
serting that it is the duty of States, regardless of varying cultural, political, and
economic systems to protect all human rights).
479 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, supra note 1, art. 2.1
(emphasis added).
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unequivocally the authoritative and common standard for all na-
tions480 - clearly states that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration." 481 Among the rights to
which all individuals are "entitled" are the "economic, social and
cultural rights" that are "indispensable" for a person's dignity and
the free development of his or her personality.48 2 These rights,
while subject to the progressive realization and available resources
limitation,483 specifically include the right to a standard of living
adequate for "health and well being" and specifically encompass
both "medical care" and "security in the event of... sickness."
484
As a result, the human rights regime actually imposes some
universal duties on all States that supplement the contractual du-
ties created by agreements such as ICESCR and the CRC. Addi-
tionally, the inclusion of the right to health in the human rights re-
gime should be viewed as interpretive. By its very nature, the right
to health is a positive right that requires substantial State action for
its assurance. By elevating the status of the right to health, the in-
ternational community has taken the position that such govern-
mental action, irrespective of treaty obligation, is no longer purely
discretionary.
The right to the highest attainable standard of health also gains
substantial support if one accepts the propositions that all human
rights and fundamental freedoms are "universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated" 485 and that civil and political
freedoms cannot be enjoyed without an adequate foundation of
economic, social and cultural rights.486 Under such circumstances,
the right to health is bolstered by a substantial body of interna-
tional law regarding such civil and political rights as self-
determination, the freedom to pursue economic, social, and cul-
tural development, the right to life, the rights to equality and in-
480 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text (explicating the Declara-
tion's authority).
481 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, art. 2 (emphasis added).
482 Id. art. 22.
483 Id.
484 Id. art. 25.1.
485 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, supra note 1, at
pmbl.; see Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 5 (noting the importance of hav-
ing certain fundamental freedoms and rights).
486 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (explaining the ideals expressed
in the Universal Declaration).
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herent dignity, and the rights to subsistence and security of per-
son.487 It is important to recognize that these rights are not subject
to the limitations of progressive realization and available re-
sources. As a result, to the degree to which the right to health is a
determinant in regard to the achievement of these other freedoms,
a corresponding duty to pursue the right to health must be placed
upon the States.
Finally, if one accepts the fact that the HIV/AIDS pandemic
poses a threat to international peace and security, the right to
health becomes further internationalized. Viewed in such a per-
spective, the Charter of the United Nations, including its provi-
sions for the maintenance of international peace and security, be-
comes substantially more relevant. Arguments regarding the mere
aspirational nature of the Charter in regard to the promotion of
human rights become preempted by the fundamental purpose of
the Charter. Additionally, the growing incidence of humanitarian
intervention evidences the fact that the United Nations is continu-
ally willing to broaden the definitional scope of a threat to peace.
While the right to health finds substantial support throughout
the international setting, such a fact cannot be equated with the
duty to provide treatment to victims of HIV/AIDS. Since re-
sources are always finite, it could be argued (as simply one exam-
ple) that the highest attainable standard of health could best be
progressively realized through HIV/AIDS education and preven-
tion. Similarly, the overall health of a population may be propor-
tionately increased (at least hypothetically) by dedicating a nation's
limited resources to the prevention of malaria, tuberculosis, river
blindness, or malnutrition. The provision of food, shelter, or pota-
ble water may conceivably be viewed as a greater progression to-
ward the realization of health than the provision of antiretrovirals.
Such policy decisions, of course, must be placed beyond the
scope of this Article. What can be argued, however, is that contrac-
tual obligations, human rights norms, the interdependence of
rights and freedoms, and the need to maintain international peace
and security all demand that States honor their duty to engage in
progressive realization. More particularly, all nations have the
duty to exercise the lawful flexibility provided in the TRIPS
Agreement as they engage in that progression. Whether through
487 See ICCPR, supra note 125, arts. 1.1, 1.2, 3, 6.1, 9, 10 (articulating a person's
fundamental rights).
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compulsory licensing, parallel importing, or the exporting of ge-
nerics by drug-producing countries, States have the obligation-at
a minimum-to take all lawful steps to ensure that pharmaceuti-
cals are priced at the lowest possible level. Since a refusal to take
such action would render a State's progressive realization regime
indefensible, the victims of HIV/AIDS are 'entitled' to no less.
5.3. The Domestic Setting
Pursuant to the international agreements discussed above,
most nations have explicitly agreed to grant a variety of enumer-
ated rights to their citizens. Under such circumstances -and de-
spite issues surrounding non-self-execution-it would seem quite
incongruent to argue that these States 'really' have no duty to do
so. When one recognizes the universal duties to respect human
rights, to maintain both national and international peace and secu-
rity, and to ensure such rights as self-determination and the pur-
suit of development, such a position becomes even more indefen-
sible. Whether viewed in terms of the rights of individuals or in
terms of contractual duties between States, some form of legal ob-
ligation must have been created when nations ratified these in-
struments. To argue otherwise would be to reduce both the inter-
national treaty regime and customary law to a series of unenforce-
able guidelines. While determining the precise nature of these ob-
ligations is indeed complex, their complexity must never be
equated with their non-existence.
As a result, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has taken the position that each Party to the ICESCR must
use all the means at its disposal to give effect to the rights granted
in the Covenant.488 They must recognize its norms in their domes-
tic legal order; they must provide appropriate remedies to ag-
grieved individuals; and they must ensure appropriate means for
governmental accountability. 489 Since a Party may not invoke its
domestic law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty, Par-
ties should "modify" their internal legal orders whenever neces-
sary to give effect to their international obligations.490 Similarly,
municipal courts should interpret domestic law, at least as far as
possible, "in a way which conforms to a State's international legal
488 Substantive Issues (1998), supra note 459, para. 2.
489 Id.
490 Id. para. 3.
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obligations," thereby avoiding interpretations that would place the
State in breach of the Covenant.491
Despite the argument that legally binding international human
rights standards "should operate directly and immediately" within
a Party's domestic legal system, 492 the internal implementation of
the ICESCR has been substantially mixed. While some States have
adopted or incorporated the Covenant into domestic law or have
given the Covenant direct effect by means of supplementing or
amending existing legislation, other States have failed to engage in
any meaningful implementation process.493 Collaterally, some do-
mestic courts have applied the Covenant's provisions either di-
rectly or as interpretive standards, while others have refused to
give any legal effect to the Covenant in cases where individuals
have attempted to use its provisions as a basis for relief.494
State practice regarding the implementation of the ICESCR in
its totality, however, should not detract from the fact that the spe-
cific right to health has gained substantial support in domestic le-
gal orders. In his recent report on the right to the highest attain-
able standard of health, Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt cited the
preliminary findings of a study being performed by the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists.495 While still in its early stages, this
study indicates that over sixty constitutional provisions include the
right to health or health care and over forty constitutional provi-
sions include such health-related rights as reproductive health care
and the right to a healthy environment.496 Additionally, a large
number of constitutions establish a variety of duties on the part of
the State - such as the duty to develop health services - from
which the existence of health entitlements can be inferred. 497 These
findings can be supplemented by the fact that more than seventy
nations have incorporated the Universal Declaration into their con-
stitutions or statutes498 (which includes provisions on medical care
491 Id. para. 15.
492 Id. para. 4.
493 Id. para. 6.
494 Id. para. 13.
495 Report of Special Rapporteur, supra note 475, para. 20 (citing International
Commission of Jurists, Right to Health Database, Preliminary Proposal, 2002).
496 Id.
497 Id.
498 RAY AUGUST, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 274 (1995).
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and security in the event of sickness),499 and that many States have
provided their citizens with a variety of social benefits (including
health care) by means of ordinary legislative action.
500
The South African Constitution,501 for example, squarely places
substantial duties on the government regarding the provision of
health care services. After recognizing the basic rights to life, in-
herent dignity, equality, and reproductive decision making,
502 the
Constitution provides that "everyone has the right to have access
to ... health care services, including reproductive health care,"
503
and that the State "must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of each of these rights."504 Significantly, the Constitu-
tion also provides that the State must "respect, protect, promote
and fulfill" these rights,505 that all organs of the State (including the
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary) are bound by these
rights,50 6 and that individuals are entitled to seek judicial relief
when these rights have been infringed or threatened.50 7 Finally,
when interpreting these constitutional provisions, South African
courts must "consider international law,"5 0 8 which would include,
at a minimum, the African Charter and the CRC to which South
Africa is a Party.
Similarly, the Constitution of Haiti5 0 9 provides that "the State
has the absolute obligation to guarantee the right to life, health, and
respect of the human person. . . in conformity with the Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Man,"5' 0 and that the State must pro-
vide the "appropriate means to ensure protection maintenance and
499 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, art. 25.1.
500 See Herman Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitu-
tion?, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 1233, 1236-37 (1995) (discussing how most coun-
tries have statutes creating rights to public health care and other social benefits).
501 S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) (amended Oct. 11, 1996).
502 Id. arts. 9, 10, 11, and 12(2)a.
503 Id. art. 27(1).
504 Id. art. 27(2) (emphasis added).
505 Id. art. 7(2) (emphasis added).
506 Id. art. 8(1).
507 Id. art. 38.
508 Id. art. 39(1)(b).
509 HAIn CONST.
510 Id. art. 19 (emphasis added).
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restoration" of the health of its citizens. 511 It is worthy to note that
the Haitian Constitution actually prohibits the National Assembly
from ratifying any international treaty or convention that contains
terms contrary to these provisions.512 Viewed in such a light, any
ratification of the TRIPS Agreement - if that Agreement were to be
interpreted in a way that frustrated the right to health -would ap-
pear to be ultra vires.
Constitutions around the world tend to recognize similar
rights. In Brazil, health care is viewed as both "a right of all" and
"a duty of the State."5 13 As a 'social right,' health is to be "guaran-
teed" by way of governmental policies that are aimed at reducing
the risk of illness and providing universal access to services for the
"promotion, protection and recovery" of an individual's health.514
In Chile, the Constitution guarantees the right to life, the right to
physical and psychological integrity, and the right to life of those
about to be born. 5 15 It also guarantees the protection of health and
the "free and egalitarian access" to measures necessary for the
"promotion, protection and recovery of the health and rehabilita-
tion of the individual."5 16 In Spain, the Constitution recognizes the
"right to health protection" 517 and places the burden on the State
"to organize and watch over public health and hygiene through
preventive measures and through necessary care and services."5 18
The right to health is constitutionally protected by a variety of
other (perhaps less direct) methods as well. Some constitutions,
for example, provide that international human rights treaties, once
they have been ratified, are granted direct domestic effect.519 Un-
der such circumstances, agreements such as the ICESCR and the
CRC would become, upon ratification, internally binding. Other
constitutions view the right to health in terms of fundamental ob-
jectives or directive principles that are to be used in creating all
511 Id. art. 23 (emphasis added).
512 Id. art. 276.
513 BRAz. CONST. art. 196.
514 Id.; see also arts. 6 and 227 (outlining universal social rights and guarantee-
ing specific rights for children).
515 CHILE CONST. art. 19.1.
516 Id. art. 19.9.
517 SPAIN CONST. Chap. III, art. 43(1).
518 Id. art. 43(2).
519 In regard to the Czech Constitution, for example, see Dalibor Jilek, Human
Rights Treaties and the New Constitution, 8 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 407, 418 (1993).
[Vol. 25:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss3/1
ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS
State policy.5 20 Finally, constitutional provisions are often directed
at protecting the health and well-being of particular constituencies,
such as families, women, children, and (at least from a national se-
curity perspective) the 'people' of the nation.
5 21
These constitutional provisions, of course, are finding support
in an increasing body of case and statutory law. According to the
Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidenic,5 22 for example, an
HIV-positive petitioner brought an action before the Supreme
Court of Costa Rica demanding combination therapy that he could
not afford on his own.5 23 The court ruled in the petitioner's favor-
immediately giving rise to similar petitions -and within weeks the
national social security system was ordered to develop a plan to
provide antiretroviral treatment to all citizens suffering from
HIV/AIDS. 24  In Venezuela, a suit was filed claiming that
HIV/AIDS victims were not receiving proper medical attention as
guaranteed both by the Venezuelan Constitution and the various
Human Rights agreements that had been ratified by that nation.
525
In choosing to uphold the lawsuit, the court ordered the Venezue-
lan Social Security System to provide free treatment to each of the
claimants.526 Outside the HIV/AIDS context, the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples' Rights found a violation of the right
to the highest attainable standard of health by the State of Nigeria
in relation to the activities of oil companies in the Niger Delta.
527
Certainly the most celebrated case, however, is Treatment Action
Campaign528 wherein the court addressed the question of whether
the South African government had taken "reasonable legislative
520 See, e.g., NIG. CONST. Chap. II, arts. 16(2)(d) and 17(3)(d) (providing a
minimum level of health care for all citizens).
521 See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. art. 28(1)(c) (providing children with basic ser-
vices); BRAZ. CONST. arts. 6, 203, 227 (protecting children and women through the
political system as well as providing them with basic forms of social assistance);
CHILE CONST. art. 1 (guaranteeing certain protections and services to the family
unit); NIG. CONST. arts. 14(2)(b), 17(3)(f) (providing for the protection of children).
522 Report on Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002, supra note 3.
523 Id. at 64.
524 Id. at 64-65.
525 Id. at 65.
526 Id.
527 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 475, para. 17 (citing Communica-
tion 155/96, SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria, Fifteenth Annual Activity Report of
ACHPR, 2001-2002. Annex V).
528 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) (S. Afr.).
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and other measures within their available resources to achieve the
progressive realization of the right to health care services" as man-
dated by Article 27(2) of the South African Constitution.5 29 More
particularly, the court was confronted with the issue of whether
the steps taken by the government in regard to the prevention of
MTCT of HIV (by means of establishing eighteen pilot sites for
dispensing Nevirapine, but confining its dispensation to those
sites) was in compliance with the progressive realization require-
ment of Article 27(2).530 In addressing these issues, the court found
that: the obligation of the State in terms of Article 27(2) was in fact
justiciable;5 31 that the judiciary did have the power to decide the
"reasonableness" of the steps being taken by the State in meeting
its obligations; and that the court was indeed required to pass a
"value judgment" as to whether the steps being taken toward the
realization of the right to health care were reasonable.5 32
The court noted that the goal of the South African Constitution
was to meet the basic needs of society, that the requirement of pro-
gressive realization "meant that the State must take steps to
achieve this goal," and that "accessibility should be progressively
facilitated."5 33 In light of the fact that Article 27(2) imposes a duty
to achieve the progressive realization of this right in terms of "an
ongoing obligation,"534 the prohibition of the use of Nevirapine
outside the pilot sites was "not reasonable" and constituted an
"unjustifiable barrier to the progressive realization of the right to
health care." 535 After indicating that "a country-wide MTCT pre-
vention programme is an ineluctable obligation of the State,"5 36 the
court ordered that Nevirapine be made available to all pregnant
women with HIV (as well as to their babies) who give birth in the
public sector.5 37 The court also ordered the State to plan an effec-
tive and comprehensive national program to prevent or reduce
MTCT of HIV through voluntary counseling and testing, the provi-
529 Id. at 379.
530 Id.
531 Id.
532 Id. at 380.
533 Id. at 381.
534 Id. at 382.
535 Id. at 384.
536 Id. at 386.
537 Id. at 386-87.
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sion of infant formula, and the provision of Nevirapine and other
medicines.5 38 The constitutional requirement of progressive reali-
zation demanded no less.
While policy establishing a legal right to free HIV/AIDS medi-
cation (such as that found in the Republic of Brazil) 539 is the most
direct form of State intervention, cases such as those noted above
provide an important new weapon against governmental indiffer-
ence. As will be discussed later in this Section, the doctrine of pro-
gressive realization is in the process of being transformed from a
defense used by nations seeking to avoid their responsibilities, to a
mechanism by which responsibility can be imposed. Whether
based on international agreement or the development of such in-
ternal law, the domestic setting regarding the right to the highest
attainable standard of health is becoming increasingly dynamic.
5.4. The Requirement of Progressive Realization
5.4.1. Introduction
In order to appreciate the concept of progressive realization, it
is necessary to briefly examine the goals toward which nations are
required to progress. It is important to note, for example, that the
right to health is not to be understood as the right to be
"healthy" 40 and that States are not to be viewed as ensurers of
good health.541 On the other hand, the right to the highest attain-
able standard of health is a fundamental human right derived from
the inherent dignity of the person,542 and must be viewed as both
indispensable for and dependent upon the exercise and realization
of other human rights.543 As a result, while Article 12 of the
ICESCR provides a small sampling of components, 544 the right to
538 Id. at 387.
539 See Report on Global HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, at 10 (citing policies of various
countries regarding HIV/AIDS care and prevention).
540 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 8.
541 Id. para. 9.
542 The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of
Physical and Mental Health, supra note 441, pmbl.
543 See Substantive Issues, supra note 3, paras. 1, 3.
544 ICESCR, supra note 23, para. 12.1 (describing components including re-
duction of stillbirth-rate and infant mortality; healthy development of the child;
environmental and industrial hygiene; prevention, treatment and control of epi-
demic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; creation of conditions which
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health encompasses a broad range of "socio-economic factors that
promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, and ex-
tends to the underlying determinants of health." 45 Such determi-
nants include: adequate food, nutrition, and housing; access to po-
table water and sanitation facilities; healthy working and
environmental conditions; access to health-related education and
information; and the existence of a social and political system that
values social progress, pursues elevated standards of living, and
respects the rights to privacy, equality, and non-discrimination.5 46
The right to health must also be viewed in terms of creating
programs that are behavior-oriented, that tend to build life-skills,
that are gender and youth-friendly, that are culturally appropriate
for indigenous populations, and that are sensitive to resource dis-
tribution. 547 National strategic plans must be developed - support-
ed both legislatively and judicially-for the strengthening of the
health care system and for the provision of the "facilities, goods,
services and conditions" that are necessary for realizing the right to
the highest attainable standard of health.548 These programs must
be accompanied by attitudinal changes that are designed to im-
prove all forms of maternal and child health by means of protect-
ing women and children from domestic violence, sexual subservi-
ence, and harmful traditional cultural practices.5 49 Additionally,
these national plans must address the needs for health insurance,
immunization, the development of technology, and the creation of
a medical infrastructure of hospitals, doctors, and related person-
nel.550
As is apparent from this abbreviated listing, the issue of health
has two related dimensions. The first concerns the actual physical
state of individuals and encompasses rights surrounding the pro-
vision of preventive, curative, and rehabilitative health care. The
second dimension addresses a wide variety of environmental con-
would assure medical service and medical attention).
545 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 4.
546 See id. paras. 3, 4, 11, 15 (discussing various determinants of health).
547 See id. paras. 10, 16, 23, 27 (expanding on the right to health considera-
tions).
548 Id. para. 9.
549 See id. paras. 10, 14, 16, 21, 22 (broadening the right to health care pro-
grams to include and address issues impacting women and children).
550 See id. paras. 19, 21, 36 (discussing further barriers that must be removed
to establish effective national plans).
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ditions that often dictate-or preordain-an individual's physical
state at some point in time. Within this setting, the right to health
can be examined from several different perspectives. First, it can
be argued that the right to health should be viewed in terms of
both freedoms and entitlements.551 Not only do individuals have
the freedom to control their own health and their own bodies, they
also have the right of access to non-discriminatory systems of
health protection.5 52 Second, the provision of health care facilities,
goods, and services can be viewed from the perspective of their
"availability," their physical and economic "accessibility," their
"acceptability" (in terms of ethical, cultural and gender appropri-
ateness), and their basic quality.
5 53
Third, the right to health can be examined in terms of three dif-
ferent types or levels of obligations that are imposed upon States:
the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill.
554 As discussed ear-
lier,555 the duty to "respect" requires States to refrain from interfer-
ing with (or limiting equal access to) preventive, curative, and pal-
liative health services. It also requires States to refrain from
marketing unsafe drugs, impeding traditional care, or censoring or
misrepresenting health-related information.
5 56 The duty to "pro-
tect" includes obligations to ensure that harmful social practices do
not interfere with the right to health, that third parties do not limit
the people's access to health care services, and that the privatiza-
tion of the health sector does not constitute a threat to availability,
accessibility, acceptability, or quality.
557 The duty to "fulfill" re-
quires States to adopt national health policies that ensure the pro-
vision of health care, that ensure equal access to the underlying de-
terminants of health, and that ensure the development of adequate
public health infrastructures.
558
The right to health can also be viewed in the context of a series
of "core" requirements and other obligations of "comparable prior-
551 Id. para. 8.
552 Id.
553 Id. para. 12.
554 Id. paras. 33-37.
555 See supra notes 450-63 and accompanying text (establishing a tripartite ob-
ligation by States to help realize the right to health).
556 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 34.
557 Id. para. 35.
558 Id. para. 36.
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ity."559 While the right to health is inherently linked to the concept
of progressive realization, these requirements appear to represent
the minimum standards by which nations will be judged regarding
their compliance with international agreements. As a result, it can
be argued that these requirements impose a binding set of legal du-
ties that are of immediate effect. Included within these obliga-
tions-and of particular importance to the HIV/AIDS crisis-are
the duties to provide essential drugs, 560 to ensure reproductive,
maternal, and child health care,561 and to take measures to prevent,
treat, and control epidemic diseases.5 62
Finally, the right to health should always be assessed in terms
of a proper international perspective. It has often been stated that
Parties to agreements such as the ICESCR, the CRC, and the Afri-
can Charter have internationalized issues that were previously
domestic in nature. Such a statement, however, fails to reflect the
fact that the right to health -as well as the effects that flow from a
denial of that right -has always been an international issue regard-
less of multilateral agreement. The spread of disease across State
borders, the migration of workers and refugees, the rise in regional
instability, the decline in regional economies, and the threat to in-
ternational peace and security all evidence the fact that the right to
health is far more than merely a domestic concern.
As a result, the international setting can in fact be viewed from
two distinct perspectives. On the one hand, Parties to international
agreements have the duty to respect the right to health in other
countries, to prevent third parties (who are under their influence)
from violating the right to health in other countries, and to facili-
tate access to health-related goods and services to those other
countries as resources permit.563 All Parties also have the duty to
negotiate, interpret, and implement international agreements in a
manner that promotes the right to health in other nations and all
Parties should create a domestic environment that encourages their
social constituencies, including their private business sector, to
help facilitate the right to health in other nations.5 64
559 Id. paras. 43-44.
560 Id. para. 43(d).
561 Id. para. 44(a).
562 Id. para. 44(c).
563 Id. para. 39.
564 See id. paras. 39, 42 (encouraging parties to facilitate the right to health in
other nations); A Human Rights-Based Approach to HIV/AIDS, supra note 3, para. 11
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On the other hand, every nation has the inherent duty to pro-
tect the security of its own citizens and such an obligation arises out
of the maintenance of sovereign legitimacy rather than interna-
tional agreement. Since the physical health of the populace sub-
stantially determines the security of a nation, all sovereigns have
both the right and the duty to take all actions necessary to secure
that health. Those actions may include the manufacture and do-
mestic sale of generic pharmaceuticals. They may also include the
manufacture and export of generic pharmaceuticals to nations
whose physical health (and accompanying economic and political
health) are posing an external threat to security. Because the wel-
fare of one nation is dependent upon the welfare of others, the per-
formance of a 'domestic' duty may necessitate the taking of inter-
national action as foreign and domestic interests fuse.
It is beyond the scope of this Article, of course, to examine the
right to health in light of such determinants as food, shelter, water,
and sanitation. In less-developed countries, the duty of the State
with regard to these determinants is subject to a substantial time
dimension and it is recognized that the duty to actually provide
these right-to-health components is not synonymous with the duty
to progress toward their realization. To argue such congruence
would be intellectually unsupportable. It is also beyond the scope
of this Article to argue any particular allocation of limited re-
sources. It is recognized that the achievement of the highest at-
tainable standard of health-for a particular population at a par-
ticular point in time-may conceivably reflect an emphasis on
education and prevention rather than treatment, or on the provi-
sion of food and potable water rather than pharmaceuticals, or on
immunization rather than antiretrovirals. In a world lacking in in-
finite resources, a State's duty in this regard is admittedly fluid,
subject to policy orientation, and extremely contextual.
What cannot be debated is that all nations have the duty to en-
gage in a progression toward the highest attainable standard of
health. The steps to be taken toward that progression, at any given
point in time, will certainly vary substantially among nations and
will reflect their different stages of economic development. What
does not vary, however, is the duty to take all of the steps that are
(calling for international cooperation in health technologies and policies); Access to
Medication, supra note 122, para. 4 (encouraging states to facilitate, individually
and cooperatively, access in other countries to pharmaceuticals or technologies to
treat pandemics).
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in fact possible within legal and resource constraints. While not
without cost in such terms as political capital, potential incentive
for future R & D, and increased drug monitoring, the exercise of
the flexibility found in the TRIPS Agreement would lower the cost
of pharmaceuticals and increase their accessibility. As a result, a
strong argument can be made that such an exercise is in fact possi-
ble since it is aimed at cost-savings rather than at additional State
expenditure. If it can be admitted that the exercise of this flexibil-
ity is indeed 'possible' within relevant restraints, then that exercise
becomes a duty rather than an option. Additionally, the inevitable
clash between such a mandate and the protection of intellectual
property rights will give the international community, as will be
discussed in Section 6, a unique opportunity to progressively con-
stitutionalize the right to health.
5.4.2. Progressive Realization as a Duty
The concept of progressive realization unquestionably places
limitations on the right to health. It recognizes the fact that such a
right-which is substantially, although not exclusively, positive in
nature-cannot be achieved overnight. Even the most affluent of
nations cannot guarantee the provision of all health-related deter-
minants such as adequate food, shelter, and rehabilitation to every
one of its citizens. Additionally, those nations that are experienc-
ing the most dramatic of health concerns are also those which have
the fewest resources by which to cope. As a result, to argue that
the right to health is no different than the right to free speech
would not only be naive, it would denigrate those aspects of the
right to health that are truly enforceable. The right to health must
therefore be viewed in terms of the duties that are imposed upon a
particular nation at a particular analytical point in time. Both the
substantive nature and the magnitude of those duties will vary
from State to State and will tend to reflect different points along
the progressive continuum.
Nevertheless, almost all nations have agreed that such a con-
tinuum exists. The concept of progressive realization, and its ap-
plication to various economic, social and cultural rights, has been
incorporated not only into the ICESCR565 but into such interna-
tional instruments as the CRC,566 the DRD,567 and the Universal
565 ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 2.1.
566 CRC, supra note 117, art. 4; see id. art. 24.4 (stating that countries should act
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Declaration. 68 By becoming Parties to international covenants, or
by recognizing the acceptance of certain minimum standards, most
nations have agreed to submit themselves to external evaluation-
albeit idiosyncratic -in regard to their progression along this le-
gally binding continuum. As a result, the duty to engage in pro-
gressive realization is no longer subject to question and the focus of
legal inquiry should now be directed at such issues as available re-
sources, 569 retrogression, and the degree of expectation at different
stages of development.
In addressing the concept of progressive realization within the
context of the ICESCR, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has taken the position that Parties to the Covenant
have a variety of duties that are of "immediate effect."
570 Despite
the constraints of available resources, all Parties have the "immedi-
ate obligation" to take "deliberate, concrete and targeted" steps
"towards" the realization of the right to health.
571 As a result, the
fact that progressive realization is inherently linked to a time di-
mension does not deprive these obligations of "meaningful con-
tent."572 Not only are retrogressive measures presumptively pro-
hibited,5 73 but the requirement of progressive realization imposes
"a specific and continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and
effectively as possible."
574
By identifying a variety of actions or omissions that would con-
stitute a violation of the Covenant's right to health, the Committee
has provided further guidance regarding the nature and scope of
the progressive realization doctrine. In determining whether a vio-
lation has occurred, for example, the Committee notes that it is
necessary to distinguish between the "inability" of a nation to
within the framework of international cooperation).
567 DRD, supra note 25, art. 4.1 (specifying that states have the duty to indi-
vidually and collectively formulate international development policies).
568 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, pmbl., art. 22.
569 See Bruce Porter, Judging Poverty: Using International Human Rights Law to
Refine the Scope of Charter Rights, 15 J. L. & Soc. POL. 117, 129 (2000) (discussing the
standards by which greater emphasis or compliance with progressive realization
may be applied in affluent countries).
570 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 30.
571 Id.
572 Id. para. 31.
573 Id. para. 32.
574 Id. para. 31.
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comply with its obligations and an "unwillingness" to do so.5 75 A
nation that is unwilling to use "the maximum of its available re-
sources" to achieve the realization of this right would be in viola-
tion of the Covenant, and if resource limitations rendered full
compliance impossible, a State would have the burden of demon-
strating that every effort had been made in seeking that compli-
ance.576 Additionally, the lack of available resources would never
justify non-compliance with the "core" requirements incorporated
in the right to health.5 77 Each of these observations, of course, sup-
ports both the existence of a binding continuum and the establish-
ment of a minimum point of commencement below which no Party
may fall.
Violations of the right to health can take the form of positive ac-
tion on the part of the State or on the part of private entities insuf-
ficiently regulated by the State. 578 Such actions might include the
adoption of domestic or international policies that restrict access to
health-related goods or services, that discriminate against certain
constituencies, that stigmatize victims, that foster monopolization
or price fixing, that misrepresent information, or that conflict with
internationally recognized standards. 579 On the other hand, many
violations of the duty to engage in progressive realization will take
the form of omissions. Acts of omission may include insufficient
State expenditure, the failure to use resources that are in fact avail-
able, or the refusal to enforce health-related domestic legislation.
They may reflect the failure to protect constituents from violence or
harmful traditional practices or the failure to safeguard citizens
from infringements of the right to health by third parties such as
employers, food suppliers, or pharmaceutical manufacturers. They
may also encompass a variety of failures that are not necessarily
linked to the availability of resources, such as the failure to account
for health-related concerns when negotiating international agree-
ments, the failure to exercise the rights or the flexibility provided
for in those agreements, or the failure to formulate domestic and
international policy alternatives that may aid a nation's progres-
575 Id. para. 47.
576 Id.
577 Id. (referring to the core requirements set out in paragraph 43 of the
ICESCR).
578 Id. para. 48.
579 See id. paras. 48, 50 (defining violations of the right to health and the obli-
gation to respect).
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sion without the need for additional resources.
580
In Treatment Action Campaign,581 the South African Court di-
rectly addressed the requirements of progressive realization in or-
der to determine whether the acts and omissions on the part of the
State were in violation of those demands. In examining the ques-
tion of whether the government had taken "reasonable legislative
and other measures within their available resources to achieve the
progressive realisation of the right to health care services,"
582 the
court admitted that the concept of progressive realization "clearly
presupposes a situation" where the full realization of a right has
not as yet been achieved and where it has been "contemplated"
that such a right cannot be realized immediately.
5 3 Despite these
limitations, the court held that the requirement of progressive re-
alization "means" that the State must take steps to achieve the re-
alization of this right, that accessibility must be progressively facili-
tated, and that legal, operational, and financial "hurdles" must be
lowered (whenever possible) over time.5 84 The fact that the "pace"
of progression may be dictated by available resources does not al-
ter the State's "ongoing obligation" to seek the "inexorable goal" of
ultimate realization.
5 85
The court also recognized the fact that there must be a realistic
balance between the goals of a nation and the means at its disposal.
In doing so, the court pointed out that while the attainment of a
goal may be delayed by a lack of adequate means, the pursuit of a
goal may serve as a catalyst to "enforce the creation of the
means."586 As a result, while resources will remain an important
factor in determining what constitutes "reasonable" behavior on
the part of the State, measures must nevertheless be taken to
achieve the right to health as "expeditiously and effectively" as
possible. 587 Policies that are merely "open-ended," that leave "eve-
580 See id. paras. 49-52 (discussing omissions and various violations of obliga-
tions by states).
581 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) (S. Afr.).
582 Id. at 379 (referring to the mandate of Article 27(2) of the South African
Constitution).
583 Id. at 381 (discussing Gov't of Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1)
SA 46, 691-70B (CC)).
584 Id.
585 Id. at 382.
586 Id. at 385.
587 Id. at 381 (quoting Grootboom Court at 71A).
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rything for the future," that are not "goal driven," and that lack a
"built-in impetus" for maintaining momentum will fail the test of
reasonableness under the requirements of progressive realiza-
tion.588
As is implicit in the Treatment Action Campaign decision, the is-
sue of available resources-while often central to the provision of
positive rights -cannot preempt the more encompassing demands
of progressive realization. It has been argued that binding legal
norms and compliance with treaty regimes can only be established
when States have the 'capacity' to adhere to those norms or those
regimes.5 89 In response to such an argument, it can be posited that
all nations, whether rich or poor, have the capacity to engage in
progressive realization. 'Capacity' in such a context, of course, is
extremely relative and may become manifest in a $500 billion social
program or simply the provision of potable water to a single South
African community. Capacity may also take the form of expendi-
ture-free measures, such as a refusal to censor information, a re-
fusal to stigmatize or discriminate, or the exercise of the new im-
port/export/compulsory licensing flexibilities under the TRIPS
Agreement. Since all nations have the capacity to progress-
although in differing degrees and by differing methods-all na-
tions must be held to the duty to do so. Whether the result of a
voluntary treaty undertaking or the development of an obligatory
customary norm, States must be accountable for lack of measurable
advancement. While the level of available resources may temper a
nation's obligations, it cannot be used as a defense to inactivity, ig-
norance, or apathy.
Finally, it is of critical importance to recognize that the concept
of progressive realization is not merely a parochial issue governing
the relationship between a nation and its own citizens. Instead,
progressive realization must also be viewed as encompassing obli-
gations and relationships between nations. In light of the fact that
generic producing States have now been given the right to export
generics to poor countries lacking in production facilities (pursuant
to the revised compulsory licensing regime),590 an actual duty to
588 Id. at 385.
589 For a brief discussion and citations in this regard see Koh, supra note 13 at
2635, 2638.
590 See supra notes 339-67 and accompanying text (discussing the evaluation
of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement).
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engage in such exporting must be established. Since access to
medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS "is one
of the fundamental elements" in achieving the right to the highest
attainable standard of health,591 the benefits of the progressive re-
alization mandate would be significantly reduced if it were to be
isolated from such an interstate perspective.
Viewing progressive realization of the right to health as a syn-
thesis of interstate relationships -rather than merely as the sum of
its domestic parts -can be supported in a number of ways. Many
international treaties require Parties to "promote" or "encourage"
international cooperation with a view toward achieving the reali-
zation of the rights that are contained therein.5 92 In other treaties,
Parties have consented "to take steps" through international coop-
eration (including both economic and technical assistance) to "the
maximum of" their available resources toward the realization of a
variety of economic, social and cultural rights.5 93 While such terms
are perhaps softer than might be desired, they cannot be viewed as
meaningless -especially when the cooperation demanded is either
costless or beneficial to the cooperating nation.
An interstate approach to progressive realization can also be
supported by a variety of contractual obligations among nations
regarding the promotion of technology transfer, the duty to pro-
vide incentives to domestic enterprises to encourage technology
transfer to least-developed countries,5 94 the recognition of the right
to share in the benefits of scientific progress and its application,
and the duty to take steps toward the diffusion of scientific knowl-
edge.595 It can also be supported by the duty to take progressive
measures (both national and international) to secure the universal
and effective observance of human rights and fundamental free-
doms 596 as well as by the duty to promote the realization of the in-
591 Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3, para. 15.
592 See, e.g., CRC, supra note 117, art. 24.4 (requiring such efforts to secure the
rights of children).
593 See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 2.1 (calling for parties to take individ-
ual steps and to cooperate with each other).
594 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 66.2 (establishing a duty to pro-
vide incentives).
595 See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 15.1(b), 15.2 (creating both a right to
benefit from scientific progress and to conserve, develop, and diffuse science and
culture).
596 See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 118, pmbl., art. 6 (pledging Mem-
ber States to the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms).
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alienable right to self-determination.597 It can also be based upon
pledges to "develop friendly relations among nations," to achieve
"international cooperation in solving international problems of...
humanitarian character,"5 98 to create global conditions of "stability
and well-being,"5 99 to promote economic and social progress, 600
and to "maintain international peace and security". 601
Finally, such a synthesis can be based upon the fact that all na-
tions have a fundamental responsibility to protect the security of
their citizens from external threat. When that threat takes the form
of an advancing pandemic, a strong argument can be made that
States have the legal duty to take all measures -including the ex-
port of generics to nations in crisis-toward the reduction of that
threat. Similar arguments can be made when threats take the col-
lateral forms of political instability, civil unrest, or economic de-
cline.
It should also be noted that while these duties are actually im-
posed upon States, it is generally accepted that all members of so-
ciety, including the private business sector, have responsibilities in
their regard. As a result, States should foster an environment in
which private parties can carry out these responsibilities. 602 Addi-
tionally, the duty to cooperate (whether on the part of the State or
the private sector) should be viewed in relative terms. Where co-
operation or assistance is extremely difficult or costly, a lack of co-
operation becomes more understandable. Where cooperation is
relatively costless, however, the duty to cooperate pursuant to in-
ternational agreements must become more demanding. Setting
opportunity costs aside, the building or expansion of generic pro-
duction facilities, the hiring of additional personnel, and the export
of generic drugs to less-developed countries at a price that is equal
to (or slightly above) their total cost would tend to fall into the lat-
ter of these two categories.
597 See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 1.3 (setting forth state obligations to
promote self-determination and to conform to provisions of the U.N. Charter).
598 U.N. CHARTER art. 1.2-1.3.
599 Id. art. 55.
600 Id. art. 55a.
601 Id. art. 1.1.
602 See, e.g., Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 42 (noting that while only
States are parties to the ICESCR, all members of society have responsibilities re-
garding the right to health under it).
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5.5. An Interdependent System of Accountability
5.5.1. Introduction
Rigid distinctions between civil and political rights and eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights-as well as traditional views re-
garding the separation of positive and negative rights-can no
longer be justified. Admittedly, it has been politically expedient to
divide these rights into two separate Covenants, to argue that some
rights impose immediate obligations while others are subject to
policy judgment, and to provide an interstate and individual com-
plaint system for one series of rights but not for the other. Such a
tidy political approach ignores the fact that many rights, especially
those surrounding the right to health, are truly hybrid in nature.
603
As a result, an attempt to classify a right under one exclusive cate-
gory or the other, and thereby determine which system of account-
ability shall apply, is doomed either to failure or to an exercise in
hypocrisy.
Despite political demands for segregation, a variety of interna-
tional instruments have taken the position that all human rights
are indivisible, interrelated, and interdependent, and that civil and
political freedoms cannot be realistically enjoyed without a strong
foundation in the economic, social, and cultural rights60 4 that pro-
vide stability and structure to a society. More particularly, these
two sets of rights are bound together by a number of undeniable
linkages that bridge the gap between traditional notions of free-
doms and more positive State obligations. For example, rights to
equality, equal protection, security of person, life, subsistence, self-
determination, and the protection of the family are all intricate
603 See Porter, supra note 569, at 148-55 (discussing substantive obligations
and substantive equality analysis).
604 See, e.g., Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 5 (stating that "[aill rights
are universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated"); Declaration on the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, supra note 1, pmbl. (reiterating the universal-
ity of human rights); DRD, supra note 25, art. 6.2 (contending that "all human
rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent"); Proclama-
tion of Teheran, supra note 31, para. 13 (proposing that "human rights and funda-
mental freedoms are indivisible"); see also, ICESCR, supra note 23, pmbl. (stating
that the ideal of free human beings can only be achieved if conditions are created
where everyone can enjoy economic, social, and political rights, as well as civil
and political rights); ICCPR, supra note 125, pmbl. (reiterating the need to secure
fundamental rights to sustain certain freedoms); supra notes 123-50 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the common source of all human rights).
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components of the right to health. Nevertheless, each of these
rights are specifically enumerated and specifically guaranteed in
the ICCPR.605
The right to self-determination provides a meaningful illustra-
tion of the overlap between civil and political and economic, social
and cultural rights. This right, identically recognized and defined
in both the ICESCR and the ICCPR, provides that all peoples are
not only free to determine their own political status, but they are
free to "pursue their economic, social and cultural development"
as well.60 6 These freedoms are in fact accompanied by a number of
positive obligations on the part of the State. The ICCPR provides
that the Parties "shall promote" the realization of this right,607 that
they shall "ensure" this right to all individuals without distinc-
tion,608 and that they shall take "the necessary steps" to adopt such
laws or other measures (including the provision of effective reme-
dies) that may be needed to give effect to this right.609
In turn, the right to self-determination is inherently linked to
the rights of development and social progress. The 'right to devel-
opment' entitles all individuals "to participate in, contribute to,
and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development" 610
and "implies the full realization of the right ... to self-determina-
tion." 611 As an inalienable right,612 its existence is not dependent
upon the passage of domestic legislation or the implementation of
an international treaty. Instead, all nations are innately bound to
refrain from frustrating or interfering with its exercise. The DRD,
however, also imposes a series of positive obligations that include
the duty to formulate national and international developmental
policies, 613 the duty to create conditions favorable to the realization
of the right to development,614 and the duty to cooperate with other
605 See ICCPR, supra note 125, arts. 1.1-1.2, 3, 6, 9, 14, 17, 23, 26 (concerning
rights of self-determination, subsistence, equality, life, security, privacy, protec-
tion of family, and equal protection).
606 ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 1.1; ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 1.1.
607 ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 1.3.
608 Id. art. 2.1.
609 Id. art. 2.
610 DRD, supra note 25, art. 1.1.
611 Id. art. 1.2.
612 Id. art. 1.1.
613 Id. arts. 2.3, 4.1.
614 Id. art. 3.1.
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nations "in ensuring development" and in "eliminating obstacles
to development" 615 that may result from the failure to observe ei-
ther civil and political rights or economic, social, and cultural
rights.616 Similarly, the collateral right to enjoy "the fruits of social
progress"6 17 arguably broadens the scope of self-determination to
include such rights as the right to the highest attainable standard of
health618 and the right to both an "equitable sharing" 619 and "in-
creased utilization" 620 of scientific and technological advances.
While the political gap between the basic rights to development
and self-determination and the more particular right to health is
substantial, such an admission does not alter the fact that these
rights are both logically and legally interdependent. The concept
of self-determination is based upon both the freedom to pursue
one's own political, economic, social and cultural development and
the freedom to choose between different courses of action in such a
regard. Where individuals and communities are facing physical or
economic extinction, these freedoms to pursue (or these freedoms
to choose) are either irrelevant or nonexistent. As a result, the in-
ternational community is increasingly taking the position that fun-
damental human rights cannot be recognized on a piecemeal basis.
While many positive rights are incapable of being realized imme-
diately, it has become obvious that their continued absence serves
to restrict the realization of all forms of rights including those that
are more politically convenient.
The indivisibility of civil and political rights and economic, so-
cial and cultural rights is also based upon a number of common in-
ternational norms. Both sets of rights, for example, are premised
upon the inherent dignity of the human person.621 Both are viewed
as absolutely necessary for the achievement and maintenance of in-
615 Id. art. 3.3.
616 Id. art. 6.3.
617 Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542, U.N. GAOR,
24thSess., Supp No. 30, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
618 See id. art. 10(d).
619 Id. art. 13(a).
620 Id. art. 24(c).
621 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 125, pmbl. (declaring that certain human free-
doms can only be achieved through the protection of civil, political, economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights); ICESCR, supra note 23, pmbl. (stating that economic, so-
cial and cultural rights, in addition to political and civil rights, must be protected
to allow the ideal of free human beings); Universal Declaration, supra note 118,
pmbl. (recognizing inherent dignity and rights of humans).
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ternational peace and security. 622 Both reflect the fact that all per-
sons are entitled to "a social and international order" in which
these rights can be realized 623 and both demand the recognition of
equality, equal protection, and the right to life.
As a result, while the ICCPR and the ICESCR are primarily di-
rected at different classes of rights, they possess a number of iden-
tical mandates and common goals. Additionally, the existence of a
symbiotic relationship of causes and effects make it impossible to
view any particular right in isolation. The HIV/AIDS crisis, for
example, is at least in part the consequence of inequality and the de-
nial of equal protection. When viewed in the context of poverty,
the HIV/AIDS crisis also reflects the absence of the rights to sub-
sistence, development, and self-determination. Simultaneously,
however, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS are also a direct cause of
increased poverty,624 heightened discrimination, and an erosion of
the rights to life, development, and self-determination.
Viewing health as an interlocking human right "indispensable
for the exercise of other human rights" 625 mandates a system of ac-
countability that goes far beyond that envisioned by the ICESCR.
Such a system must not only encompass the positive obligations
imposed by the right to health, it must capture also its effects on
civil and political freedoms, international peace and security, and
interstate relationships.
5.5.2. Searching for Accountability
The U.N. General Assembly has taken the position that any
person whose human rights or fundamental freedoms have been
violated must be provided "a public hearing before an independ-
ent, impartial and competent judicial or other authority" and must
be awarded, as circumstances require, an effective and enforceable
form of legal relief.626 Similarly, the Committee on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights, while acknowledging that individual
complaints are not expressly recognized in the ICESCR, has indi-
cated that such remedies are presumptively implied by the all "ap-
622 Id.
623 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, art. 28.
624 See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 475, para. 45 (indicating that
ill health can be both a cause of poverty and a consequence of poverty).
625 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 1.
626 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, supra note 1, art. 9.2.
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propriate means" requirement found in Article 2.1 of the Cove-
nant.627 As a result, any Party seeking to justify a failure to provide
domestic remedies would face the substantial burden of demon-
strating that such remedies were either inappropriate or unneces-
sary.
628
Certainly this ideal of an individual complaint procedure for
violations of economic, social, or cultural rights can be the subject
of substantial frustration. The positive connotations of these rights,
the unavoidable subjectivity of progressive realization, and the re-
alities of both political decision making and the availability of fi-
nite resources tend to temper the willingness of governments to
acknowledge their liability. Such an observation should not be
equated with a lack of accountability. In particular regard to the
right to health, accountability may be imposed by means of a broad
patchwork of domestic proceedings, international monitoring and
'adjudication,' individual and interstate complaints, global con-
demnation, multilateral sanctions, Security Council action, and
humanitarian intervention. Whether viewed in terms of imposing
monetary liability on States or in terms of 'punishing' nations for
breaches of international covenants, an interdependent system of
accountability can, in fact, be developed.
As discussed earlier, many nations have adopted constitutional
provisions that guarantee their citizens the right to health or health
care, as well as to a variety of other health-related entitlements.
Additionally, many States have incorporated either the Universal
Declaration or the ICESCR into their constitutions or statutory re-
gimes, while others have granted their citizens health-related
rights by means of domestic legislation. 629 In light of the funda-
mental tenet that all nationals have the right to an effective remedy
by a competent domestic tribunal for violations of rights that have
been granted to them by their own constitution or domestic laws,
630
it is relatively safe to assume (barring issues of justiciability) that
accountability may be imposed by means of domestic proceedings.
627 See Substantive Issues (1998), supra note 459, para. 3 (emphasizing the im-
portance of judicial remedies).
628 Id.
629 See supra notes 495-539 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
guarantees of health-related rights around the world).
630 See Universal Declaration, supra note 118, art. 8 (proclaiming the right to ef-
fective remedy by national tribunals for violations of fundamental rights granted
by law).
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In South Africa, for example, the constitution not only guarantees
all citizens the right to health services, 631 it specifically provides in-
dividuals with the right to institute legal proceedings in domestic
courts if such a right has been violated.632 The judicial remedies
that have been granted by courts in such nations as South Africa,
Venezuela, and Costa Rica 633 further testify to an increasing ability
of individuals to domestically enforce the right to health.
Although subject to substantial qualification, it can also be ar-
gued that individuals have acquired the right to seek domestic
remedies pursuant to the terms of international agreements even
where those agreements have not been specifically incorporated
into a State's constitutional or legislative framework. Such an ar-
gument, of course, is limited by the concept of non-self-execution.
Treaties that are not self-executing establish rights and duties be-
tween ratifying nations but do not establish binding relationships
between a nation and its own citizens. Unless a Party adopts ena-
bling legislation (thereby making the treaty binding internally) in-
dividuals are not awarded domestic rights by means of the treaty
and have no grounds upon which to enforce its mandates against
their own governments. 634 Additionally, even self-executing trea-
ties are not internally binding in some nations (such as the United
Kingdom) unless the legislative body chooses to enact implement-
ing legislation. 635
On the other hand, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has taken the position that the ICESCR "does not
negate the possibility that the rights it contains may be considered
self-executing" and that in most States it is the responsibility of the
judiciary (and not the executive or legislature) to make such a de-
termination.636 As a result, it is particularly important "to avoid
631 S. AFR. CoNST., art. 27(1)a.
632 Id. art. 38.
633 See supra notes 522-38 and accompanying text (discussing South African
legal responses to HIV/AIDS).
634 See AUGUST, supra note 498, at 81-86 (discussing enabling legislation);
Southard, supra note 439, at 42-43, 45, 47-49 (citing John H. Jackson, United States,
in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DoMEsTIc LAW 141, 148-56 (Frances G. Jacobs & Shel-
ley Roberts eds. 1987)); see also Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (holding
that the California Alien Land Law "is invalid as in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment" and that no treaty between the United States and Japan gives plain-
tiff the right to own land).
65 AUGUST, supra note 498, at 335.
636 Substantive Issues (1998), supra note 459, para. 11.
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any a priori assumption" that the Covenant's norms are non-self-
executing.637 Many of these norms, according to the Comnmittee,
"are stated in terms which are at least as clear and specific as those
in other human rights treaties" that have been regularly deemed to
be self-executing by domestic courts.638 In support of such a posi-
tion, the Committee cites the fact that attempts to include a provi-
sion stating that the Covenant was non-self-executing "were
strongly rejected" during the drafting process.639
It should also be noted that the concept of non-self-execution is
only applicable to treaty law and thus does not impose limitations
on the individual enforcement of rights that have evolved from
customary law.640 As will be discussed in more detail in Section 6,
the interplay of domestic law, state practice, global declarations,
and regional and international agreements is creating a body of
customary human rights norms that actually transcends individual
treaties. To examine each source of law in isolation -and to diag-
nose each treaty as to its internal effect-is to ignore the evolution
of more unifying principles. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,641 for exam-
ple, the court demonstrated that non-self-executing treaties such as
the U.N. Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American
States, as well as non-binding declarations and General Assembly
resolutions, can in fact be used to carve out binding principles of
customary international law.642 Similarly, an "expectation of ad-
herence," 643 while originating in non-binding expressions, can
gradually ripen into a legal rule conferring fundamental rights on
citizens in relationship to their own governments.6 44
Whether based upon domestic law or international treaty, eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights (including the right to health) are
inevitably associated with the issue of justiciability. It can be ar-
gued that these rights are not really 'rights' at all but are instead
637 Id.
638 Id.
639 Id.
64 Southard, supra note 439, at 54 (citing Jordan J. Paust, Litigating Human
Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 81, 139 (1981)).
641 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
642 See id. at 880-85 (showing how international treaties affect the laws of na-
tions, with a particular emphasis on human rights).
643 Id. at 883.
644 See id. at 884-85 (discussing how a non-binding expression can become a
legal rule providing fundamental rights).
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only aspirational governmental objectives. 645 As a result, the am-
biguities surrounding these objectives and the means for their pro-
gressive realization are best resolved through the policymaking of
elected officials and not through the process of adjudication.
646
There is no doubt that some of the issues regarding economic,
social and cultural rights are non-justiciable. Whether it is better to
fund progressive realization by means of an increase in income tax
rates or the imposition of a sales tax, for example, is certainly a
question best left to policymakers. It would be absolutely ludi-
crous, however, to argue that economic, social and cultural rights
are, in their entirety, beyond judicial adjudication. As Professor
Schwartz has noted, modem courts have undertaken a variety of
"affirmative activities" including the supervision of school deseg-
regation and monitoring of unions.647 Whether viewed in terms of
positive rights or in terms of the negative aspects of positive rights,
courts have also chosen to address issues such as the right to edu-
cation, affirmative action, abortion, housing, welfare benefits, and
the equal protection ramifications of poverty.
648
It is also important to recognize that when courts examine posi-
tive rights, whether they arise from domestic law or international
agreement, an exercise of the policy making function is not de-
manded. Instead, courts may simply adjudicate rights that have
been legislatively granted-by constitution, statutory regime, or
treaty ratification-in terms of their meaning, their scope and ap-
plication, and their accompanying remedies. Such an interpreta-
tion of rights, despite the resource implications that may follow,
649
is a function that courts perform on a daily basis.
650
645 See Porter, supra note 569 (discussing how rights are actually just govern-
ment aspirations).
646 See id. at 128, 137-45, 147-48, 155-60 (arguing that these issues are best re-
solved through the policymaking of elected officials and not through adjudica-
tion).
647 Schwartz, supra note 500, at 1237.
648 For a discussion of economic and social rights, positive and negative
rights, and rights of a hybrid nature, see id.
649 See Substantive Issues (1998), supra note 459, para. 10.
650 As Bruce Porter indicated, "Poor people such as the claimants in Masse [v.
Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20 (1996)] do
not advance rights claims under the [Canadian] Charter on the assumption that
courts are experts in social policy and on that account ought to redesign pro-
grammes. Rather, they seek from courts adjudication of constitutional rights..
Porter, supra note 569, at 157.
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As a result, the segregation of civil and political rights and eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights in terms of justiciability would not
only be erroneous, but "arbitrary" and "incompatible" with their
indivisibility and interdependence. 651 Implicitly recognizing such a
fact, the court in Treatment Action Campaign took the position that
the reasonableness of steps taken by the government in fulfilling its
constitutional obligation to progressively realize the right to health
was indeed a justiciable issue. 652 In response to the argument that
a grant of relief would involve both policymaking and a breach of
the separation of powers, the court indicated that when the judici-
ary "sits in judgment on the reasonableness of steps taken by the
executive arm in the fulfillment of its constitutional obligations, it
is exactly a perfect example of how the separation of powers should
work."653 To rule otherwise would be to negate the supremacy of
the Constitution.654 Similarly, a refusal by the courts to enforce leg-
islatively recognized rights or to provide remedies for their breach
would be to allow an executive to dilute the power of a legislating
body.655
In addition to the provision of domestic remedies, a substantial
degree of accountability could also be developed at the regional
and international levels. A variety of multilateral agreements,
while employing differing sets of jurisdictional prerequisites, have
already established both human rights monitoring mechanisms
and individual and interstate complaints systems. In regard to re-
gional agreements, for example, the African Charter has estab-
lished the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to
promote and ensure the protection of human rights throughout the
continent.656 The Commission is designed to formulate rules aimed
at solving legal issues relating to human rights, to make recom-
mendations to member governments, and to interpret the provi-
651 Substantive Issues (1998), supra note 459, para. 10.
652 Treatment Action Campaign v. Minister of Health, 2002 (4) BCLR 356, 379-
80 (T) (S. Afr.).
653 Id. (emphasis added).
654 See id at 380 (referencing Mohammed and Another v. President of the Republic
of S. Afr. and Others, 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC)).
655 Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt has indicated that a variety of laws and de-
cisions at the national, regional, and international levels confirm the justiciability
of the right to health. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 475, para. 20.
656 African Charter, supra note 474, arts. 30, 31, 41.
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sions of the Charter.657 The Commission is also empowered to hear
interstate complaints regarding violations of the Charter (and to is-
sue reports and recommendations in their regard) 658 and to con-
sider "other communications," 6 9 (including those from individu-
als) that reveal "a series of serious or massive violations" of human
rights. 660 Additionally, a protocol to the Charter, although not yet
in force, would establish a permanent African Court on Human
and People's Rights.661
Other regional bodies, such as the European Commission on
Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the Euro-
pean Committee of Social Rights, and the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights can also assume a larger role in ensuring the
observance of fundamental rights and freedoms. While employing
varying prerequisites and distinctions -such as the need for recog-
nizing the competence of a particular body, the separation of civil
and political rights from economic, social and cultural rights, the
distinguishing of individual and systemic violations, and the need
for exhaustion of domestic remedies -several of these institutions
have already addressed violations of the right to health and other
health-related issues.662 Additionally, the competencies of these
bodies are generally supplemented by a regional monitoring proc-
ess, such as that found in the African Charter663 and the Protocol of
San Salvador,664 that require States to submit periodic reports re-
garding the progressive measures they have taken to realize the
rights set forth in the relevant treaty.
At the international level, each of the major human rights trea-
ties-including the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the CRC, and the
CEDAW665- establish a similar monitoring process under the aus-
657 Id. art. 45.
658 Id. arts. 47-54.
659 Id. art. 55.
660 Id. art. 58.1.
661 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establish-
ment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998), reprinted in BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 741 (Ian Brownlie et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 4th
ed 2002).
662 See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 475, paras. 17-19 (illustrating
examples of international bodies answering fundamental rights and freedoms).
663 African Charter, supra note 474, art. 62.
664 Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 471, art. 19.
665 ICCPR, supra note 125, arts. 28-45; ICESCR, supra note 23, arts. 16-25; CRC,
supra note 117, arts. 43-45; CEDAW, supra note 119, arts. 17-22.
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pices of various U.N. Human Rights Committees. States will sub-
mit periodic reports describing the measures adopted and progress
made toward the achievement of treaty rights. Periodic reviews of
State action will be conducted by the Committee charged with su-
pervising State compliance and Concluding Observations (includ-
ing statements of treaty violation or non-compliance) will be issued
by that Committee. In particular regard to the right to health-
which encompasses rights of women and children, rights to equal-
ity and non-discrimination, and rights to self-determination and
development -several treaty-based Committees are capable of le-
gitimately monitoring State progress.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is of
particular interest in light of the fact that it is responsible for ensur-
ing compliance with the ICESCR but lacks the power to hear indi-
vidual complaints. In addressing this issue and the evolutionary
role of the Committee, however, Bruce Porter has indicated that
while "lacking a jurisprudence arising from an individual com-
plaints procedure ... the Committee has adopted an adjudicative
framework" 666 for examining claims regarding social and economic
rights. Such an observation is based upon the fact that the Com-
mittee has now decided to allow oral submissions by non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") as part of the consideration
of periodic reports and to grant NGOs the right to appear in the
context of the periodic review of a State's compliance.667 Such an
"adjudicative model," Porter argues, "facilitates what amounts to a
hearing-considering allegations of non-compliance advanced by
domestic groups and then considering 'responses' from govern-
ments."668 This new process represents "a critical means for bring-
ing to light violations of social and economic rights." 669 With a fo-
cus on the availability of economic resources, the conditions of
vulnerable constituencies, and the need for measurable progress
under the concept of progressive realization,670 the monitoring
process of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
has been transformed into a legitimate and "influential human
666 Porter, supra note 569, at 126.
667 Id. at 124-25.
668 Id. at 125.
669 Id. (citation omitted).
670 Id. at 129-30.
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rights adjudication procedure."671
In regard to an international complaints system, Resolution
1235672 authorizes the Human Rights Commission "to examine in-
formation relevant to gross violations of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms," to make a thorough study of situations that re-
veal a "consistent pattern" of violation, and to report their findings
(with accompanying recommendations) to the Economic and Social
Council. 673 Additionally, Resolution 1503674 authorizes the Com-
mission (through its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, its Working Groups, and its ad
hoc committees) to consider "all communications," as well as gov-
ernmental replies, received by the Secretary General with the simi-
lar purpose of determining whether there is a "consistent pattern
of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights."675 In car-
rying out 1503 complaint investigations, ad hoc committees have
the right to hear witnesses and review all communications 676 and
the Commission is authorized to report and make recommenda-
tions in such a regard. Unfortunately, the need for State consent,
along with the requirement of confidentiality and the general po-
litical nature of the Commission, tend to detract from the legiti-
macy of the 1503 complaint procedure. 677
Throughout this Article it has been consistently argued that
economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights
are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. It has also been
argued that the right to the highest attainable standard of health,
while generally viewed as a positive right, has a substantial influ-
ence on the realization of such civil and political rights as life,
equality, and self-determination. Consistent with this position, it
can also be argued that the provisions of the ICCPR-including its
complaint procedures -are capable of being applied to the right to
671 Id. at 127.
672 1967 U.N.Y.B. 512, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967), available at http://www.oup.
co.uk/pdf/bt/cassese/cases/part3/ch16/1602.pdf.
673 Id. paras. 2, 3.
674 1970 U.N.Y.B. 530 U.N. Doc. E/4868 (1970), available at http://
www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/HR-DOCS/ERES1503.HTM.
675 Id. paras. 1, 5.
676 Id. para. 7(b).
677 See id. paras. 5, 7(c), and 8 (discussing confidentiality); id. paras. 6(b) and 7
(discussing consent); The U.N. Human Rights Regime, supra note 21, at 462 (contain-
ing remarks by Markus G. Schmidt).
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health in a variety of contexts. As a result, the opportunity to en-
force the right to health under the interstate and individual com-
plaint mechanisms found in the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol
should not be ignored.
By becoming a Party to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,678 a
State recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee
to "receive and consider" complaints from individuals who claim
to be victims of a violation (on the part of the State) of the rights set
forth in the ICCPR.679 While certainly not universally accepted, it
is promising that more than one hundred nations have become
parties to this Protocol and have thereby agreed to submit them-
selves (subject to comity and exhaustion requirements) 680 to an in-
dividual complaints procedure before an international treaty-
monitoring body.
In regard to interstate complaints, Article 41 of the ICCPR pro-
vides that a Party may declare that it recognizes the competence of
the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider complaints
in which one State Party claims that another State Party is not ful-
filling its obligations under the Covenant. 681 To date, forty-eight
States have made such a declaration, including such nations as
South Africa, Russia, and the United States. It should also be noted
that Article 41 only deals with the process of bringing interstate
complaints before the Human Rights Committee. It specifically
applies "without prejudice" to other procedures "prescribed in the
field of human rights" in other instruments of the United Nations
and its specialized agencies.682 As a result, this article does not
prevent States from having recourse to alternative systems for the
settlement of interstate disputes regarding the violation of civil and
political rights.683
The availability of these ICCPR proceedings could serve to in-
crease governmental accountability in regard to the right to the
highest attainable standard of health. It is certainly conceivable,
for example, that a denial of reproductive rights could infringe
678 G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR 3d. Comm., 21st Sess., 1496th mtg. at 49
(1966).
679 Id. pmbl., art. 1.
680 Id. art. 5.2.
681 ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 41.1.
682 Id. art. 44.
683 Id.
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upon the rights of equality or equal protection, that a denial of
antiretroviral treatment could infringe upon the right to life, and
that the denial of an HIV/ AIDS prevention program could infringe
upon the right to self-determination or development.
Irrespective of these remedies, every State has an absolute right
to expect that all other States will adhere to their treaty commit-
ments. Such an expectation is based upon the fact that even non-
self-executing treaties -which create no binding relationships be-
tween a nation and its own citizens -are nevertheless binding be-
tween the nations that are parties to those agreements. As a result,
and despite its status within any particular country, a treaty un-
questionably creates a "legal obligation . . . on the international
plane".684 Additionally, because a State is sovereign for the pur-
pose of limiting its own sovereignty,685 States can legally bind
themselves to other nations on issues of internal policy and thereby
internationalize those domestic issues.686 Even when internal en-
forcement mechanisms are lacking, it is generally accepted that
once a State has undertaken a treaty obligation-for example,
agreeing to provide its citizens with certain human rights -it can
no longer assert to its treaty partners that those obligations are
within its exclusive jurisdiction.687 If such an international princi-
ple is to have meaning, Parties to an agreement must have the right
to seek enforcement of treaty provisions and to take action in the
event of their breach. Any argument to the contrary would negate
the legitimacy of treaty regimes.
The concept of enforcement, of course, is subject to interpreta-
tion. It could be argued, for example, that in the absence of the
power to enforce, no legal duty can exist. On the other hand, it
could also be argued that the concepts of 'duty' and 'enforcement'
are in fact distinct and that duties-both in moral and legal
684 See INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENvIR. RESEARCH AND LAWYER'S COMMITTEE
ON NUCLEAR POLICY, RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW? AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S.
POLICIES AND AcrIONS REGARDING SECuRITY-RELATED TREATIES 30 (Nicole Deller, et
al., eds., 2002) [hereinafter RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?]; Southard, supra note
439, at 43 n.7 (citing JOHN H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES, IN THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN
DOMESTIC LAW 141, 148-56 (Frances G. Jacobs et al. eds. 1987)).
685 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 131
(June 27).
686 See AUGUST, supra note 498, at 253 (stating that "a state may agree by
treaty to limit its sovereignty and thus internationalize a subject").
687 Id. (discussing the holding in the Advisory Opinion on Nationality De-
crees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4).
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terms-can be assumed by nations even when enforcement is im-
practical or abstract. In either event, this Article takes the position
that treaty duties -including the duty to provide the highest at-
tainable standard of health -are enforceable by means of a number
of individual and interstate complaint systems at the domestic, re-
gional, and international levels.
Additionally, enforcement can also be viewed in terms of the
ability to 'punish' even when actual treaty performance cannot be
mandated. The existence of lawful international mechanisms that
can be used to punish nations that violate treaty obligations sup-
ports the position that human rights treaties establish recognizable
duties that can in fact be 'enforced' by other Parties. Lawful pun-
ishment may take the form of formal international condemnation
which, contrary to common understanding, is a response that most
countries are eager to avoid.688 Punishment may also take such
forms as withholding privileges under the treaty that has been
breached, the reduction or elimination of unilateral or multilateral
aid, the denial of loans by national or international lending institu-
tions, the imposition of travel bans, or the freezing of individual or
State assets.689 In particular regard to the HIV/AIDS crisis, a
State's denial of the right to the highest attainable standard of
health -or a refusal by an infected State to take all possible steps to
combat the epidemic -could be punished by means of embargoes
or other economic sanctions imposed by nations potentially en-
dangered by such neglect. If those nations viewed such a refusal
(and the resulting spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic) as a threat
to their security, such a response (while admittedly draconian)
would be legally justified.
Additionally, it can be argued that the U.N. Security Council is
empowered under Chapter VII to take similar measures whenever
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Since the U.N. Security Council has already recognized the
HIV/AIDS epidemic as a potential threat to international secu-
rity,690 it would seem logical that the Council would have the au-
thority to intervene in such a regard. From a broader perspective,
688 RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 138 (discussing partici-
pation in intergovernmental organizations to avoid such condemnation).
689 Id.
690 U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4172nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc S/Res. 1308 (2000) (ad-
dressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic).
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it can be argued that massive violations of human rights also con-
stitute a threat to the peace that can justify U.N. Security Council
intervention.691 As Lodico has noted, States have become bound,
whether through treaty or customary law, to protect the basic hu-
man rights of their citizens and such protections can be enforced
when their violation jeopardizes international security.692 While
the existence of an HIV/AIDS epidemic does not in itself constitute
a violation of human rights, the lack of a progressive realization of
the right to health (or the refusal to take all possible measures for
the prevention, treatment, and containment of the HIV/AIDS cri-
sis) would in fact constitute such a violation. Under such a circum-
stance, the concept of sovereignty or territorial integrity would not
prevent the use of multilateral sanctions or humanitarian interven-
tion if the global community was being threatened.
The availability of both lawful punishment and valid interven-
tion underscore the fact that the welfare of a population is no
longer the sole domain of national governments.693 By viewing
'enforcement' in these terms, it seems clear that States owe a vari-
ety of duties to their citizens that can be externally 'enforced'.
States can be held accountable for ignoring human rights norms as
third parties (both unilaterally and in concert) have the right to
demand treaty compliance.
The arguments advanced above can in fact be supported by a
relatively traditional treaty law approach to international relations.
It will now be argued, however, that in the limited context of hu-
man rights a 'constitutional law' approach must be adopted that
transcends any particular agreement and is unencumbered by
treaty-based notions of self-execution, implementing legislation,
and the consent of individual States.694 Unlike agreements that
691 See supra notes 411-413 and accompanying text (addressing the universal
rights of all humans and the Congressional adoption of international sanctions
against Fidel Castro's regime).
692 Lodico, supra note 21, at 1028, 1031.
693 See id. at 1027-50 (discussing how military force is justified if gross viola-
tions of human rights threaten international peace and security and providing ex-
amples of when international force has been used).
694 In the context of the European Union, Eric Stein has authoritatively ar-
gued that:
[T]he Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned a con-
stitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe... has con-
strued the European Community Treaties in a constitutional mode rather
than employing the traditional international law methodology... [and]
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merely establish relationships among nations, human rights trea-
ties are directed toward individuals695 and are designed to acknowl-
edge the inherent dignity and fundamental rights of each citizen.
They are oblivious to nationality, governmental structure, and ter-
ritorial boundaries and they view human rights solely in terms of
international universality. Additionally, these agreements are
supplemented by a substantial body of customary law-primarily
reflecting the tenets of the Universal Declaration and the expecta-
tions of the United Nations-as well as by a variety of principles
that have arguably reached the status of jus cogens.
The enforcement of human rights on the basis of constitutional
law requires a reassessment of the fundamental nature of constitu-
tions, the premises upon which they are based, and the process by
which they may come into being. Additionally, a State's consent to
the imposition of duties must no longer be assessed in terms of
treaty ratification, but in terms of a legal prerequisite for member-
ship in the community of legitimate nations. Such attitudinal
changes toward the concepts of enforcement and duty must ini-
tially be based upon the recognition that a constitutive system need
not be finite in order to exist and that binding constitutional prin-
ciples can develop -even in the absence of traditional machinery -
by means of a dynamic and fluid process of progression.
6. THE HIv/ AIDS CRISIS IN A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
6.1. Introduction
The HIV/AIDS crisis represents a substantial failure of both
domestic and international polities. Such a failure may be viewed
in terms of a lack of respect for human rights and treaty obligations
or a lack of respect for the value of human life. It may reflect the
existence of poverty, the acute differentials in standards of living,
has established and obtained acceptance of the broad principle of direct
integration of Community law into the national legal orders.
Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 1 (1981). In arguing an evolution from a traditional treaty approach to a
direct effects constitutional approach, Stein addresses such issues as the direct ef-
fects principle, supremacy, and the individual as the subject of Community trea-
ties. Id. at 3-27.
695 For a discussion of individual rights and the 'direct effect' principle within
the context of the EU, see id. at 3-10. In regard to individuals as the subjects of
treaties, see Southard, supra note 439, at 43.
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the condoning of traditional practices, or the apathy of those na-
tions less affected. Whatever the cause, the failure of current re-
gimes has not only become evidenced by the deaths of millions, it
portends future failure in regard to other health crises as well.
These failures also present an unprecedented opportunity for
the global community to redefine its fundamental common values
and to internalize a new international identity.696 Such a transfor-
mative process may take the form of a 'higher lawmaking' on the
part of the 'people,' 697 a mandate from the increasing pool of public
and private international actors, or an acknowledgment by States
(in their capacity as individual citizens of a global regime) that
rights and interests are indeed hierarchical in nature. While not
designed to create a world government or to establish a global con-
stitution governing all aspects of international relations, such a
process is replete with constitutive properties that can withstand
constitutional analysis, that can impose constitutional duties, and
that can identify a progressive global constitutionalism in the spe-
cific domain of human rights.
It has been argued throughout this Article that the HIV/AIDS
crisis is fundamentally an issue of human rights whether examined
in terms of the right to health, the right to equality and non-
discrimination, the right to self-determination and development, or
the right to realize civil and political freedom.698 By placing these
rights within a constitutional dimension, a variety of universal
principles may be imposed. Not only would individuals be the
central object of these rights, their constitutive nature would pro-
vide all citizens with the right to judicially enforce individual
claims. All interstate actors -including States, national and inter-
national institutions, and the private sector-would be bound to
respect these rights and to refrain from interfering with their reali-
zation, irrespective of whether they have consented to their recog-
nition. In specific regard to positive rights such as the right to
696 In regard to re-defining fundamental values and developing a new iden-
tity in the national setting, see ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS and ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 17. In regard to the process of "internalization", see
Koh, supra note 13.
697 See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS and ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra
note 17 (focusing on constitutional politics, thought, formation, and foundations
in the United States).
698 See supra notes 32-151 and accompanying text (providing an in-depth
analysis of the nature and human rights ramifications of the HIV/AIDS crisis).
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health, it is admitted that global actors may ultimately meet these
'constitutional' responsibilities by engaging in bona fide attempts at
progressive realization. Nevertheless, a constitutional perspective
would inherently create a hierarchy of values in which these hu-
man rights would prevail over those that are more property or con-
tract related.
In order to establish the existence of a progressive constitutive
process, historical conceptions of textualism, domesticity, totality,
and formal rulemaking must be questioned. From a traditional
perspective, a constitution is endowed with a variety of character-
istics that serve to differentiate its supremacy from lower-order
norms, laws, or treaties. Fundamentally, a constitution represents
a practical compromise by which a 'community,' in order to pro-
tect and ensure the freedoms of every member of society, agrees to
impose a limited number of restraints on those freedoms.699 This
agreement to maximize rights for all -subject to restrictions on the
ability to interfere with the rights of others -must be enforced, in
Kant's words, by the "coercive laws" 700 of a "supreme power."701
Under such a rule of law, self-interest defers to the greater social
interest whenever the two are in conflict.
702
More particularly, a constitution establishes the relationships
between the government and the people being governed. In doing
so, it provides for substantial limitations on the exercise or abuse of
governmental power by means of reserving certain inalienable
rights for all citizens and by creating a system of checks and bal-
ances among governmental institutions.703 These checks and bal-
ances are realized by means of a separation of powers under which
the authority to create, implement, and interpret the law are di-
vided among distinct institutions. This division among legislative,
699 See KANT, supra note 12, at 41-53, 73, 74, 76, 127, 134 (providing the history
of democratic participation and mechanisms for protection against government
abuses, such as a system of checks and balances).
700 Id. at 73.
701 Id. at 127.
702 See Stone, supra note 16, at 465, 473 (explaining how a constitution helps
promote societal interests, not self-interest).
703 See Fassbender, supra note 13, at 532-38, 569 (stating that constitutions cre-
ate a "complex of fundamental norms governing organization and performance of
governmental functions... and describing the relationship between state authori-
ties and citizens"); Petersmann, supra note 18, at 758-61 (surveying the five major
political interventions of Constitutionalism); and Reisman, supra note 13, at 95
(discussing the use of constitutions to help prevent government abuse).
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executive, and judicial units creates a fundamental legal structure
that is viewed as requisite for a constitutional form of govern-
ment.704 The supremacy of the rule of law, the existence of auton-
omy among institutions, the recognition of an internal hierarchy,
the provision for lawful change, and the universality of application
further characterize the traditional constitutional regime.
In light of these qualities, the concept of constitutionalism has
been primarily associated with the legal frameworks of individual
nation-states.705 Additionally, it has been argued that the lack of
such constitutional elements as supremacy, institutional autonomy,
lawmaking capacity, identifiable community, and a system of
checks and balances render theories of constitutionalism inapplica-
ble in the international setting.706 On the other hand, it has also
been argued that "what counts as a constitution" should not be
based exclusively on posited rules707 and that "constitution build-
ing" should not be viewed in a purely "legalistic fashion." 708 In
terms of the metaphysical, binding constitutional principles can in
fact develop outside the boundaries of traditional thinking and
without the sanction of traditional political theory. Constitutional
communities can indeed exist wherein all members of society are
bound (with or without their consent) to certain subject matter ten-
ets that can be created, administered, and interpreted through
more innovative means.
While the elements of a constitution are fairly well established,
it does not follow that the creation - and thus the existence - of a
constitution must be predicated upon a momentous, one-time
event. Instead, the creation of constitutional rights and duties may
result from an evolutionary process along a progressive contin-
704 See Stone, supra note 16, at 449-54, 473 (recognizing that constitutions spec-
ify the responsibilities of a country's formal institutions); Fassbender, supra note
13, at 532-38, 548, 553, 556-57, 569, 574 (describing the separation of powers as a
central tenet of the American and European constitutional state); Petersmann, su-
pra note 18, at 758-61, 766 (noting that constitutions establish a basic legal frame-
work).
705 See Fassbender, supra note 13, at 555-61 (exploring the dichotomy between
domestic and international laws).
706 For a discussion and various citations in this regard, see id. at 616; Koh,
supra note 13, at 2616; Macdonald, supra note 18, at 228-31; Reisman, supra note 13,
at 95; and Stone, supra note 16, at 449-54.
707 Macdonald, supra note 18, at 230.
708 Reisman, supra note 13, at 99.
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uum, 709 whereby rights and duties can become constitutionally
binding even in the absence of a full-blown, formally recognizable
constitution. By viewing constitutional construction in such a way,
formal State action becomes less central to constitutional develop-
ment. Informal State action, as well as the practical demands of in-
terstate actors and the increasing expectations or mandates of the
'people', can force a re-definition of global political identity over
time. While evidence of a broader movement toward constitution-
alism can be found in the activities of such bodies as the United
Nations, the WTO, and the International Criminal Court-as well
as in such concepts as universal jurisdiction- constitutional guar-
antees can develop in distinct subject matter areas as well. Such
subject matter constitutions are not merely 'constituent treaties'
710
designed to create the legal structures of international organiza-
tions. Instead, they are capable of creating universally binding re-
lationships and enforceable rights on the part of individuals and
they are also capable of being developed (at least in substantial
part) outside any formal treaty regime.
Additionally, by viewing the constitutive process progres-
sively, the establishment of binding rights and duties can be incre-
mental in nature and need not await the ultimate completion of
such a process. While the breadth of these rights may expand over
time -and may be accompanied by more recognizable forms of in-
ternational constitutional machinery -there is no doubt that consti-
tutional rights can be established along the way. The nature and
scope of these rights will reflect particular points along the contin-
uum both in terms of societal change and the presence, absence,
and strength of particular constitutional elements. For example,
the erosion of both State sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention, the gradual expansion of liberalism, and the increas-
ing desire to be accepted by the international community (whether
the result of peer pressure or the simple pursuit of international
trade) cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the evolution of indi-
vidual rights. Increasing interaction and decision making by pub-
lic and private actors, as well as the substantial growth of positive
law aimed at the conditions of individuals, tend to reduce the im-
portance of achieving unanimous State consent. Whether based on
709 In regard to a continuum of regime forms, see Stone, supra note 16.
710 For a discussion of the term 'constituent treaties', see Fassbender, supra
note 13, at 532, 538-41.
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natural law or self-preservation, a hierarchy of common values
seems to be emerging (as evidenced by the Decision on Implemen-
tation of the Declaration on TRIPS)711 that places social interest
above self-interest and that is capable of being enforced by means
of humanitarian intervention and economic punishment. Anarchy,
at least in part, appears to be giving way not only to Koh's inter-
nalization,7 2 but to an international 'community building' that is
capable of supporting constitutional principles in the area of hu-
man rights.
6.2. Philosophical Foundations
Constitutionalism is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Consti-
tutionally binding relationships, including the duty to engage in
the progressive realization of the right to the highest attainable
standard of health, can be established between nations even in the
absence of a comprehensive document governing all subjects of in-
ternational law. Constitutional elements need not exist in their en-
tirety before they are capable of imposing a degree of obligation re-
flective of their stage of development.
Such a progression toward a global constitutionalism, while
admittedly being argued from different perspectives, gains context
from a variety of schools of thought. Immanuel Kant, for example,
believed in the steadily advancing development of man's original
and natural capacities and that each generation passes its enlight-
enment on to the next.713 He also believed that antagonism among
men, at least in the long run, inevitably leads to social order. An-
tagonism, distress, violence and other forms of social evil compel
individuals to create civil States for their own protection and to
discipline themselves by means of creating a domestic constitu-
tion.714 Kant also recognized that the establishment of a domestic
constitution was in fact subordinate to the creation of a law-
governed external relationship with other nations. A civil constitu-
tion among individuals would be of little value in the absence of a
711 Decision, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on TRIPS, supra
note 260.
712 See Koh, supra note 13 (discussing why nations obey international law and
finding that looking at the transnational legal process can help in understanding
obedience to international law).
713 KANT, supra note 12, at 41-43.
714 Id. at 44-47.
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federation among States. 715
As a result, just as violence and distress inevitably leads indi-
viduals to create a civil State, antagonism among nations will in-
evitably lead to the creation of an international federation of
States. 716 Such a federation, however, would not be in the form of a
cosmopolitan commonwealth or an international State since such a
republic could not be governed geographically and could arguably
result in despotism.717 Since the ideal of an international State can-
not be realized (at least according to the conception of international
right and the will of nations existing at that time), a "gradually ex-
panding federation" would be the best "negative substitute."718
Kant envisioned this federation as limited in nature, primarily
designed to protect States from one another and to secure the free-
dom of each. It would not represent a supreme sovereignty and it
would not interfere with the internal affairs of individual States. 719
Nevertheless, Kant also recognized that fundamental human rights
are the basis for constitutionalism, 720 that all nations are interde-
pendent,72' and that there will be a natural unification of States
(based on mutual self-interest) that will inevitably result from in-
ternational commerce and economic relations.722 While Kant's vi-
sion of corollary international rights was somewhat restricted, he
recognized that nations will enter into mutual relations that may
"eventually" be regulated by public laws, "thus bringing the hu-
man race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution." 723 As
Petersmann has characterized the Kantian argument, "national and
international constitutional rules and problems are interdependent
and require a mutually consistent constitutional theory based on
human rights." 724
In his seminal article on international regimes, Alec Stone
viewed constitutions as bodies of metanorms, higher order norms
715 Id. at 47-49.
716 Id. at 47-49, 90.
717 Id. at 90-92, 102.
718 Id. at 105.
719 Id. at 104, 127, 165.
720 See, e.g., id. at 74, 84, 125 (stating that a lawful state is based on a priori
rights of the people, and that the rights of man must be held sacred).
721 Id. at 51.
722 Id. at 114.
723 Id. at 106.
724 Petersmann, supra note 18, at 767.
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that govern how lower order norms are produced, applied and in-
terpreted. 725 These metanorms actually "constitute a polity," "en-
hance the legitimacy of legal norms," and "fix the rules of the
game." 726 Since regimes are merely highly demanding forms of
community, and constitutional regimes are merely highly demand-
ing forms of regimes, Stone argues that there is nothing inherent in
the nature of international regimes that excludes the possibility of
constitutionalism. 727 Instead, both national and international re-
gime forms can be viewed along a continuum-from the most
primitive to the supranational constitutional -that encompasses a
"sequence" of norm-based cooperation, institutionalization, the
generation of legal norms, the codification of metanorms, and the
inseparability of regimes from organic metanorms.728 Such a "re-
gime continuum" captures the relative status or formality of re-
gime norms (from tacit norms to metanorms) and the relative de-
gree of institutionalization of the social interest (from simple norm-
based behavior to formal organizations with autonomous capac-
ity).729 The existence of Stone's continuum, of course, implies that
international regimes may progress toward the creation of constitu-
tionally binding relationships among nations. However, issues
remain regarding whether these binding relationships can be cre-
ated 'along the way' and the degree to which obligations may be
imposed prior to actual constitutionalization.
Viewing constitutional duties in terms of a progression may
also find support within the context of the New Haven School. W.
Michael Reisman, for example, takes the position that a constitu-
tion "is a continuing process, not a single event," 730 and that a con-
stitution results from "a unique and continuing constitutive proc-
ess."731 A constitutive process, in New Haven language, refers to
authoritative power exercised to allocate fundamental functions
and to provide an institutional framework for decision making.
732
725 Stone, supra note 16, at 444.
726 Id. (emphasis deleted).
727 Id. at 448.
728 Id. at 470, 441.
729 Id. at 470-75.
730 Reisman, supra note 13, at 96.
731 Id. at 99.
732 Fassbender, supra note 13, at 544 (quoting Myres S. McDougal et al., The
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL
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The "constitutive decisions" that result from such a process are di-
rected at such issues as identifying decision makers, specifying
community policies, allocating bases of power, and securing per-
formance of decision functions.733 Additionally, by emphasizing
legal decision making "as part of a higher and complex societal
process," formal rules are in no way equated with 'actual' interna-
tional law.734 As Koh has noted, the New Haven School has "con-
sistently argued that international law is not a body of rules, but a
process of authoritative decision making." 735 By downplaying the
need for formality and by placing constitutionalism within a more
social/process/realism context, such an approach arguably allows
for constitutional duties to be more particularized.
The idea that binding obligations can be created by less tradi-
tional processes, or at least by means that are outside formal law-
making mechanisms, also supports the argument that constitu-
tional duties can be imposed progressively. At the national level,
for example, Bruce Ackerman has argued that the United States is a
dualist democracy based upon a two-track system of democratic
lawmaking. 736 These two decisional tracks consist of normal law-
making regarding the ordinary decisions made by governments
and higher lawmaking by the 'people' reflecting crucial transfor-
mative periods or acts of constitutive authority. 737 These higher
lawmaking constitutional moments, which include the Founding,
the Reconstruction, and the New Deal, "failed to follow well-
established rules and principles ... and did not respect established
norms for revision ... "738
Antonio Perez has extended these ideas of dualism and higher
lawmaking to the international setting.739 Perez argues that the col-
lective intervention on the part of the U.N. Security Council since
LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 191, 192 (1981)).
733 Id. (quoting HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, I JURISPRUDENCE
FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 93 (1992)).
734 Id. at 551.
735 Koh, supra note 13, at 2620. For a discussion of the New Haven School
and its leading proponents (and a series of citations in such regard), see id. at 2618,
2620, 2622-24, and Fassbender, supra note 13, at 544-46, 551.
736 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 6, 12, 32; ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 17, at 5.
737 ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 17, at 7, 11, 409.
73 Id. at 11-12.
739 Perez, supra note 18.
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the end of the cold war clearly represents an informal amendment
to the U.N. Charter by means of supranational constitutional poli-
tics on the part of a supranational political community. 740 Such a
constitutional moment, whereby the U.N. Charter was amended
without employing the formal procedures set forth therein, repre-
sented a constitutional change by the 'people' and a constitution-
alization of higher values rather than simply an interpretation of
existing law.741
By recognizing the existence of dualism within the interna-
tional community, theories like those of Perez can serve as another
basis for arguing that human rights (and the duty to progressively
realize the right to the highest attainable standard of health) can ac-
tually be created outside, or in the absence of, formal legal struc-
tures. It has often been argued, for example, that natural rights
precede the State and are not established by the State.742 As a result,
Eisner has posited that the extension of natural rights principles to
the international system may provide individuals with interna-
tional law protection even in the absence of traditional conventions
or treaties. 743 Whether based on State practice, customary law, or
extremely powerful (even if tacit) norms,744 both 'peoples' and in-
dividuals can demand that a hierarchy of values be enforced irre-
spective of national or international governmental consent. Com-
mon values, as expressed in the form of inalienable rights, are
simply not dependent upon a system of structural confirmation.
As a result, a binding higher law may precede (rather than be the
product of) formal global institutionalization.
The progressive imposition of constitutional obligations can
also be supported by the fact that a constitution need not be re-
duced to a single, textual document. As a result, this Article does
not take the position that the U.N. Charter is the constitution of the
international community. Instead, it is argued that a global consti-
740 See id. at 355, 357, 384, 397-98, 449 (drawing on parallels between Acker-
man's theories and those of the United Nations).
741 Id. at 384.
742 See KANT, supra note 12, at 74 (stating that freedom, equality, and inde-
pendence are a priori principles); Petersmann, supra note 18, at 760 (summarizing
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Dent 1962) (1690)).
743 Eisner, supra note 21, at 211 (explaining the strength and importance of
tacit norms between countries).
744 See Stone, supra note 16, at 462-63 (describing how tacit norms can cause
nations to conform to a standard of conduct).
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tution can be based upon an integration of a substantial number of
international instruments and a variety of sources of unwritten
law. Such an integration implies the existence of an ongoing con-
structive process where legal duties can be created in different set-
tings (at different points in time) and where the need to meet an
all-or-nothing threshold can be discarded.
Tomuschat, for example, clearly recognizes that the judicial,
administrative, and lawmaking functions are necessary elements of
any constitution.745 Nevertheless, he also believes that "the inter-
national community can... be conceived of as a legal entity, gov-
erned by a constitution . ,"746 In reaching such a conclusion, To-
muschat argues that States exist within a legal framework of a
limited number of common values or basic rules which bind all
States irrespective of their consent.747 The global constitution is de-
fined as the entirety of these basic principles, 748 and a variety of
"world order treaties" (such as the U.N. Charter, the ICCPR, and
the ICESCR) serve to "concretize" these basic constituent elements
or constitutional premises.749 Since these fundamental axioms exist
independently from treaty law, world order treaties are of constitu-
tional rank to the extent that they mirror those preexisting constitu-
tional norms.7 °
In contrast, Fassbender believes that the U.N. Charter is in fact
the constitution of the international community with regard to all
subjects of international law and that the Charter supervenes re-
lated principles of customary law.751 He nevertheless recognizes
that other international treaties can have constitutional rank, that
constitutional prescriptions may exist in the form of customary
law, and that the ICCPR and ICESCR "are part of the constitutional
foundation of the international community." 752 These sources of
law can be granted "constitutional quality" if they characterize or
74 Tomuschat, supra note 15, at 216 (emphasizing that "every modem system
of governance is operated through law making, administration and adjudica-
tion").
746 Id. at 236.
747 Id. at 211.
748 Fassbender, supra note 13, at 549 (characterizing Tomuschat's approach).
749 Tomuschat, supra note 15, at 269.
750 See Fassbender, supra note 13, at 550 (characterizing Tomuschat's ap-
proach).
751 Id. at 529, 531-32, 586.
752 Id. at 588.
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further develop the law of the Charter.753
Finally, the progressive nature of constitutionalism can also
find support in Koh's theories of internalization. 754 While Koh ex-
amined the more general issue of why nations obey international
law, his observations can arguably be applied to the process by
which constitutional obligations are created over time. Koh de-
scribed a "transnational legal process" of interaction, interpreta-
tion, and internalization through which an international norm
penetrates a nation's domestic legal system, becomes part of that
nation's "internal value set," and reshapes the national interest and
identity of that nation. 755 Repeated interactions between transna-
tional actors force interpretation or enunciation of global norms
and, when internalized through legislative, judicial, or executive
acceptance, generate legal rules that will guide future interac-
tions.756
In such a context, it could be argued that as an international
norm (such as the duty to engage in the progressive realization of
the right to the highest attainable standard of health) becomes
more universally internalized, the distinctions between domestic
law, international law, and global constitutional law become in-
creasingly indistinct. The gradual process of creating enforceable
global norms, whether those norms are ultimately enforced by in-
ternational or domestic machinery, can be viewed as a progression
that is constitutive in nature.
6.3. Liberalism and a Focus on Individuals
Whether viewed in terms of constitutional moments, authorita-
tive decision making, universally binding common values, or steps
in an internalization or integrative constitutive process, the Coun-
cil's Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declara-
tion on TRIPS757 represents a substantial attitudinal change in the
global polity. While certainly encumbered by a number of practi-
753 Id.
754 See Koh, supra note 13 (describing the reasons why nations obey interna-
tional law).
755 Id. at 2602-03, 2641, 2645-58.
756 Id. at 2646.
757 See supra note 260 (discussing the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health).
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cal, political, and implementational problems, 758 this Decision
clearly defines a hierarchy of basic values wherein private property
rights and parochial self-interests are subordinated to the global
social interest of protecting public health and attacking the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. The ability of nations to unify in the face of
such an overriding crisis, and to actually modify existing interna-
tional law in the field of intellectual property rights, reflects an in-
creasing global liberalism in which the rights of individuals can no
longer be territorialized.
The inevitability of progressive liberalization cannot be open to
dispute. A 'liberal' State can be defined, for example, in such terms
as the existence of democratic or representative forms of govern-
ment, the enjoyment of civil and political rights, or the availability
of judicial remedies.759 Viewed in such a perspective, the Secre-
tary-General has argued that authoritarian regimes are in fact giv-
ing way "to more democratic forces and responsive Govern-
ments." 760 The concept of a progressive liberalism, however, must
be more fundamentally defined in terms of international trade and
economic development which actually serve as the catalysts for
democratization and the recognition of basic human rights. These
catalysts not only create wealth, they give rise to demands by indi-
viduals for the protection of that wealth against any arbitrary inter-
ference by governments.761 They also stimulate transnational in-
teractions that give rise to demands for enforceable legal norms
upon which rights can be predicated and effects can be predicted.
As wealth continues to be created and interactions continue to
broaden, individuals increasingly demand the right to engage in
their own social, political, and economic decision making. The re-
sult of these demands is the intensification of universal rules of law
that not only bind nations to a set of common values, but serve as a
foundation for international constitutional principles.
The relationship between trade, liberalism, and constitutional-
ism has been recognized since the late eighteenth century when
758 See supra notes 351-67 and accompanying text (describing the various
problems that plague the resolution of global health care issues).
759 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 13, at 2633; Stone, supra note 16, at 459 (describing
attributes of "liberal" states).
760 An Agenda For Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992),
quoted in Perez, supra note 18, at 405.
761 McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 18, at 588.
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Kant concluded that the "spirit of commerce" will eventually (and
quite naturally) unite all nations and will compel those nations to
promote the international peace that is necessary to engage in that
commerce.762 Such observations, of course, must be modernized
and Kant's vision of 'perpetual peace' must encompass far more
than merely the avoidance of war. In the current environment the
HIV/AIDS epidemic is substantially more destructive than tradi-
tional notions of armed conflict. Not only does this epidemic cre-
ate both domestic unrest and regional and international instability,
it completely negates the ability of affected nations to engage in the
wealth-creating process of international trade. As a result, the in-
ternational action necessary to ensure a level of peace that is con-
ducive to global commerce has become substantially more inclu-
sive.
Additionally, the scope of international commerce, and its ef-
fect on the willingness of nations to unite for common purposes
and to develop universally binding rules of law, could not have
been anticipated even by Kantian visionaries. World exports of
merchandise and commercial services, for example, recently
reached $7.84 trillion.763 Evidencing a geographic expansion of lib-
eralism, trade in the so-called transition economies expanded at
double-digit rates for both imports and exports and the economies
of those nations experienced both the highest annual rates of trade
expansion764 and the strongest levels of economic growth. 7 65 Simi-
larly, ten African nations experienced more than a 5% growth in
their economies, while five African nations saw their GDP's in-
crease by more than 10%.766 One hundred and seventy-six regional
trade agreements were in force at the end of 2002767 and member-
ship in the WTO, currently at 146, continues to grow.
This expansion of liberalism has both domestic and interna-
tional effects. In terms of the former, McGinnis and Movsesian
have suggested that international trade helps to democratize na-
762 KANT, supra note 12, at 114.
763 WTO, World Trade Developments in 2002 and Prospects for 2003, at 4,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/rese/statis-e/its2003_e/its03_general_
overview-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
764 Id. at 4.
765 Id. at 8.
766 Id. at 10.
767 Id. at 16. While many of these agreements were limited in scope or were
bilateral in nature, such a substantial number remains quite impressive.
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tions.768 Since democracy and prosperity are in fact highly corre-
lated, citizens increasingly demand more democratic forms of gov-
ernment (as well as more civil and political rights) as their wealth
continues to grow.769 From an international perspective, liberalism
increases economic interdependence, provides incentives for inter-
state cooperation,770 and mandates a regime of constitutive princi-
ples aimed at the broader-based prerequisites for international
peace. As Stone has suggested, the more relative autonomy that a
regime possesses, such autonomy being more likely to develop
within a zone of liberalism, the closer it can come to constitutional-
ism.771 Similarly, the intensification of international trade (along
with a growing interdependence and the resulting need for legal
security) is, in Fassbender's words, the driving force behind the
process of constitutionalization. 72
Progressive liberalism must also be viewed in terms of its sym-
biotic relationship with individuals both as participants in interna-
tional affairs and as subjects of international law. In regard to par-
ticipation, a variety of private actors- including individuals,
multinational business enterprises, fundraising organizations, con-
sultants, lobbyists, NGOs and other watchdogs -are wielding sub-
stantial influence over both domestic policies and interstate rela-
tionships. NGOs, for example, are now playing a more critical role
in the human rights monitoring system.773 Multinational busi-
nesses are requiring more open international trading practices, in-
creased transparency, nondiscriminatory treatment, and legal
structures conducive to direct investment. Private organizations
continue to gain credibility and (at least in some cases) are directly
taking part in negotiation and implementation processes. The
Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative, for example, has dealt
directly with foreign governments in the development of detailed
768 See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 18, at 588 and accompanying cita-
tions ("[A]s citizens become richer, they increasingly demand more democracy
and civil rights to protect their wealth from the arbitrary actions of government.").
769 See id. and accompanying citations ("[D]emocracy and prosperity are
highly correlated.").
770 Stone, supra note 16, at 459-63.
m Id. at 464.
772 Fassbender, supra note 13, at 618.
m7 See notes 666-71 and accompanying text for a description of the Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' incorporation of non-governmental
organizations into its human rights monitoring system.
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operational plans for the treatment of AIDS patients and has acted
as an intermediary between those governments and pharmaceuti-
cal companies.7 74 In each of these instances, modifications of inter-
state relationships (as well as modifications in the relationship be-
tween a State and its own citizens) are in fact stimulated by private
actions and interactions rather than by governmental initiative. In
a very real sense, the development of 'inter-national' law is no
longer the sole domain of national (or public) regimes.
Both increasing liberalism and private-party participation in
the development of global norms have been accompanied, whether
as a cause or as an effect by the emergence of the individual as a
fundamental subject of international law. Whether the result of an
advancing civilization, an exercise of fashionable politics, or a sim-
ple recognition of a progressive ideal, the community of nations
has clearly been replaced by a community of individuals in the
field of human rights.
As discussed throughout this Article, the Universal Declara-
tion, a variety of U.N. resolutions, and such agreements as the
ICCPR, the ICESCR, the CRC, the CEDAW, and the ICERD775 are
directly focused on the rights and conditions of individuals rather
than on the relationships between States. These instruments repre-
sent only a part of a fundamental shift in emphasis away from
state-centric theories of international relations. The new perma-
nent International Criminal Court ("ICC"), for instance, has been
empowered to prosecute individuals accused of genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity.776 Individuals may be tried be-
fore this tribunal even if they are nationals of non-party States
(when the crime occurred within the territory of a Party)777 and
even if they hold an official capacity such as Head of State. 778 The
ICC, of course, builds upon such ad hoc tribunals as those estab-
lished in Rwanda and Yugoslavia for the imposition of individual
accountability for human rights violations. 779 Similarly, the doc-
trine of universal jurisdiction, while apparently subject to the dip-
774 See Mark Schoofs, Clinton Program Would Help Poor Nations Get AIDS
Drugs, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 23, 2003 at B1 (reporting on Clinton's success dealing with
pharmaceutical companies and foreign governments).
775 See supra notes 1, 25, 116-20, 125.
776 Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 5.1.
777 Id. art. 12.2.
778 Id. art. 27.
779 For a discussion of these tribunals, see Lodico, supra note 21, at 1034-35.
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lomatic immunity exception of Congo v. Belgium,780 not only grants
States the right, but imposes the duty to prosecute individuals for
crimes that offend the international community as a whole no mat-
ter where (or by whom) they are committed.78' Under Doe v. Uno-
cal Corp.,782 private corporations may also be held accountable un-
der international law if they participate or assist in certain human
rights violations. It has also been suggested that the U.N. Security
Council has the power to address the conduct of both individuals
and corporations if that conduct poses a threat to international
peace and security.
783
This increasing focus on the rights and responsibilities of indi-
viduals is manifested in more subtle ways as well. The new WTO
Agreement is not designed to merely protect the wealth of nations
or the welfare of national economies, but to protect and promote
the interests of the various constituents of those economies. As a
result, individuals (generally in the form of private enterprises) are
protected from the effects of foreign subsidies, dumping, discrimi-
nation, non-tariff barriers, and the infringement of intellectual
property rights. Additionally, while this Agreement is aimed at
enhancing international trade, such a goal is merely a means by
which to accomplish a more comprehensive result. The true spirit
of the WTO Agreement lies in its attempt to create additional
global wealth, to raise global standards of living, and to ensure that
poorer nations (and the individuals who populate those nations)
share in the benefits that accrue from the Agreement. 784 In order to
do so, both the WTO Agreement and its GATT predecessor have
accorded special treatment to less-developed nations in an attempt
to stimulate their growth and these agreements have recognized
that the promotion of trade with these nations is one of the "pri-
mary objectives of the Contracting Parties."785
More particularly, the whole purpose of Part 4 of the Agree-
780 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 14).
781 RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 120 (citing IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990)).
782 John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 2002 WL 31063976
(9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), reh'g en banc granted, 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14,
2003).
783 Fassbender, supra note 13, at 610.
784 See Cann, supra note 175, at 80 and accompanying citations for a discus-
sion of the true spirit of the WTO Agreement.
785 Gatt Analytical Index, supra note 378, at 1040.
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ment786 is to alleviate the specific problems facing less-developed
countries and to enhance their economic and social development
by means of raising standards of living and ensuring the availabil-
ity of essential imports. 787 Pursuant to the so-called Enabling
Clause, contracting parties have been specifically authorized to
"accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing
countries, without according such treatment to other contracting
parties."788 These provisions, of course, are not simply aimed at
abstract national entities, but at individuals who are experiencing
substantial need. In such a sense, the WTO Agreement is in fact a
social compact whereby national governments have agreed to act
for the benefit of all global citizens.
By attempting to stimulate trade with less-developed countries,
the WTO Agreement is addressing the inevitable link between
poverty and the absence of human rights. In conjunction with such
an approach, the international community is also attempting to de-
velop a more meaningful human rights regime that will bind na-
tions to a standard of progressive realization. As discussed ear-
lier,789 this regime consists of a variety of Charter-based and
Treaty-based bodies as well as mechanisms for periodic reporting,
monitoring, investigation, and both individual and interstate com-
plaints. While certainly not without problems, this regime has ex-
perienced unprecedented growth both institutionally and in the es-
tablishment of international norms directed at the rights of
individuals.790
The expansion of this regime has also been accompanied by an
increasing willingness of the U.N. Security Council to take action,
whether in the form of embargoes, economic sanctions, or humani-
tarian intervention, when the violation of human rights is so de-
plorable as to constitute a threat to international peace and secu-
rity.791 In Somalia, the U.N. Security Council took action under
786 GATT, supra note 370, arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII.
787 Id.; see also Cann, supra note 14, at 443.
788 Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Par-
ticipation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at
203 (1980).
789 See, e.g., supra notes 656-95 and accompanying text.
790 The U.N. Human Rights Regime, supra note 21, at 460 (remarks of Thomas
Buergenthal) (addressing whether such growth affects protection of human
rights).
791 See Lodico, supra note 21, at 1028, 1031, 1038, 1041-47 (discussing the ap-
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Chapter VII of the Charter to "ensure the delivery of humanitarian
assistance" and to prevent the "looting of relief supplies destined
for starving people." 792 Similar action was taken in Haiti based
upon "the incidence of humanitarian crisis" and the "mass dis-
placements of population." 793 The fact that such interventions are
authorized -despite the claims of sovereignty -underscores the
position that human rights are no longer within the sole discretion
of national governments. The fundamental rights of individuals
have been placed at the pinnacle of global values and actually
serve to preempt the traditional rights of nations.
6.4. A Constitutional Foundation for the Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health
The expansion of liberalism, the increasing importance of the
individual, and the recognition that binding international norms
may be created outside the formal lawmaking process provide
substantial impetus for a progressive global constitutionalization.
At least in the area of human rights, there is in fact an adequate
foundation of international community, hierarchical norms and in-
stitutions, and rulemaking and enforcement mechanisms to create
a constitutional regime. Under such a regime, the duty to engage
in the progressive realization of the right to the highest attainable
standard of health, including the duty to take all realistically avail-
able measures for the prevention and treatment of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, is a duty that is constitutional in nature.
6.4.1. The Existence of a Community
Immanuel Kant believed that before any form of international
right was possible, a "lawful State" must already be in existence
and that without a State there can be no "public right."794 Neither
individuals nor a group of nations can constitute a State if they are
living in a "lawless freedom." 795 Whether the existence of such a
community must actually precede the creation of a constitution (or
whether the existence of a constitution must actually precede the
propriate course of action in cases of extreme human rights violations).
792 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
793 U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg. at pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993).
794 KANT, supra note 12, at 129.
795 Id. at 164.
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creation of a community) is an issue that remains open to debate. 796
In either event, there is unquestionably an interdependence be-
tween the two concepts. As Fassbender has argued, a constitution
needs a community "as its substratum," but a community also
needs "to be constituted." 797
It is the position of this Article that an international community
does in fact exist that is sufficient both in its identity and its con-
struction to impose constitutional duties in the area of human
rights and, more particularly, in regard to the right to health. Such
a community may be viewed in terms of a community of States, or
a community of individuals. It may also be viewed as a commu-
nity of States or individuals within the borders of a particular 'sub-
ject matter' such as human rights or international peace and secu-
rity.
Whatever label is ultimately attached, the existence of an inter-
national community is fundamentally dependent upon the rela-
tionship between social interest and self-interest. A 'community'
should be defined as any relationship among individuals or sover-
eign States wherein self-interest (whether of the individual or of
the State) has become subservient to the social interest of the
whole. The preeminence of social interest within an identifiable
group, whether that group is defined territorially or as adherents
to a particular set of subject matter norms, creates a community or
a communal foundation upon which constitutive principles can be
based.798 Such an argument acknowledges that both nations and
individuals exhibit substantial cultural, economic, and political dif-
ferences and that the practical implementation of international
norms varies tremendously among nations. It is undeniable, how-
ever, that there are a number of common values (or minimum
standards) that bind all global constituencies such as the inherent
dignity of the person, the right to self-determination and develop-
ment, the inalienability of fundamental human rights, and the duty
796 See Fassbender, supra note 13, at 561-68 (discussing two conflicting views
on the relationship between community and constitution).
797 Id. at 567.
798 Stone has indicated that "a liberal regime, like a constitution, may create,
reinforce, and disseminate the social interest, while delegitimizing narrow self in-
terest." Stone, supra note 16, at 465. Similarly, Fassbender has indicated that "the
notion of the constitution offers a coherent explanation of current developments
in international law which more and more emphasize interests of the international
community as a whole over those of individual states." Fassbender, supra note 13,
at 553. For a discussion of the nature of a community, see id. at 561-68.
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to promote international peace and security.799 Through the recog-
nition of such basic principles, the international community ac-
quires an identity, while far from complete, that serves to create
expectations, advances predictability, establishes a basis for con-
demnation, and encourages further value identification and coop-
eration.
In regard to both the realization of human rights and the main-
tenance of international peace and security-each of which is inex-
tricably linked to the HIV/AIDS crisis -it can no longer be argued
that nations exist in a "lawless freedom." If the position is taken
that the individual States are in fact the citizens of the international
community, it seems apparent that these citizens are engaged in a
progression that is fundamentally changing the global political
identity. Ackerman has indicated that a constitution may actually
be viewed "as the culminating expression of a mobilized citi-
zenry." 800 By way of analogy, it may be argued that 191 States (as a
'mobilized citizenry') are now members of an organization whose
charter is primarily focused on the promotion of human rights and
the maintenance of international peace. Pursuant to Article 2.6,
even those few States who are not members of the United Nations
are nevertheless bound by the basic principles of this community.
Similarly, the 192 Parties to the CRC, the 147 Parties to the
ICESCR, and the 192 Member States of WHO have specifically
bound themselves to provide the right to the highest attainable
standard of health.801 Perhaps as a culminating expression of this
citizenry, the Declaration on TRIPS802 and its Implementing Deci-
sion803 make it clear that the private rights of individuals will not
be allowed to frustrate the greater social good of global public
health. When combined with the other substantial components of
the human rights regime, as well as with an increasing willingness
to intervene during humanitarian crises, the resulting absence of
799 For a discussion of the concept of common values and determinative or
elementary rules, as well as citations in this regard, see Fassbender, supra note 13,
at 548-51 (discussing the views of Tomuschat), and at 566 (discussing the existence
of basic, universal standards of human rights). See also Perez, supra note 18, at 384
(discussing the "constitutionalization of higher values").
800 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 291.
801 See supra notes 447, 465-70 and accompanying text (providing health care
rights for all).
802 Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 28 (emphasizing the importance of solv-
ing serious global health issues).
803 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 260.
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lawless freedom implies the existence of a community for human
rights purposes. While issues surrounding the potential for a 'con-
stitutional community' will be addressed shortly, there is no doubt
that a community (that may conceivably give rise to constitutional
relationships) can be identified.
It may also be argued that States need not be communal for all
purposes. Just as one State (out of the totality of States) may create
a distinct territorial community, a consensus of States may create a
particular subject matter community to which all adherents belong.
Since the protection and enforcement of public rights are the pri-
mary purposes of a legitimate community, a communal human
rights 'State' may exist if the presence of such mechanisms can be
identified. As a result, while an international community may not
yet exist in terms of some objectives (for example, the application
of uniform labor standards), it may in fact exist for others.
Finally, it can be alternatively argued that the real citizens of a
human rights community are not the States who express their
agreement through treaties and declarations, but the individuals
who are entitled to human rights protection. While some of the
provisions of the U.N. Charter do in fact address the 'peoples' of
the world rather than its States, 804 the existence of the Universal
Declaration, the substantial customary law to which it has given
rise, and the expansion of the concepts of natural and inalienable
rights to the international legal setting all seem to indicate that in-
dividuals are endowed with fundamental rights irrespective of
State action or condonation.805 Additionally, any State that en-
gages in activities designed to frustrate the enjoyment of these
rights becomes illegitimate and theoretically ceases to exist as a
'State' for human rights purposes.806 This recognition that indi-
viduals possess a series of common rights that transcend any con-
cept of 'State' suggests the presence of something more than a
mere community of nations. It suggests the existence of an inde-
pendent, identifiable, human rights community composed of indi-
viduals. The suppression of individuals in non-democratic States
804 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER pmbl. ("We the Peoples of the United Nations...
."); id. art. 1, para. 2 ("self-determination of peoples").
805 See Eisner, supra note 21, at 211 (establishing the existence of certain fun-
damental human rights).
806 For a discussion regarding the relationship among the recognition of hu-
man rights, legitimacy, and the doctrines of sovereignty and non-intervention, see
Petersmann, supra note 18, at 762.
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does not alter such a fact.
6.4.2. The Existence of Hierarchy
6.4.2.1. The Erosion of Sovereignty
As Kant anticipated, mutual self-interest has driven nations
towards more international cooperation. The WTO Agreement, for
example, has given rise to the implementation of a variety of eco-
nomic and socio-economic rules governing international trade rela-
tionships. It has also established a Dispute Settlement Body and
provided for various forms of economic punishment in the event of
a breach. While this is certainly a high-profile reflection of the
transfer of sovereign powers to an international organization, it can
still be argued that participation in the WTO is merely voluntary
and therefore subject to rescission by way of withdrawal.
In contrast, a nation's membership in the human rights com-
munity, wherein the inalienable rights of individuals cannot be de-
nied, is neither voluntary nor subject to withdrawal. The existence
of these fundamental rights and the potential for multilateral hu-
manitarian intervention represent a true erosion of the principle of
sovereign community. In concert with a human rights regime that
monitors, investigates, and provides complaint mechanisms, the
international community is now taking the position that human
rights violations (at least when they endanger the very subjective
notion of peace and security) are no longer shielded by the doc-
trines of sovereignty and non-intervention. 807 Despite a tradition
of State centricity (wherein international law was directed at the
rights and obligations of States and not of individuals),808 and de-
spite the U.N. Charter's recognition of both the principle of non-
intervention80 9 and the territorial integrity and political independ-
ence of nations,810 the international community now recognizes
807 See Lodico, supra note 21, at 1031-35 (discussing the changing notions of
State sovereignty in the context of humanitarian intervention); Petersmann, supra
note 18, at 762 (discussing the framework of humanitarian intervention). For a
discussion regarding human rights and the erosion of the doctrines of sovereignty
and non-intervention, see generally, Eisner, supra note 21; Lodico, supra note 21;
The U.N. Human Rights Regime, supra note 21; and Perez, supra note 18.
808 Eisner, supra note 21, at 196 (discussing the historically dominant position
of the state).
809 U.N. CHARTER art. 2.7.
810 Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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that human rights are truly universal in nature. As a result, their
protection can be ensured globally rather than merely domesti-
cally.
The erosion of sovereignty, non-intervention, and State-
centricity has been generally acknowledged by legal scholars. Koh
has indicated that the transformation of international law has been
characterized by a decline in national sovereignty and a corre-
sponding proliferation of global decision making by States, inter-
national regimes, intergovernmental organizations, regional com-
pacts, NGOs, and informal networks.811 Nevertheless, it is of
fundamental importance to acknowledge to whom these traditional
sovereign powers have been transferred and to whom the responsi-
bility for ensuring their enforcement has been delegated. In a very
real sense, these powers can be neither created nor destroyed, but
merely transferred upstream to international institutions, down-
stream to individual citizens, or to some combination thereof. In
either event, identifying such a transfer is critical for imposing an
international constitutional duty regarding the progressive realiza-
tion of the right to the highest attainable standard of health.
6.4.2.2. The Non-exclusivity of International Hierarchy and
Anarchy
Certainly such treaties as the ICESCR and the CRC impose a
variety of duties in regard to human rights and the right to health.
However, in order to impose a 'constitutional' duty among States,
whereby certain relationships between a State and its own citizens
may be preempted by an international authority, the global com-
munity must exhibit some form of hierarchical structure.
Traditionally, the international community has been described
as anarchic where all States are viewed as both equal and sover-
eign and all cooperation is viewed as voluntary. The centrality of
States, their undifferentiated functions, and their status as "like
units" leads to a system of domestic hierarchy and international
anarchy.8 2 As evidence of such a dichotomy, it is argued that the
international system lacks both the rule of law and autonomous in-
stitutions. It is argued that there are no separation of powers, no
811 Koh, supra note 13, at 2604, 2631 (arguing that norm-based cooperation is
possible in international society).
812 Stone, supra note 16, at 449-55. Stone, of course, disagrees with such an
assessment. See id. at 469-70.
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checks and balances, no enforcement and rulemaking mechanisms,
and no compulsory judicial review.813
On the other hand, there are those who believe that an interna-
tional hierarchy does in fact exist and that the U.N. Charter repre-
sents its constitution. 814 In support of such a position, it may be
noted that the supremacy clause of Article 103 provides that Char-
ter obligations will prevail over all other obligations that Members
have undertaken pursuant to other international agreements. Arti-
cle 2.6 binds non-members to the Charter's basic principles when-
ever necessary to maintain international peace and security, while
Article 2.7 excepts Chapter VII enforcement measures from the
concept of non-intervention.
All members have also agreed to accept and carry out the deci-
sions of the U.N. Security Council pursuant to Article 25 of the
U.N. Charter. By binding themselves in advance to Chapter VII
decisions, the U.N. membership has created a ruling body with
substantially subjective jurisdiction.815 This discretionary authority
has been recently exercised in order to engage in a variety of hu-
manitarian interventions and to form and secure the post-Taliban
regime in Afghanistan.16 It has also been used to justify the adop-
tion of Resolution 1373817 (requiring Members to implement meas-
ures regarding terrorists) which has been described as a creation of
"instant global law", a means for avoiding the "cumbersome and
time-consuming" treaty process, and "an order from on high to the
world's states."8 18 Such a combination of subjectivity, supremacy,
and advanced approval apparently "trumps all contrary non-
Charter legal obligations." 819
The international community need not be exclusively hierar-
813 For a discussion in such a regard, see, e.g., Macdonald, supra note 18, at
228-31 (debating whether the U.N. Charter serves as a constitution); Petersmann,
supra note 18, at 765-79 (addressing whether the U.N. Charter is a constitution).
814 See, e.g., Fassbender, supra note 13; see also, id. at 577-78 (discussing a hier-
archy of values).
815 See Reisman, supra note 13, at 88, 93 (discussing the broad powers of the
U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter).
816 RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 38 (discussing the
United Nations' role as an international mediator).
817 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1373
(2001).
818 RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 39-40.
819 Reisman, supra note 13, at 93 (referring to the "synergy of Articles 25 and
103" of the U.N. Charter).
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chical or exclusively anarchic. As has been argued throughout this
Article, this community is engaged in a progressive constitution-
alization in the area of fundamental human rights which need not
possess either a finite beginning or a finite end. The right to the
highest attainable standard of health, whether viewed as actually
constituting such a fundamental human right or as an inextricable
influence on the realization of those rights, must be incorporated
into that constitutive process. Additionally, the existence of a hier-
archy must not be judged solely by 'upstream' transfers of power
or by the presence of formal institutions. If the U.N. Security
Council can lawfully intervene to prevent gross violations of hu-
man rights, then the international community cannot be exclu-
sively anarchic. If individuals have rights that the international
community will protect, then the presence of some supremacy or
hierarchy must be implied. There is no doubt that some entity has
imposed limitations on the powers of national governments in the
field of human rights and there is also no doubt that the imposition
of restrictions to combat potential abuse is at the heart of constitu-
tionalism.820
It may also be argued that the presence of anarchy, equality,
and self-interest actually serve to stimulate (rather than to impede)
international cooperation. While Kant limited his vision of coop-
eration to the creation of a federation of free states, 821 he would
undoubtedly agree that anarchy eventually gives way to some
form of coercive public law. In a sense, anarchy is self-destructive.
In the particular area of human rights, demands for public law will
continue to increase as liberalism continues to spread. Nations are
neither static nor "like units" -with identical polities and identical
demands from their citizenries-and liberal States are much more
likely to engage in international cooperation. 822 As Stone has indi-
cated, both compliance and enforcement of international law may
be extremely high within a liberal international regime and this
law "may have relatively more status, autonomy, and legitimacy
820 Petersmann has indicated, for example, that "Constitutionalism emerged
in response to negative experiences with abuses of political power as a means to
limit such abuses .. " Petersmann, supra note 18, at 758.
821 See supra notes 713-24 and accompanying text (arguing for an inevitable
progression towards a federation of states).
822 See Stone, supra note 16, at 461-63, 469-70 (stating the proposition that legal
norms govern the interaction between liberal states and promote cooperation
through economic ties).
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than legal norms in many domestic settings."823 Stone rejects the
domestic/hierarchy and international/anarchy dichotomy 824 and
believes that "the distinction between international regimes and
domestic constitutional forms is relative not absolute."
825
It should also be recognized that international hierarchy can be
created by means of transfer of power downstream to individuals.
While it could be argued that individuals (at least in theory) have
always held such 'powers' as the right to equality, life, inherent
dignity, self-determination and development, the ultimate power
to determine human rights policies was vested in the State. Under
classical theory, domestic policies that frustrated the enjoyment of
these rights were beyond reproach under the doctrines of sover-
eignty and non-intervention. As a result of the evolution in inter-
national law, the power to deny human rights - at least when those
denials affect international peace and security-has been taken
from domestic regimes. The true governance of these rights has
now been transferred to the individual in the form of an inalien-
able power to govern oneself that is capable of being internation-
ally enforced. The fact that certain rights can no longer be quali-
fied by governmental fiat enhances the fundamental quality of
those rights by placing them above national sovereignty and prin-
ciples of non-intervention in the international legal hierarchy.
While somewhat out of context, it can also be argued that these
fundamental rights, whether linked to the U.N. Charter, interna-
tional covenants, or customary law, have a constitutional 'direct ef-
fects' application. Despite their origin, they inherently constitute
the domestic or internal law of all nations and they are neither
treaty-dependent nor reliant upon any form of implementing legis-
lation. Despite the absence of domestic judicial procedures to en-
force these rights in some nations, they are nevertheless capable of
being protected by an international machinery that is restricted
only by a very subjective peace and security standard.
In order to ultimately determine the presence of an interna-
tional hierarchy that is capable of creating constitutional rights it is
also necessary to briefly examine a number of collateral issues.
These issues involve the ability to bind non-members or objecting
nations, the ability to engage in lawmaking, the presence of some
823 Id. at 470.
824 Id. at 469.
825 Id. at 474.
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form of judicial intervention, and the ability to engage in enforce-
ment or hierarchical coercion.
6.4.2.3. The Inclusive Nature of Human Rights Obligations
In order to be constitutional in nature, a rule of law must be
binding on all members of a community with or without their con-
sent.826 As Kant noted, the "principle of being content with major-
ity decisions must be accepted unanimously" in order for a consti-
tution to exist.8 27 If members of a community may lawfully exempt
themselves from the application of an objectionable (but valid)
rule, or if they may avoid that application by simply exercising a
contractual right of withdrawal, then such a rule would lack consti-
tutional quality.
Identification of the actual composition of a community, as well
as identification of the rule of law allegedly governing that com-
munity, is essential for determining the presence of constitutional-
ism. If it is argued, for example, that the U.N. Charter is the consti-
tution of the whole international community and is binding on all
members and constituencies within that community, issues regard-
ing those few States that are not Members of the United Nations
must be addressed. As discussed earlier, it can be argued that Ar-
ticles 2.6, 2.7, and 103 clearly indicate that non-Members are in fact
bound by the U.N. Charter's basic principles and objectives828 and
by its enforcement mechanisms contained in Chapter VII. Simi-
larly, Article 32 of the Charter provides that "any state which is not
a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under
consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to partici-
pate ... in the discussion relating to the dispute."8 29 Such a provi-
sion explicitly indicates that the U.N. Security Council can hear
disputes involving non-Members and can take action in their re-
826 For a discussion in this regard, see, e.g., Fassbender, supra note 13, at 548-
49 (discussing Christian Tomuschat), 581-84, 617 (explaining the U.N. Charter ap-
plicability to non-Members); Perez, supra note 18, at 447 (noting that the U.N.
Charter is better understood as a constitution that confers rights and imposes du-
ties on members of communities that have not given their consent to be governed
by it).
827 KANT, supra note 12, at 79.
828 See supra notes 814-19 and accompanying text (citing evidence that the
U.N. Charter will be enforced against non-Member nations); see also, e.g., Fass-
bender, supra note 13, at 593 (noting that viewing the U.N. Charter as a constitu-
tion best explains the demands made on non-Members).
829 U.N. CHARTER art. 32.
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gard. As Fassbender notes, under such a system of collective secu-
rity, a non-member State that breaches the U.N. Charter would, "in
the very second" of the breach, be subject to its provisions.830 Fi-
nally, the conception of 'unanimity in the majority' is also evi-
denced by the fact that fundamental amendments to the U.N.
Charter come into force "for all Members" when adopted by two-
thirds of the General Assembly and ratified, in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes, by two-thirds of the
Members (including all of the permanent Members of the U.N. Se-
curity Council). 831 As a result, as many as one-third of the Mem-
bers of the United Nations may be absolutely bound by an
amendment to the U.N. Charter despite their substantial opposi-
tion.832
On the other hand, this Article has chosen to define a commu-
nity not in terms of those who are subject to the U.N. Charter but
in terms of those who either possess human rights or have human
rights obligations. Whether based upon the U.N. Charter, interna-
tional conventions, common values, customary law, or jus cogens,
such a community of human rights is (by definition) all inclusive.
There are in fact no 'non-members'. Certain rights are fundamen-
tal and while some nations may exercise the 'power' to suppress
those rights (since international intervention is far from consistent)
no State has the 'right' to do so.
While the U.N. Charter expressly recognizes the importance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 833 problems surrounding
830 Fassbender, supra note 13, at 583.
831 U.N. CHARTER art. 108.
832 For a discussion in this regard, see Fassbender, supra note 13, at 578-79.
Fassbender argues, of course, that non-Members are bound by the U.N. Charter,
that the Charter is the constitution of the international community, and that the
Charter is binding on all Members of the international community including
States, intergovernmental organizations, individuals, etc. Id. at 529, 531-32, 584,
609-15. For a discussion and citations regarding the debate as to whether the U.N.
Charter is the constitution of the international community, see id. at 616; Mac-
Donald, supra note 18, at 228-31 (citing commentators who claim that the U.N.
Charter is a "world constitution"); Perez, supra note 18, at 357 (presenting "a new
hermeneutic based on constitutional theory"), 402 (arguing that "a supranational
constitution has emerged around the U.N. Charter as its textual source"); Reis-
man, supra note 13, at 95 (stating that "checks and balances" are held to be "crucial
in modem constitutional theory"); id. at 100 (claiming that the U.N. Charter is part
of an "ongoing world constitutive process").
833 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1. 3 ("promoting and encouraging respect...
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms").
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non-self-execution and the creation of internally binding domestic
law will continue to persist.834 In contrast, international law, at
least when taken in its entirety, is in fact part of the law of each na-
tion.835 Rules based on customary law can be binding on all na-
tions that do not consistently object to the existence of those rules
836
and it is quite unlikely that a nation would consistently object (at
least outwardly) to the existence of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Even when rights are not actually observed in a particu-
lar State, their purported (or facial) acceptance would make it ex-
tremely difficult to subsequently deny their applicability. Addi-
tionally, it should be emphasized that rules based upon customary
law are not subject to the doctrine of non-self-execution 837 and that
norms that develop over time based on generally accepted treaty
provisions may actually become binding on States that are not par-
ties to those agreements. 8
38
In regard to the Universal Declaration,839 it can be strongly ar-
gued that this Declaration has reached the status of binding cus-
tomary law. The Universal Declaration has been viewed as "a
common standard of achievement" for all nations, as a "yardstick"
by which to measure the degree of compliance with international
human rights, and as the fundamental source of philosophy for "all
subsequent work in the field of human rights."8 40 It has been ac-
cepted as "authoritative" by all States (regardless of whether they
are parties to the ICCPR or ICESCR) and it has served as both the
basis and the justification for actions taken by the United Na-
tions.841 Being "universal in scope" it is binding on all nations "re-
gardless of whether or not Governments have formally accepted its
834 See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1952) ("A treaty does not
automatically supersede local laws which are inconsistent with it unless the treaty
provisions are self-executing.").
835 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law
is part of our law.").
836 RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 29.
837 See, e.g., Southard, supra note 439, at 54 (arguing that customary interna-
tional law has an advantage over treaty law in U.S. courts because "the doctrine of
non-self-execution does not apply").
838 See RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 29 (noting that
"compliance with the NPT obligation.., is reasonably good" even by nations not
party to that agreement).
839 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, pmbl.
840 Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev.1), supra note 143, at 4-5.
841 Id. at 10.
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principles." 842 As a result, the Declaration's specific recognition of
the right to health, medical care, and security in the event of sick-
ness must be given substantial stature.
843
Non-agreeing members can also be bound by a variety of per-
emptory norms or jus cogens. By definition, these norms are bind-
ing on all members of the international community and are im-
mune from State objection.844 While certainly subject to debate, it
can be legitimately argued that a variety of principles have in fact
achieved jus cogens status including the right to life and inherent
dignity, the duty to promote and encourage respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, the duty to maintain interna-
tional peace and security, and the duty to refrain from interfering
with self-determination and development.
845
Whether viewed solely in terms of customary law or as a sub-
stantial determinant in the achievement of the principles of jus co-
gens noted above, all nations have the duty to engage in the pro-
gressive realization of the right to the highest attainable standard
of health. While such a statement may seem overly inclusive, it is
simply incomprehensible that customary law would allow a stan-
dard by which nations would have no duty to even attempt to en-
gage in such a progression. Not only are most States parties to the
ICESCR, CEDAW, and ICERD, near unanimity has been achieved
in regard to the CRC. Additionally, those States that have chosen
not to become parties to these agreements generally abstain out of
fear that a formal recognition of these rights will result in additional
domestic liabilities on the part of national governments. In reality,
State practice in these non-members (such as the United States)
would arguably serve to support rather than deny the recognition
of the right to adequate prevention, treatment, and health care fa-
cilities. To equate the fear of formal liability with a consistent ob-
jection to the right to health would be both disheartening and erro-
neous.
6.4.2.4. A Progression Toward Human Rights Governance
Modern constitutional theory places a substantial emphasis on
842 Id.
843 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, art. 25 para. 1.
844 RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 29.
845 For a discussion in this regard, see Macdonald, supra note 18, at 206-09
(providing a list of principles that have achieved the status of jus cogens).
2004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
the need for autonomous institutions that perform distinct legisla-
tive, judicial, and enforcement functions and that provide a system
of checks and balances in regard to institutional power.846 Such an
emphasis substantially reflects the fact that constitutional theory
has primarily developed out of an analysis of national polities. As
a result, the current approach to constitutionalism is inherently en-
cumbered by domesticized baggage that may prove less applica-
ble, or at least too rigid, in the international setting. In order to
witness the progression towards human rights governance, tradi-
tional political thinking must be adjusted to recognize the influence
that the international community is exerting on legal relationships.
6.4.2.4.1. The Presence of Lawmaking
It would be na'fve to argue the existence of a world government
or the presence of a formal legislative entity. It would be equally
unrealistic, however, to deny the existence of an international body
of law (that is more than a mere combination of interstate agree-
ments or the result of an association of free States) or to ignore the
fact that the sources of this law are rooted independently from the
will of individual nations.
While certainly in less traditional ways, the ability to legislate
this international law is becoming increasingly apparent. Ronald
MacDonald notes, for example, that despite the fact that the U.N.
Security Council is not explicitly endowed with lawmaking capac-
ity, its exercise of humanitarian intervention seems to indicate the
establishment of new norms of international law.847 Similarly,
while the U.N. Security Council lacks any formal lawmaking com-
petence over individuals, the Council (without any official objec-
tion from the U.N. membership) established International Tribu-
nals in Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia that were directed at
the activities of individual persons.8 48 There is also no doubt that
international lawmaking has proscribed such activities as torture,
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and has legis-
lated mechanisms for imposing accountability (at least under cer-
846 See, e.g., notes 703, 704, and 706 and accompanying text (stating that a con-
stitution implements a separation of powers to create a system of checks and bal-
ances).
847 MacDonald, supra note 18, at 215.
848 Id. at 216 (relating how the U.N. Security Council established International
Tribunals for both Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, respectively).
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tain circumstances) irrespective of the contractual consent of gov-
ernments. 849 Whether viewed in terms of creating "instant global
law" 85 0 or in terms of legislating fundamental changes to the U.N.
Charter, 85' the condemnation of mass displacement, starvation, and
terrorism 852 further underscores the increasing scope of interna-
tional lawmaking.
The powers vested in the U.N. Security Council, however, are
far from being fully utilized. Pursuant to Article 24 of the U.N.
Charter, "Members confer on the Security Council primary respon-
sibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"
and, under the terms of Articles 25 and 48, agree to accept and
carry out Council decisions in such a manner. As the Security
Council continues to interpret the concept of 'primary responsibil-
ity' as well as the global and domestic conditions requisite for the
maintenance of international peace and security, its international
lawmaking function will continue to expand. This decision mak-
ing, accompanied by a mandate that those decisions be accepted
and implemented by all States, may certainly be characterized as
quasi-legislative in nature.
Of critical importance will be the willingness of the U.N. Secu-
rity Council to exercise this lawmaking power when faced with
such health crises as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and similar
epidemics that may develop in the future. As has been argued
throughout this Article, jurisdiction to do so (whether based upon
a foundation of human rights or international security) is beyond
question. Nations that do not recognize their duty to engage in the
progressive realization of the right to health, assuming that such a
failure frustrates the realization of fundamental human rights or
endangers international peace and security should be subject to
such lawmaking power.
International lawmaking in the field of human rights is not lim-
ited to the actions of the U.N. Security Council. As Koh has indi-
cated, while human rights treaty regimes have been notoriously
849 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 22, arts. 5-8, 12 (establishing an Interna-
tional Criminal Court with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and the crime of aggression).
850 RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 39.
851 See Perez, supra note 18 (arguing that the United Nations has created a su-
pranational government complete with a supranational constitution).
852 See supra notes 791-93, 816-18 and accompanying text (describing recent
United Nations actions).
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weak, core customary norms have nevertheless been clearly de-
fined and often have become peremptory in nature.8 3 This cus-
tomary law is in effect 'enacted' by the international community as
a whole and may emanate from such 'institutions' as treaty rela-
tionships, state practice, or common values represented by inalien-
able rights. Whatever its institutional basis, the body of law that is
created is just as binding as that enacted by more traditional forms
of legislative entities.
The creation of customary law requires substantially more than
mere custom or political rhetoric. It requires both consistent and
recurring state practice (usus) and recognition by States that the
customary practice is in fact legally obligatory (opinio juris).854
When such conditions are met, customary law (while not necessar-
ily granting individuals the right to institute actions against their
own governments) can create binding constitutional relationships
among States that are capable of being externally enforced.
Evidence of both state practice and obligatory nature in regard
to the right to the highest attainable standard of health appears to
be compelling. A variety of treaties, declarations, U.N. General
Assembly resolutions, international conferences, Commis-
sion/Conmittee comments and domestic laws all serve to testify
to such a fact. Treaties such as the ICESCR, CEDAW, ICERD, and
CRC not only create binding contractual obligations among States,
they also provide substantial evidence of state practice and serve to
support (or to articulate) global norms of customary international
law.8 55 As discussed earlier, these treaties are supplemented by a
variety of regional agreements such as the Protocol of San Salvador
and the African Charter that similarly recognize the right to
health.85 6 Additionally, not only have many nations chosen to in-
corporate the right to health or other health-related entitlements
into their domestic statutes or constitutions (or have chosen to in-
853 Koh, supra note 13, at 2655.
854 AUGUST, supra note 498, at 60. For a discussion in this regard see id. at 60-
65 ("The psychological element in showing that a customary practice has become
law is the requirement that states... must regard it as binding.").
855 Eisner, supra note 21, at 211; see also, RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, su-
pra note 684, at 133 (demonstrating how State practice by a "powerful and influen-
tial state" may be seen by other States as "a justification to relax or withdraw from
their own commitments").
856 See supra notes 471-76 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the
Protocol of San Salvador and the African Charter).
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corporate the Universal Declaration), such rights are being increas-
ingly recognized by domestic and regional tribunals.
85 7
These formal indicia of state practice and obligatory intent are
further validated by a substantial body of secondary evidence.
While U.N. General Assembly resolutions are not legally obliga-
tory, they are nevertheless relevant to the development of custom-
ary international law. As MacDonald has argued, a resolution that
restates or clarifies an existing principle of customary law signifies
that "the majority of states consider the interpretation ... to be rep-
resentative of the current opinio juris on the subject." 58 In support
of such an observation, it can be underscored that the whole pur-
pose of Article 13.1.a of the U.N. Charter is to provide the General
Assembly with the ability to initiate studies and to make recom-
mendations "for the purpose of . . . encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification."
8 59
In such a context, it may be noted that the Universal Declara-
tion, including its provision on the right to health, medical care,
and security in the event of sickness 860, has in fact been proclaimed
by way of a U.N. General Assembly resolution.861 Similarly, the
Vienna Declaration -which recognizes that the universality of the
rights contained in the Universal Declaration are "beyond ques-
tion,"86 2 that such rights are the "birthright of all human beings,"
863
and that respect for these rights without distinction "is a funda-
mental rule of international human rights law"8 64 - has also been
endorsed by means of a General Assembly resolution.865 Pursuant
to the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations, the General Assembly has also taken the posi-
tion that the promotion of universal respect and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the mainte-
nance of global peace and security, "constitute basic principles of
857 See supra notes 495-539 and accompanying text (laying out the mecha-
nisms for tribunals).
858 MacDonald, supra note 18, at 214.
859 U.N. CHARTER art. 13.1.
860 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, art. 25, para. 1.
861 G.A. Res. 217, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810, (1948).
862 Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 1.
863 Id.
864 Id. para. 15.
865 G.A. Res. 114, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg. at para. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/48/121 (1993).
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international law." 866
This combination of formal legal recognition and recurring sec-
ondary validation must be viewed as giving rise to customary
norms in regard to the right to health.867 Perhaps as a climactic rec-
ognition of such a fact, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the
Declaration of Commitment 68 which recognized that access to
medicines in the context of pandemics "is one of the fundamental
elements to achieve progressively the full realization of the right of
everyone to.. . the highest attainable standard of physical and men-
tal health."869 Pursuant to this Declaration, all U.N. Members
agreed to take action against a global emergency that was threaten-
ing international security, undermining social and economic de-
velopment, and frustrating the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.870  Despite treaty affiliation (or lack
thereof), all nations indicated support for an emerging interna-
tional norm in the area of global public health.
It is the existence of peremptory human rights, however, that
can actually bridge the gap between customary law and constitu-
tional law. Kant suggested that respect for the rights of individuals
is "obligatory," "unconditional," and "absolutely imperative".871
John Locke similarly argued that the only legitimate purpose of a
government was to protect the natural rights of those being gov-
erned, since such rights actually precede the existence of the State
and are not conferred by the State. 872 In the international setting,
the ICJ has recognized that human rights may transcend treaty re-
lationships and that the absence of a legally binding agreement be-
tween States would not imply an ability to engage in human rights
866 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 124, U.N. Doc. A/8018
(1970).
867 It should also be noted that complete unanimity is not required to achieve
such a result since the existence of a few objecting nations would not serve to de-
feat a norm's applicability to all other States.
868 Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3.
869 Id. para. 15 (emphasis added).
870 See, e.g., id. at paras. 2, 5, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16 (providing examples of the dam-
age caused by HIV/AIDS).
871 KANT, supra note 12, at 129.
872 Petersmann, supra note 18, at 760 (summarizing the position of John
Locke).
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violations. 873
If a right is truly natural or 'inalienable,' it would defy all logic
to argue that States may lawfully deny that right by means of con-
sistently objecting to its existence. Inalienable rights are in fact in-
dependent from the State and need neither State conferral nor State
acquiescence. Since no State may lawfully exempt itself from the
recognition of these rights, inalienability and a lack of peremptory
status would be inherently contradictory.
The difficulty, of course, lies with identifying which rights are
actually inalienable and thus peremptory in nature. Rights to be
free from genocide, torture, slavery, or forced labor 874 clearly fall
within such a designation. Rights to life, inherent dignity, equality,
equal protection, self-determination and development should also
be similarly categorized. Unfortunately, some of these rights tend
to defy precise parameters and the distinction between inalienabil-
ity and social policy choices becomes legitimately blurred. The
right to 'life' and the right to a particular 'quality' of life, for exam-
ple, are fundamentally different issues. The right to live in dignity
and the right to a particular standard of living would be similarly
distinct.
Nevertheless, there is a sufficient core of inalienable rights-
including the inalienable right of all 'peoples' to self-
determination 875 and the inalienable right of "every human per-
son" to enjoy economic, social, political, and cultural develop-
ment876-upon which to base a set of peremptory rules that are
binding on all States under a constitutional human rights regime.
In order to give practical effect to these laws there must also be an
implied lawmaking power on the part of the global community in re-
gard to the progressive realization of the right to health. Without
such an implication, the indivisibility and interdependence of these
rights will substantially undermine any notion of their inalienabil-
ity.
873 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
134 (June 27) ("[T]he absence of such a commitment would not mean that Nicara-
gua could with impunity violate human rights.").
874 In regard to forced labor, see John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603,
00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), reh'g en
banc granted, Nos. CV-96-06959 RSWL, CV-96-06112 RSWL, 2003 WL 359787 (9th
Cir. Feb. 14, 2003).
875 See, e.g., Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 2.
876 DRD, supra note 25, art. 1.1.
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6.4.2.4.2. A Rudimentary Patchwork of Judicial and
Enforcement Functions
In order to impose a constitutional duty among States to en-
gage in progressive realization, some form of fact-finding and in-
terpretive mechanism must be identified. The ICJ has been desig-
nated the "principle judicial organ of the United Nations" 87 and
could conceivably hear disputes between Member States regarding
breaches of treaty-based, customary-based, or constitutionally-
based duties to provide the highest attainable standard of health.
The resulting ICJ decision would be binding on all U.N. Members
who were parties to the action and could be enforced by way of
appropriate U.N. Security Council measures.
878
Unfortunately, the ICJ lacks compulsory jurisdiction over in-
ternational disputes and can acquire such jurisdiction only by way
of consent or acceptance by the States who are parties to the dis-
pute. Since only a minority of Members have chosen to accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (and even those acceptances
have often been subject to substantial reservations),879 the ICJ can-
not be currently viewed as an effective arbiter of human rights is-
sues.
On the other hand, there are a number of less traditional
mechanisms that can in fact contribute to an adjudicative approach
to human rights. It could be argued, for example, that the holding
of individuals and States accountable for human rights violations
constitutes a form of judicial intervention. While there is no doubt
that the protection of human rights would best be served by grant-
ing access to individual complaint procedures, the ability of some
international bodies to interpret human rights violations, to render
decisions against both individuals and States, and to impose some
form of punishment on offenders should not be ignored. Whether
stimulated by complaints from individuals or from other global ac-
tors, the cumulative reaction of the international community to
human rights violations serves to create more identifiable human
rights jurisprudence and enforcement standards.
877 U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
878 Id. art. 94.
879 Petersmann, supra note 18, at 771. In regard to a lack of compulsory juris-
diction, see also, Fassbender, supra note 13, at 575; RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF
LAW?, supra note 684, at 37 (discussing how the United States undermined the au-
thority of the International Court of Justice).
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In regard to holding individuals judicially accountable for hu-
man rights violations, it has already been noted880 that the U.N. Se-
curity Council established ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia precisely for such a purpose. Similarly, the
Rome Statute88' has now created a permanent International Crimi-
nal Court that is empowered to prosecute individuals (including,
under certain circumstances, nationals of non-member States) for a
variety of serious human rights offenses.882 The ICC, with 139 Sig-
natories and more than 90 Parties, is in fact a separate institution
(rather than an arm of the United Nations) and is therefore largely
independent from the U.N. Security Council.883 Its jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity includes widespread or systematic
rape, forced pregnancy, sexual violence, and persecution based on
gender.884 The court also has jurisdiction over "other inhumane
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." 885 In addi-
tion to its fact-finding function, the ICC will be compelled to inter-
pret the substantial breadth of such language as "inhumane acts,"
"great suffering," and "serious injury" to physical or mental
health. Whether an intentional denial or interference with the right
to health -such as a conscious failure to provide available pharma-
ceuticals during pandemics or a refusal to engage in any form of
progressive realization-would constitute the imposition of such
suffering or serious injury is a question in need of resolution.
Individuals can also be held accountable by means of an inter-
national judicial system that is composed of domestic courts en
masse. The concept of universal jurisdiction, for example, applies
to crimes and other grave breaches of international law that are so
substantial that they offend the international community as a
whole. As a result, all States not only have the right, but the obliga-
tion to prosecute offenders no matter where the act occurred and
no matter what the nationality of the individual actor.88 6 As Beth
880 See supra note 848 and accompanying text (discussing tribunals set up by
the U.N. Security Council).
881 Rome Statute, supra note 22.
882 See supra notes 776-79 and accompanying text (listing examples of human
rights offenses).
883 RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 122-23.
884 Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 7.1(g), (h).
885 Id., art. 7.1(k).
886 RULE OF POWER OR RULE OF LAW?, supra note 684, at 120 (citing IAN
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Stephens has indicated, universal jurisdiction "dispenses com-
pletely with a requirement of a particular connection between a
state and the activities under review" and instead relies upon the
collective interest of all States.887 The concept "permits domestic
legal systems to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over a growing
list of international offenses" 8 8 and, in Stephen's opinion, should
include the assertion of domestic jurisdiction over civil human
rights claims.889 A similar issue remains, however, as to whether
governmental officials who breach their duty to engage in a pro-
gressive realization of the right to the highest attainable standard
of health would be subject to such jurisdiction in the event of mas-
sive human suffering.
In regard to the accountability of States, U.N. Security Council
powers include a substantial quasi-judicial component. Determi-
nations regarding whether humanitarian intervention is author-
ized, whether the use of force is appropriate, or whether economic
sanctions should be imposed all require fact-finding and interpre-
tive decision making symptomatic of the judicial function. In order
to make such determinations, it would seem logical that the U.N.
Security Council would also be required to determine whether a
State was 'guilty' of violating international law, whether particular
conduct represented a gross violation of human rights, and
whether international peace and security were being endangered.
Additionally, the fact that both targeted sanctions and humanitar-
ian intervention are increasing would seem to indicate that the
powers of the U.N. Security Council, and the nature of human
rights violations giving rise to U.N. Security Council action, are
subject to judicial' interpretation in light of changing global phi-
losophies.
International judicial machinery has also been substantially
strengthened by the new WTO Agreement. While admittedly in a
different context,890 this Agreement incorporates a large social
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990)). For a discus-
sion of universal jurisdiction and human rights, as well as the Geneva Conven-
tions upon which it is based, see Stephens, supra note 24, at 40-44.
887 Stephens, supra note 24, at 40-41.
888 Id. at 49.
889 See, e.g., id. at 5-6, 34-57 (discussing a multinational approach to domestic
remedies).
890 See supra notes 784-88 and accompanying text (discussing the spirit of the
WTO Agreement).
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component that recognizes the interdependence of international
trade, social and economic development, and the eradication of
poverty. By doing so, the WTO is positioned to play a more impor-
tant role in encouraging the practical realization of human rights
by means of promoting higher standards of living, by encouraging
special treatment for less-fortunate nations, and by prohibiting dis-
criminatory practices and protectionist measures by more politi-
cally sensitive nations. As a result, dispute resolution panel re-
ports that are designed to enforce these mandates and protect the
legitimate interests of less powerful nations can in fact have con-
siderable long-term human rights effects. Under the old GATT
Agreement, adoption of these reports was dependent upon the
unanimous consensus of all GATT members including the actual
parties involved in the dispute. Under the new WTO Agreement,
this process has been reversed and a report will be adopted (and
become binding on the parties) unless there is a consensus against
its adoption.8 91 Such a reversal has added substantial importance to
the WTO dispute settlement function and may contribute not only
to the economic development of poor nations, but also to the reali-
zation of human rights that generally accompanies that develop-
ment.
Finally, each of these judicial or quasi-judicial components
serves to supplement the more traditional adjudicative functions of
the human rights regime addressed earlier in this Article. 92 As
discussed in Section 5, adjudicative accountability can be imposed
by a number of regional and international bodies both by means of
adjudicative monitoring and the use of individual and interstate
complaint systems. The African Commission on Human and Peo-
ple's Rights, for example, is not only empowered to interpret the
provisions of the African Charter, but also to hear interstate com-
plaints and to consider "other communications," including those
from individuals.8 93 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights has transformed its monitoring function into an "in-
fluential human rights adjudication procedure" 894 by adopting an
891 LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 26, at 365.
892 See supra notes 626-95 and accompanying text (referring to the adjudica-
tive functions of the human rights regime).
893 See supra notes 656-61 and accompanying text (discussing the powers of
the African Commission on Human and People's Rights).
894 Porter, supra note 569, at 127. For a discussion of Porter's position, see su-
pra notes 666-71 and accompanying text (stating that Porter believes the Commit-
2004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
"adjudicative framework" 895 for examining claims and by granting
NGOs the right to participate in the context of periodic reviews.
896
The Human Rights Committee has been empowered to hear both
interstate and individual human rights complaints in regard to na-
tions that have (respectively) declared under Article 41 of the
ICCPR or become parties to its Optional Protocol.897 This Commit-
tee is of particular import in light of the indivisibility of civil and
political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights and in
light of the fact that the right to health exerts a determinative influ-
ence on the realization of each.898 As a result, this Committee has
the potential to exert some independent adjudicatory jurisdiction
in regard to the right to health by redefining the determinants of
civil and political freedoms.
The totality of such human rights bodies -whether emanating
from the U.N. Charter, multilateral treaties, regional agreements,
or domestic policy-makes it increasingly difficult to deny the
progression toward international adjudication. Additionally, the
results of these adjudications are in fact subject to enforcement
both in terms of coercion and punishment. While it is true that the
ultimate performance of an international obligation cannot always
be practically mandated, much like the remedy of specific per-
formance cannot always be mandated in civil proceedings, sub-
stantial penalties may be imposed for noncompliance. Offending
nations may experience international condemnation, the withhold-
ing of privileges under a treaty that has been breached, or a retalia-
tion or suspension of concessions under the WTO Agreement or
other trade arrangement. Nations may also be subject to a reduc-
tion of international aid, a denial or rescission of loans from lend-
ing institutions, or a freezing of individual or State assets.
899
Both punishment and coercion may also be imposed by means
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has adopted an adjudicative frame-
work for examining claims regarding social and economic rights).
895 Id. at 126.
896 Id. at 124-25.
897 See supra notes 678-83 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR).
898 For a discussion in this regard, see supra notes 603-25 and accompanying
text (discussing the indivisibility, interrelation, and interdependency of human
rights).
899 For a discussion and citations in this regard, see supra notes 688-93 and
accompanying text (referring to availability of lawful punishment and valid inter-
vention).
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of embargoes or other forms of economic sanction. Some security-
based sanctions, for example, can "actually be implemented for
humanitarian purposes and are designed to force nations to alter
abhorrent policies" or reverse systematic denials of human
rights.900 It must be admitted, however, that economic sanctions
generally hurt people more than their governments. The effects of
foreclosing consumer markets, denying economic aid, withholding
essential goods and services, and blacklisting the identity of a na-
tion are primarily borne by those most in need.90'
On the other hand, the increasing use of 'smart' sanctions that
apply a particularized approach focusing on the coercion, isolation,
containment, and punishment of decision making elites tends to
substantially reduce the impact of sanctions on both the civilian
population and surrounding geographic region. Such targeted
sanctions as travel bans, arms embargoes, diplomatic reductions,
and freezes on the assets of governmental leaders and their fami-
lies also lend themselves to monitoring, inspection and periodic
review mechanisms as well as to the use of Sanctions Committees
and Panels of Experts. 902
Finally, international adjudications may also be enforced by
means of humanitarian intervention whenever massive human
rights violations or an extreme crisis in public health endangers in-
ternational peace and security.903 While the institutions of the hu-
man rights regime are far from perfect,9 4 human rights norms are
becoming more clearly defined.905 As a result, as the determinants
of international peace and security become more comprehensive,
and as international trading relationships become more inclusive,
9w See Cann, supra note 14, at 465.
901 Id. at 466 (citing The Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions: The Bottom
Line, 89 AM. Soc'Y. INT'L. L. 337, 339-40, 351, 359 (1995) (remarks by Laurence Bois-
son de Chazournes and W. Michael Reisman)).
902 For a discussion in regard to "smart" sanctions, see U.N. Sanctions Secre-
tariat, Smart Sanctions, The Next Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions
(Dec. 3-5, 2000) (informal paper presented at the Second Expert Seminar, Berlin)
(proposing that sanctions directed at specific targets could minimize the adverse
humanitarian effects of sanctions).
903 For citations regarding the humanitarian intervention debate, see supra
note 21.
904 See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 18, at 768, 770, 777, 780-81, 789 (providing
examples of regime imperfections and the lessons to glean from them).
905 The U.N. Human Rights Regime, supra note 21, at 460 (remarks by Thomas
Buergenthal); see also Koh, supra note 13, at 2655-56 (discussing the development
of human rights norms).
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the likelihood of humanitarian intervention to enforce these norms
will continue to grow.906 The limitations imposed by the concepts
of sovereignty and non-intervention will continue to naturally
erode as fundamental common values alter the domestic identities
of nations. Whether based exclusively on U.N. Security Council
action or on the delegation of U.N. authority to national or regional
enforcement organizations, 907 the exercise of this collective action
will in turn alter the realities of global governance.
6.4.3. The Rights of Self-Determination and Development
The existence of an international community, a growing nor-
mative and institutional hierarchy within that community, and an
identifiable (although limited) set of lawmaking, adjudicatory, and
enforcement powers all suggest a progression toward the creation
of constitutional relationships both between States and between
States and their own citizens. While such a progression is based
upon an increasing recognition of a variety of rights, those of self-
determination and development are particularly dependent upon
the constitutionalization of the right to health.
Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR specifically recognize that all
"Peoples" have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this
right, they may freely pursue their own economic, social, and cul-
tural development, and they may not be deprived of their own
means of subsistence.9 8 This right also recognizes that all Peoples
have control over their own "natural wealth and resources"909 -
including biological and genetic resources 910 - and that these re-
sources can be traded by those Peoples for a variety of rents such
as access to technology, scientific research, and the fruits of utiliza-
tion or commercialization.911 The right of self-determination has
been incorporated into the U.N. Charter,912 the Vienna Declara-
906 See Eisner, supra note 21, at 210-13 (discussing the ascendancy of human
rights).
907 See Perez, supra note 18, at 421-36 (providing examples of U.N. delega-
tion).
908 ICCPR, supra note 125, arts. 1.1, 1.2; ICESCR, supra note 23, arts. 1.1 and
1.2.
909 ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 1.2; ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 1.2.
910 See CBD, supra note 189, pmbl., arts. 2, 15-19 (discussing the access and
exchange of various information and resources).
911 See id. arts. 15-19.
912 U.N. CHARTER arts. 1.2, 55.
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tion,913 and the DRD 914 and it has been consistently mandated by a
variety of other General Assembly resolutions and proclama-
tions.915 It has been categorized as an "inalienable" right by the
United Nations916 and is believed, at least by some, to constitute a
principle of jus cogens.9
17
Unfortunately, the right of self-determination has been tradi-
tionally linked to the concept of colonization and the preemption
of domestic governance by foreign or alien nations.918 Even under
such a restrictive perspective, it can be argued that a form of de
facto colonization results from the external domination of intellec-
tual property rights and the external power to impose universal
definitions of those rights.919 Domination over production facili-
ties, manufacturing processes, and pricing may also be viewed as a
form of colonialism in light of the fact that pharmaceuticals are far
from luxury goods. The ability to control the availability of these
essential products can be translated into a power to influence the
political, economic, social, and cultural structures of a nation. The
actual imposition of substantial restrictions on availability, of
course, could result in the destruction of those internal structures.
While this Article is not suggesting the existence of such a con-
scious destructive scenario, the mere presence of these powers un-
dermines the concept of self-determination by placing the internal
health of a nation under the dominion of foreign States. As a re-
sult, the right of self-determination should in fact be applicable to
the creation and interpretation of intellectual property rights and it
913 Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 2.
914 DRD, supra note 25, pmbl.
915 See, e.g., Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, supra note
1, pmbl.; Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress, supra note
198, pmbl. (providing examples of resolutions mandating the right of self-
determination).
916 See World Conference on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 121, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/121 (1993) (stating that "promotion
and protection of human rights is a matter of priority for the international com-
munity.").
917 See Macdonald, supra note 18, at 207 ("[T]he obligation to promote and en-
courage respect for human rights... appears to have reached the status of jus co-
gens.").
918 For a discussion regarding self-determination, decolonization, and an ex-
pansion of this right, see Perez, supra note 18, at 405-12.
919 In regard to issues surrounding the TRIPS Agreement and imperialism,
see Marci Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotec-
tive, 29 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 613 (1996); Oddi, supra note 29.
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should serve as a foundation for imposing legal limitations on ex-
ternal forces that might frustrate its realization.
It can also be argued that the concept of self-determination
should not be limited to the relationships between nations (and the
exercise of power by one State over another), but should also in-
clude the constitutional relationship between a State and its own
citizens. Such an argument would reflect the fact that States do not
have the right of self-determination. Instead, this right has been
specifically vested in the various "Peoples" of the international
community. If Peoples have been endowed with this right, it
would seem logical that a State, as personified by its current gov-
ernmental regime, would not have the right to interfere with the
self-determination of its people.
Because 'States' and 'Peoples' are independent concepts, the
Peoples' right to self-determination must be protected from State
interference whether that interference be foreign or domestic in
origin. If this were not so, there would be no logic in the distinc-
tion between 'States' and 'Peoples' that has been recognized in all
human rights instruments addressing this particular right. Simi-
larly, if self-determination is in fact an inalienable right, it is not an
inalienable right of the State but a collective right of the people of
that State. As with all inalienable rights, the right to self-
determination precedes the State, is not created by the State, and is
independent from the State. It can not be denied by means of for-
eign interference or by means of the domestic policies of a particu-
lar Peoples' territorial government.
While the right to self-determination is collective in nature, the
right to development provides both collective and individual
rights. In the DRD, the U.N. General Assembly described devel-
opment as "a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and politi-
cal process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-
being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of
their active, free and meaningful participation." 920 The Declaration
recognizes the human person as the "central subject" of this proc-
ess and as both its main participant and its primary beneficiary. 921
The right to development is also viewed as an "inalienable human
920 DRD, supra note 25, pmbl. (emphasis added).
921 Id. pmbl., art. 2.1; see also Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 10 (echo-
ing the Universal Declaration by recognizing that the "human person is the cen-
tral subject of development").
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right" by which all Peoples and all individuals are entitled to enjoy
economic, political, social and cultural progress.922 While certainly
a more 'positive' right in nature, the right to development is also
viewed as interdependent with the right of self-determination 923
and as an integral part of all fundamental human rights.924
The right to development also possesses a substantial distribu-
tive component that fundamentally influences the relationships
among nations. All people, for example, have the right to share in
the benefits resulting from social and economic development in-
cluding those emanating from scientific advancement and its ap-
plications.925 Such a fact is specifically recognized in the Universal
Declaration 926 and it can be argued that a variety of other interna-
tional instruments reflect similar distributive obligations. The
TRIPS Agreement recognizes that the protection of intellectual
property rights should contribute to the transfer and dissemination
of technology to the mutual benefit of producers and users and
should be employed in a manner that is conducive to social and
economic welfare. 927 It also specifically mandates that developed
country Members provide incentives to their domestic enterprises
and institutions for the purpose of promoting and encouraging
technology transfer to least-developed countries. 928  The CBD
speaks in terms of an "equitable sharing" between developed and
developing nations of the benefits arising from the utilization of
traditional knowledge. 929 It also provides for the promotion of
broader participation in scientific research, the exchange of infor-
mation among States, the facilitation of both public and private
sector technology transfer, and the sharing in a fair and equitable
way of the results of R&D and the fruits of genetic resource com-
922 DRD, supra note 25, art. 1.1; see also Vienna Declaration, supra note 101,
para. 10 (stating that "the right to development [is] a universal and inalienable
right and an integral part of fundamental human rights").
923 See, e.g., DRD, supra note 25, art. 1.2 ("[T]he human right to development
also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination.").
924 Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, para. 10.
925 See, e.g., id. para. 11; ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 15.1(b); DRD, supra note
25, pmbl.; Declaration on Social Progress and Development, supra note 617, art.
13(a).
926 Universal Declaration, supra note 118, art. 27.1.
927 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 7.
928 Id. art. 66.2. This mandate was reaffirmed in the Declaration on TRIPS.
Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 28, para. 7.
929 CBD, supra note 189, art. 8(j).
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mercialization. 930
In recognizing the importance of scientific and technological
progress to the social and economic development of poorer coun-
tries (and that the transfer of science and technology is one of the
principle ways for accelerating both development and the realiza-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms), the U.N. General
Assembly has taken the position that States have the duty to coop-
erate in establishing and strengthening the scientific and techno-
logical capacity of developing nations.93' As a result, the country
of origin of a particular form of development and the country of
origin of the potential recipients of developmental benefits should
no longer be separated by strict national or proprietary boundaries.
These international agreements recognize that the creation of
the conditions necessary for development is the "primary respon-
sibility" of the domestic State.932 Each State owes a duty to its own
citizens to formulate appropriate national policies (both internal
and external) for the promotion of this right and to take the practi-
cal measures necessary to advance its realization. 933 Individual
States also have the duty to prevent outflows of capital that are
detrimental to economic and social development 934 and to take ap-
propriate action to extend the benefits of science and technology
"to all strata of the population." 935
Simultaneously, all States (both individually and collectively)
also have the duty to create international conditions that are favor-
able to the realization of this right in countries other than their
own. Accordingly, all States have the duty to cooperate with each
930 Id. arts. 15-19. In such a regard, see also Declaration on Social Progress and
Development, supra note 617, arts. 13(a), 24(c) (calling for the "equitable sharing of
scientific and technological advances" and "increased utilization of science and
technology for social and economic development....").
931 Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress, supra note 198,
pmbl., paras. 1, 5, 7 ("All States shall co-operate in the establishment, strengthen-
ing, and development of the scientific and technological capacity of developing
countries with a view to accelerating the realization of the social and economic
rights of the peoples of those countries.").
932 DRD, supra note 25, pmbl.
933 See id. arts. 2.3, 8.1; see also Declaration on Social Progress and Development,
supra note 617, pmbl. (stating that it is "of cardinal importance to accelerate social
and economic progress everywhere" and that "the primary responsibility for the
development of the developing countries rests on those countries themselves").
934 Declaration on the Social Progress and Development, supra note 617, art. 16(d).
935 Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress, supra note 198,
para. 6.
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other to ensure universal economic and social development, to
eliminate obstacles to that development, to supplement national
efforts aimed at raising standards of living, and to formulate inter-
national policies for the purpose of facilitation.936 In light of the
fact that the promotion of economic and social progress is one of
the fundamental purposes of the United Nations937, and in light of
the fact that developmental status (or social and economic condi-
tion) is a fundamental determinant of international peace and secu-
rity938, the recognition of such universal duties is quite under-
standable.
The interplay between the inalienability of self-determination
and development and the duties that are imposed upon individual
States and the international community evidences something more
than mere contractual relationships. While these rights are consis-
tently recognized in a variety of treaties and declarations, they are
not created by those instruments. Instead, these rights exist inde-
pendently and define the relationships (in terms of limitations on
governmental powers) between domestic governments and their
citizens and between the international community and the nations
and individuals that constitute its global citizenry. The duty to
protect these rights, as well as the duty to refrain from interfering
with their realization both domestically and in other nations, is a
responsibility that is inherent in the definition of a lawful State.
When combined with domestic and international adjudicatory,
lawmaking, and enforcement mechanisms, these duties take on a
progressively constitutional nature.
As has been consistently argued, the physical health of a citi-
zenry determines the health of its economic, social and political
structures. Whether viewed in terms of stability, educational op-
936 See DRD, supra note 25, arts. 3.1, 3.3, 4.1 ("States have the primary respon-
sibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable to the
realization of the right to development."); see also Vienna Declaration, supra note
101, para. 10; Declaration on Social Progress and Development, supra note 617, art. 9
("Social progress and economic growth require recognition of the common inter-
est of all nations ... beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.").
937 See U.N. CHARTER pmbl., art. 55 ("[Tlhe United Nations shall promote...
conditions of economic and social progress.").
93 See, e.g., Declaration on Social Progress and Development, supra note 617,
pmbl. ("Convinced that international peace and security.., and social progress
and economic development ...are closely interdependent and influence each
other."); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (stating that the U.N. promotes economic
and social progress "with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being").
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portunity, productivity, or agricultural and industrial infrastruc-
ture, the rights of self-determination and development are abso-
lutely dependent upon the progressive realization of the right to
the highest attainable standard of health. To recognize 'constitu-
tional' duties in regard to one and not the other would represent
an exercise in futility.
6.4.4. Restraining Interference and Increasing the Capacity to
Obey
Not only do all nations have the duty to engage in progressive
realization, they also have the duty to refrain from interfering with
legal obligations that have been validly undertaken by other States.
Treaties such as the ICESCR, for example, have established con-
tractual relationships between nations which reflect mutual prom-
ises to pursue the progressive realization of the right to the highest
attainable standard of health. As a result, activities that interfere
with the ability of a nation to honor its treaty commitments to
other nations or that frustrate the fulfillment of those contractual
obligations should be viewed with substantial suspicion. Simi-
larly, actions that interfere with the ability of a State to meet its
domestic contractual obligations -created by means of valid do-
mestic legislation establishing duties between a State and its citi-
zens - must also be severely questioned.
The proper balance between lawful IPR policy and unlawful in-
terference is difficult to establish. While all nations have the sover-
eign right to create their own domestic IPR regime, mandating the
domestic IPR policy of another nation would constitute interfer-
ence. Requiring a foreign nation to adopt a particular exhaustion
policy would also fall within the latter of these categories. Simi-
larly, while nations may not have the duty to supply particular
products (such as pharmaceuticals), no State should have the right
to dictate the export policy decisions of other countries such as In-
dia, China, or Brazil.
The notion of interference is particularly important in light of
the nature of IPR regimes. Developed countries, for example, have
no duty to ensure that the contractual obligations undertaken by
other countries are in fact fulfilled where those obligations are be-
tween different States or between a State and its own citizens. In-
stead, the fulfillment of those responsibilities is the duty of the ob-
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ligated State. Thus, it can be argued that developed nations have
no legal duty to ensure the provision of adequate education, hous-
ing, food, or other necessities for the citizens of foreign countries.
At the same time, developed nations have not chosen to establish a
statutory regime that actually withholds the provision of these ne-
cessities or that inhibits the realization of these rights.
In contrast, IPR regimes inherently create a legal framework by
which access to pharmaceuticals is restricted and barriers to reali-
zation are governmentally condoned. By their very nature, such
regimes legalize market dominance, allow monopolistic pricing,
and prevent other producers from meeting the demands of con-
sumers. While the need to provide incentives and rewards for in-
ventive activity is beyond question, the unique problems created
by IPR policies must be carefully scrutinized. Not only may these
policies interfere with the realization of the right to health, they
may also interfere with the realization of civil and political rights,
the rights of self-determination and development, the rights to
subsistence and to family, and the rights to social and cultural ad-
vancement.
Perhaps in recognition of such a fact, numerous international
instruments have acknowledged both the duty to refrain from cre-
ating "obstacles" to the realization of human rights and the duty to
"eliminate" obstacles to global development.939 Nations have also
been directed to "respect the enjoyment of the right to health in
other countries", 940 to prevent both third parties and international
agreements from interfering with the global realization of this
right,941 and to refrain from activities that are inconsistent with the
achievement of higher standards of living, economic and social
progress and the resolution of health-related problems.
942
At the opposite end of this spectrum lies the issue of 'capacity.'
939 See, e.g., Vienna Declaration, supra note 101, paras. 10, 13, 31 ("States should
eliminate all violations of human rights... as well as obstacles to the enjoyment
of these rights."); see also DRD, supra note 25, art. 6.3 (stating that States "should
take steps to eliminate obstacles to development resulting from failure to observe
civil and political rights").
940 Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 39 (emphasis added). While this par-
ticular provision is aimed at Parties to the ICESCR, this Article takes the position
that its basic objectives are in fact applicable to all States.
941 Id.
942 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2.4, 55, 56 ("All Members shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state.").
20041
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
In order for binding constitutional principles to develop, and in
order to create a global legal framework wherein nations must obey
those principles rather than merely comply with them, States must
possess the actual capacity to adhere to those constitutional man-
dates. 943 International norms that establish standards that are im-
possible to carry out cannot give rise to a breach of duty when ad-
herence is lacking. The willingness of a particular nation to
recognize certain fundamental principles -whether by means of
ratifying a treaty, enacting domestic legislation, or recognizing cus-
tomary law -becomes irrelevant for all practical purposes in the
presence of incapacity.
In theory, all nations inherently possess the capacity to engage
in the progressive realization of the right to the highest attainable
standard of health. The level of that capacity (and thus the speed
of that progression) will of course vary dramatically from State to
State. Nevertheless, any nation that devotes even one dollar of
public funds toward the provision of health care services is in fact
engaged in a 'progression.'
On the other hand, the capacity of poor nations to meet pro-
gressive constitutional obligations can be enhanced in a variety of
ways. Increased international trade, for example, does not merely
redistribute global wealth, but also creates additional wealth that
can benefit less-developed nations. Both the philosophy of the
WTO Agreement and its exceptions, preferences, and diminished
expectations of reciprocity can also serve to expand the ability of
poorer nations to obey international law. Increasing the interaction
of international constituents whether they be governmental offi-
cials, businesspeople, NGOs, students, or even tourists, can en-
hance the economic capacity to obey and can serve to stimulate so-
cial demand for practical solutions to the problems that accompany
incapacity. As global actors become more aware of both potentiali-
ties and the obstacles to their achievement, pressure for change in-
evitably follows.
Viewed from its most basic perspective, the capacity to meet
developing constitutional duties is primarily a function of money.
943 In regard to elements necessary for creating obligatory norms and treaty
regime compliance (including the element of capacity), see Oscar Schachter, To-
wards a Theory of International Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300 (1968) and ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (both cited and discussed in Koh,
supra note 13, at 2622 n.113, 2638).
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Political and social recognition, even when accompanied by an ab-
solute willingness to comply, must be supplemented by the finan-
cial resources upon which progression is based. Third World debt,
for example, has reached unacceptable levels. According to the
World Bank's Global Development Finance database 2004, the total
external debt of developing countries was over $2.33 trillion at the
end of 2002.944 Of that amount, $872 billion was owed to public-
sector creditors945 while $1.466 trillion was owed to creditors in the
private sector.946 The external debt of AIDS-stricken Sub-Saharan
Africa reached $210 billion, while that of Latin American and the
Caribbean was over $727 billion.947 In light of the tremendous
burdens involved in the servicing of this debt, arguments in favor
of debt cancellation have gained substantial credence. While debt
cancellation may represent a cost to creditors, those costs may be
far outweighed by the benefits that could result. Increased stan-
dards of living, the creation of vast numbers of new consumers, the
amelioration of economic, social, and political instability, the en-
hancement of the capacity of nations to obey and implement inter-
national law, and the prevention of future epidemics would all ul-
timately benefit the international community.
The lack of financial resources can of course be addressed by a
variety of other mechanisms as well. Foreign aid (without expecta-
tion of repayment) and increased direct foreign investment can
both enhance a nation's capacity to obey. The provision of techni-
cal assistance, the legislating of incentives for the purpose of en-
couraging technology transfer from domestic enterprises to poorer
nations,948 and the creation of a more equitable balance of benefits
between the owners of IPRs and the owners of traditional knowl-
edge and biological resources 949 would all serve to increase the
ability of nations to meet their constitutional responsibilities. Sub-
944 THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: HARNESSING CYCLICAL
GAINS FOR DEVELOPMENT 219 tbl.B.42 (2004).
945 Id. at 224 tbl.B.47.
946 Id. at 225, tbl.B.48.
947 Id. at 219, tbl.B.42.
w See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26, art. 66.2 (requiring agreement Mem-
bers to provide "incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for
the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed
country" Members).
949 See, e.g., CBD, supra note 189, arts. 1, 8(j), 15, 16 (stating that parties should
share results of research and development).
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stantial catalysts could also be provided by recognizing that tradi-
tional knowledge is an IPR, by creating royalty systems for the
suppliers of genetic materials, and by using differential pricing
mechanisms that reflect both the limited purchasing power and the
fundamental contributions of the developing world. Whatever the
mechanism selected, investing in the financial health of other na-
tions, and supplementing the willingness to obey with the capacity
to obey, would provide a practical stimulus to the progression to-
ward global constitutionalism in the area of human rights.
6.5. A Concluding Synthesis: Constitutionalizing Global Public
Health
Since the United Nations issued its Declaration of Commitment
in 2001,950 the HIV/AIDS crisis has widely been accepted as an is-
sue of human rights. While such a recognition was landmark in
nature, global public health must now be viewed in terms of the
constitutional rights of individuals and the constitutional duties of
the domestic and international communities. The right to the
highest attainable standard of health-whether recognized as a
fundamental human right under the Universal Declaration and its
prodigies or as an absolute determinant for the achievement of
rights that are in fact viewed as fundamental -imposes a constitu-
tional mandate on all governments in regard to progressive reali-
zation. Additionally, in order to give practical effect to universally
recognized human rights, the global legal structure must assume
the implied authority to enforce this mandate. Without such an
implication, the indivisibility of these rights will transform their
inalienability into legal fiction.
The establishment of constitutional rights and duties in regard
to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and other public health crises is based
upon both the totality of the international legal regime and its ca-
pacity to engage in incremental constitutionalization. A concep-
tion of international law that focuses upon the frailties of individ-
ual instruments or the lack of traditional structural mechanisms
ignores the fact that universally binding principles have developed
from a totality of treaties, customary law, and other expressions of
global unity, and that international institutions possess the legal
capacity (although not always the political willingness) to enforce
950 Declaration of Commitment, supra note 3.
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those principles. It also ignores the fact that constitutional rights
and duties may result from an evolutionary process (with no finite
beginning or end) whereby relationships become constitutionally
binding even in the absence of a formally recognizable constitu-
tion. The right to be free from torture, for example, need not await
the creation of a global legislature.951
By viewing the constitutive process progressively, this Article
has argued that constitutional rights and duties may be created in-
crementally and need not be dependent upon the completion of
such a process. While the nature of these relationships will become
more defined over time (and more recognizable international en-
forcement machinery will be developed), this Article suggests that
constitutional relationships can in fact be created along the way.
Because these obligations are capable of developing outside tradi-
tional lawmaking mechanisms, formal State action becomes less
critical for their evolution and binding law may precede (rather
than be a product of) formal international institutionalization. 95 2
This incremental process has resulted in the creation of a num-
ber of peremptory human rights principles that cannot be defined
as voluntary or contractual in nature. These fundamental norms
establish a global hierarchy of values that preempts the traditional
rights of individual sovereigns and reflects a transition from inter-
national law to international constitutional law in the field of hu-
man rights. Based upon the logic that inalienability and the need
for consent are contradictory notions, these rights require neither
State conferral nor State acquiescence. Additionally, their indivisi-
bility mandates that they cannot be recognized on a piecemeal ba-
sis, that their particular origins cannot be examined in isolation,
and that they cannot be neatly categorized into exclusive groups
with artificially distinct mechanisms of accountability.
Similarly, the right to the highest attainable standard of health
cannot be reduced to the provisions of multilateral agreements.
While extremely important, these treaties form only a part of a
more fundamental global, regional, and normative framework that
has created a series of unifying principles in the area of public
health. Under such a structure, the withholding of available treat-
ment or the refusal to undertake the degree of progressive realiza-
951 See, e.g., supra notes 709-56 and accompanying text (discussing how rights
and duties may be established incrementally).
952 See id.
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tion that is congruent with available resources should be viewed as
an interference with the achievement of inalienable rights and as a
threat to international peace and security
A requirement of 'congruence' would inherently recognize that
the reasonableness of the relationship between progression and
available resources is subject to both measurement and judicial (or
quasi-judicial) review. It would also acknowledge the fact that the
doctrine of progressive realization is not a defense to be used to es-
cape responsibility, but a lens through which governmental activ-
ity may be evaluated and accountability may be imposed. 953 While
a requirement of congruence would certainly not equate the duty
to 'progress' with a duty to 'fulfill,' it would demand that the issue
of available resources be examined in the context of a broader and
more rigorous analysis. The availability issue would be relevant in
regard to the tempering of obligations and the reduction of exter-
nal expectations, but it would not be dispositive of governmental
compliance. All nations would be held to possess some capacity to
progress whether based upon the existence of financial resources,
the ability to promote human rights, the ability to refrain from in-
terfering with fundamental freedoms, or the ability to exercise the
lawful flexibilities provided for in international agreements. As a
result, while the definition of reasonable progression would re-
main variable, the duty to pursue progressive realization would
remain constant.
While the concept of congruence is primarily directed at the
duties of national governments, the demands of progressive reali-
zation are not limited to the domestic setting. The refusal of a State
to engage in progressive realization, as well as foreign interference
with the ability of a nation to meet its domestic obligations, would
constitute a violation of international law. Additionally, all nations
have already accepted a variety of contractual and customary du-
ties that have public health implications, including those surround-
ing human rights, technology transfer and scientific advancement,
self-determination and development, and international peace and
security. As argued earlier,954 the synthesis of these international
953 See supra notes 540-602 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of
requiring a right of health, while simultaneously allowing a period of progres-
sion).
954 See supra notes 590-602 and accompanying text (discussing the responsibil-
ity of various countries and the private sector to progressively realize the right of
health).
[Vol. 25:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss3/1
ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS
relationships creates a duty of progressive realization that far ex-
ceeds the sum of its domestic parts.
By viewing fundamental human rights within a context of
global constitutionalism, and by establishing progressive realiza-
tion of the right to the highest attainable standard of health as an
implicit constitutional duty, issues surrounding global public
health acquire symmetry with similar preemptive norms. Like
other human rights, the concept of public health is directed at indi-
viduals rather than at the relationships among nations. Nationality
and territorial boundaries give way to universality. Consent by
treaty ratification gives way to consent by means of membership in
the community of lawful States. While such an approach necessi-
tates a reassessment of the nature of constitutions and the process
by which they come into being, this Article has suggested that the
fundamental components of constitutionalism can be identified
within the international human rights setting.
This Article has argued that the rigid distinction between do-
mestic hierarchy and international anarchy must be discarded in
favor of non-exclusivity and a theory of progressive hierarchy-
building.955 It has also argued that there is in fact an international
'community' where that term is defined as a relationship among
individuals or States by which the self-interest of those constituen-
cies has become subservient to the common interests of the whole.
The preeminence of social interest within an identifiable group,
whether that group is identified territorially or in terms of adher-
ence to a particular set of subject matter norms, creates the founda-
tion for a constitutional community in which all members are
bound irrespective of consent. In the area of global public health, a
subject matter constitutional community is developing wherein pa-
rochial values and domestic economic interests are deferring to
more universal needs.956 Such a progression will be stimulated by
the inevitable pursuit of liberalism, by which individuals refuse to
accept a territorialization of human rights and increasingly de-
mand the ability to participate in economic, social, and political de-
cision making. As fundamental principles continue to be recog-
nized, the international community gains an identity that will be
955 See supra notes 812-25 and accompanying text (explaining the need for an
international hierarchy, as well as the existence of a "relative" international hier-
archy).
956 See supra notes 794-806 and accompanying text (noting the ways in which
an international community already exists).
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progressively redefined over time by the increasing expectations of
the people and the practical demands of interstate actors.
957
This Article has also suggested that despite the lack of tradi-
tional forms of autonomous institutions that are generally associ-
ated with domestic constitutional settings, there is an undeniable
progression toward a system of international accountability. 958 The
totality of domestic proceedings, regional and international moni-
toring and adjudication, and individual and interstate complaints,
implies the existence of hierarchical coercion in regard to funda-
mental common values. These procedures are also combined with
a variety of formal and informal lawmaking mechanisms, 9 9 fact
finding and interpretive procedures, and a means for imposing
punishment through multilateral sanctions, financial penalties,
U.N. Security Council measures, and humanitarian intervention.
960
Since there can be no legitimate non-members of the human rights
community, such a system is, by definition, binding upon all
States. The ability of this subject matter community to impose law-
ful mandates on all constituencies and to take lawful action (even if
sporadic) against States that violate those mandates certainly sug-
gests the presence of a continuum upon which constitutional rights
and duties are being developed.
The premise of a progressive global constitutionalism is ac-
companied by a variety of practical and legal ramifications. It may
be initially noted that while progress is being made within the area
of global public health, the lack of adequate resources continues to
frustrate the realization of significant goals. The WHO's
HIV/AIDS initiative to treat three million individuals by 2005, for
example, may already be collapsing from the lack of financial sup-
port,961 and donations to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tubercu-
losis and Malaria are now reaching only 20% of the yearly target
957 See supra notes 757-93 and accompanying text (referring to the spread of
liberalism and individual rights across national boundaries).
958 See supra notes 626-95 and accompanying text (discussing the develop-
ment of accountability of states for the provision of international human rights).
959 See supra notes 846-76 and accompanying text (mentioning the organiza-
tions that work to insure international human rights).
960 See, e.g., supra notes 877-907 and accompanying text (discussing institu-
tional and non-institutional sources of international judicial and executive action).
961 See McNeil, Jr., supra note 42, at 1 (discussing the views of Stephen Lewis,
special U.N. envoy for AIDS in Africa).
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set by Secretary General Koffi Annan.962 As a result, substantial
tensions will continue to exist between the undeniable need to spur
innovation through the provision of financial incentives and re-
wards and the need to acquire access to pharmaceuticals at the
lowest possible price. Elevated notions regarding the status of
IPRs within the global hierarchy of values, as well as western con-
ceptions of property, ownership, and exclusivity, 963 will continue
to erect artificial (State created) barriers to the fulfillment of inal-
ienable rights.
This Article has argued that pursuant to the substantial flexibil-
ity found in the TRIPS Agreement, these ideological differences
(and the ultimate provision of greater access to pharmaceuticals)
need not create a conflict as a matter of law. A nation's consent to
be bound by the terms of the Agreement cannot be equated with its
consent to enforce all western notions of IPRs or to adopt the judi-
cial history of western systems. Ample discretion exists under the
subjective language of articles 7, 8, and 27-as well as under the
exceptions found in articles 30, 31, and 73-for nations to develop
an IPR policy that is consistent with their individual social, eco-
nomic, and public health needs.964
Under the progressive constitutionalism argument being ad-
vanced in this Article, the ability to exercise this discretion in the
pursuit of the highest attainable standard of health is transformed
from a sovereign right to a constitutional duty.9 65 The political and
ideological conflict that will result from the fulfillment of this duty
can give rise to either increased tensions between rich and poor na-
tions or a new concept of international relations in the area of pub-
lic health. Nations should take the opportunity to acknowledge
that IPRs are only one of the values within a total value hierarchy
and recognize that existing conflicts and their resulting compro-
mises can be approached as constitutive in nature.
This Article also suggests that the international community is
962 Id.
963 See supra notes 152-77 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of intel-
lectual property as property with rights and contrasting it with other views of
"rights").
964 See supra notes 277-437 and accompanying text (discussing the flexibility
of the TRIPS Agreement).
965 See supra notes 438-602 and accompanying text (stating a duty to exercise
the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement).
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already in the midst of a 'constitutional moment'96 6 in regard to the
issue of global public health. The Declaration on TRIPS and its De-
cision on Implementation, as well as the moratorium against non-
violation complaints, 967 the tremendous expansion of private actor
involvement, and the repeated global expression that some rights
are in fact superior to others, all indicate that binding norms are
developing even in the absence of traditional lawmaking machin-
ery. These actions -together with the increasing number of human
rights treaties and declarations, the growth of humanitarian inter-
vention, and the developing emphasis on the rights of women,
children and other disadvantaged groups- are actually signaling a
new understanding of global duties and interstate relationships.
Such an understanding no longer reflects the policy decisions of
individual governments, but the fundamental rights and funda-
mental needs of the people in the face of an overwhelming public
health crisis.
From a domestic perspective, one of the major ramifications of
constitutionalizing the right to the highest attainable standard of
health would be a substantial increase in the availability of legal
relief. Since the right to health would inherently constitute the do-
mestic constitutional law of all nations, each State would have the
constitutional duty to engage in progressive realization irrespective
of whether its actual domestic constitution or statutory regime
provided for such a right. All citizens would be empowered to
bring individual complaints before competent local tribunals
whenever those domestic constitutional rights were being violated.
While individual complaints could not seek the impossible, and the
validity of complaints would be judged in light of the availability
of resources, the existence of constitutional rights and a total ab-
sence of judicial enforcement would logically constitute an oxymo-
ron.
As was held in Treatment Action Campaign,968 judicial systems
are in fact capable of determining the reasonableness of govern-
966 In regard to "constitutional moments," see ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, su-
pra note 17; see also supra notes 736-41 and accompanying text (discussing Acker-
man's beliefs).
967 See supra notes 431-32 and accompanying text (stating that Article 64 pro-
hibited non-violation complaints for five years, and that this prohibition has been
extended by the Ministerial Declaration at Doha).
968 See supra notes 528-38 and accompanying text (discussing Treatment Ac-
tion Campaign v. Minister of Health, 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) (S. Afr.)).
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mental action and whether that action has complied with the de-
mands of progressive realization. While courts should not be al-
lowed to substitute their own policy judgments for those of execu-
tive or legislative bodies, courts have always had the duty to
interpret constitutional rights and to determine whether those
rights have been violated. Deference to governmental decision
making has never been interpreted as requiring deference to gov-
ernmental indifference. Accordingly, the ability to institute indi-
vidual complaints would logically flow from the duty of judiciaries
to enforce domestic constitutional mandates whether those man-
dates were created by means of a traditional domestic constitution
or by means of a domestically binding international constitutive
norm.
The imposition of a constitutional duty to engage in progres-
sive realization may also mandate a variety of other fundamental
changes within domestic statutory regimes. This Article has ar-
gued, for example, that the capacity to progress is not solely de-
pendent upon the availability of financial resources. A 'progres-
sion' toward the right to the highest attainable standard of health
also encompasses the elimination of discrimination against
women, the abolition of harmful traditional practices, the prohibi-
tion of both invasions of privacy and the dissemination of mislead-
ing information, and the development of policies aimed at raising
needed capital. Since the promotion of such policies can often be
accomplished without adverse economic effect, even the poorest of
nations can be held to constitutional responsibilities in their regard.
In order to meet those responsibilities, substantial statutory revi-
sion may become necessary.
From an international perspective, this Article has argued that
the constitutionalization of the right to health primarily imposes
three fundamental responsibilities on the global community. First,
regional and international human rights regimes (including the
U.N. Security Council) have the duty to enforce constitutional
norms and to punish those governments that fail to comply with
lawful expectations. Second, all nations have the duty to refrain
from unlawful interference with the realization of the right to
health in other nations. While interference is admittedly elusive,
its application will ultimately depend upon the distinction between
mere passivity and active policy making, the degree of socioeco-
nomic consequence, and the effect on the rights of development
and self determination. Third, a subject matter constitutional rela-
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tionship between nations also increases the duty to enforce the
positive obligations that have been accepted by members of that
community. Some of those duties are admittedly tenuous in their
legal effect, being based upon promises to 'promote' or to 'cooper-
ate' in the realization of human rights. In contrast, others are quite
tangible in character, and establish enforceable duties regarding
technology transfer, incentives for development, equality, non-
discrimination, trade preferences, and the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. In each of these instances, the global
community has been accepting increasing responsibility for raising
the capacity of all nations to meet their constitutional duties and to
'obey' the norms of international law.
Finally, the existence of a constitutional community, even when
limited to the subject matter of human rights, fundamentally alters
the dynamics among the domestic and international members of
that community. In a constitutional entity, not only do the actions
of the majority bind all members, but the more elusive duties of
promotion, cooperation, and interference tend to gain additional
credence. Constitutionalism also removes a substantial degree of
discretion from governmental regimes as constitutional rights
serve to preempt other governmental priorities of a non-
constitutional nature. While not intending to degrade any particu-
lar policy, it must be admitted that there are no constitutional
rights or duties surrounding most governmental programs, expen-
ditures, or subsidies and there is certainly no constitutional foun-
dation in regard to excessive spending, patronage, or profitmaking
by governmental officials.
In contrast, the right to the highest attainable standard of
health imposes a constitutional duty to dedicate economic and
policymaking resources to achieve the progressive realization of
that right. While methods of implementation will always be sub-
ject to policy judgments, the priority of constitutional rights over
non-constitutional rights cannot be open to debate.
This Article does not pretend to impose particular policy deci-
sions on domestic governments or international regimes. The
manner in which a duty is carried out will vary widely and gov-
ernments must enjoy the necessary flexibility to address their own
social and economic condition. Nevertheless, it must be reiterated
that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is posing the most serious public
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health crisis in more than 600 years.969 Under such a circumstance,
it would seem quite logical to argue that domestic and interna-
tional constitutional communities are in fact bound to place sub-
stantial emphasis on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in fulfilling their du-
ties of progressive realization. With almost twenty-eight million
fatalities and another forty million living with the infection,97
0 gov-
ernmental policies that are either retrogressive or merely passive in
nature must be viewed with substantial suspicion.
As a result, this Article suggests that nations experiencing the
HIV/AIDS crisis must (as a matter of law) invoke the compulsory
licensing provisions of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Where
domestic production capacity is lacking, those nations must in-
stead invoke the compulsory licensing scheme provided by the
Implementing Decision of the Declaration on TRIPS. In the further
event that compulsory licensing proves to be inadequate or overly
burdensome -whether economically, politically, or bureaucrati-
cally-nations must exercise their rights under the security excep-
tion of Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement and acquire pharmaceu-
ticals from producers capable of selling at the lowest possible price.
Similarly, in meeting their responsibilities toward other communal
States, drug-producing nations are under the duty (even if only
phrased in terms of promotion and cooperation) to exercise their
rights under the security exception and the Decision on TRIPS to
export pharmaceuticals to populations in need. While govern-
ments of exporting nations inherently possess more legal discretion
than those of HIV/AIDS stricken States, duties to export may cer-
tainly be based upon enumerable promises to aid in global devel-
opment, to promote human rights and self-determination, to re-
spect the right to health in other countries, to facilitate access to
pharmaceuticals, 971 and to take action for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. Additionally, the duty to export can
be supplemented by the fact that exporting nations have the duty
to protect their own citizens from possible invasion of the epidemic
and to take preventive measures in such a regard.
969 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing HIV/AIDS as the
most lethal epidemic since the Black Death 650 years ago).
970 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing the large num-
bers of people infected with HIV/AIDS and the signs that the epidemic is only in
its early stages).
971 See, e.g., Substantive Issues, supra note 3, para. 39 (describing the interna-
tional obligations of States).
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This Article also suggests that, in addition to statutory revision
in such areas as discrimination and the right to privacy, nations
have the legal duty to consider (and to implement whenever ap-
propriate) a variety of intellectual property policy alternatives. Na-
tions must consider, for example, the relative merits of creating
statutory protection in regard to the use of traditional knowledge
and the appropriation of genetic resources. They must also con-
sider the effects of establishing both a royalty system that reflects
the level of those contributions and a system of taxation 972 on intel-
lectual property that recoups those contributions later in the com-
mercialization chain. Either of these systems, assuming they do
not violate anti-discrimination or national treatment provisions,
can be targeted at specific products and tailored to meet a particu-
lar domestic health crisis.
On the other hand, all nations benefit from advances in medical
science and from the development of life-saving pharmaceuticals,
both of which can be initially dependent upon the resources of
less-developed countries. As a result, royalty and taxation systems
can also be approached from a more universal perspective. This
Article argues that the progression toward a human rights consti-
tutional community increasingly transforms individual States into
citizens of a higher polity with rights progressively emanating
from (and duties progressively owed to) that common entity.
Within such a dynamic, a system of royalties or 'fees' that would
be federative in character could, at least conceivably, be envisioned.
Under such a system, each State-citizen would be required to con-
tribute to a global public health fund in proportion to an estab-
lished index. While contributors could be given credits upon
which to draw, the resources generated would be available for ad-
dressing any public health crisis irrespective of geographic location
or level of contribution. Parenthetically, it should be emphasized
that mandated contributions may be more than offset not only by
future savings in health care costs, but by reductions in such ex-
penditures as those surrounding military responses to civil unrest
and regional destabilization.
Simultaneously, the progressive realization of the right to the
highest attainable standard of health also requires that all nations
protect the viability of the pharmaceutical industry and to ensure
972 In regard to the potential taxation of IPR, see supra notes 425-28 and ac-
companying text (discussing Abbott).
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the continuing process of R&D. Much like individual nations pro-
vide incentives and support to domestic drug companies, a consti-
tutional dynamic would require the international community to
provide a federative foundation for the 'global drug industry.' Dif-
ferential pricing, for example, would be strongly encouraged and
strict standards would be imposed for the prevention of diversion.
Safety and purity standards could be uniformly enforced and sup-
pliers of fraudulent or worthless medications could be held ac-
countable. Economies of scale could be established in terms of
purchasing power, distribution, and administration. Financial in-
centives could be offered for innovation, and supplemental R&D
support could be made available, pursuant to similar international
funds generated by mandated royalty/fee contributions.
While discussions regarding the creation of federal relation-
ships and the mandating of financial contributions may appear
utopian, the progression toward a global constitutionalization of
human rights and public health is far from the theoretical. To the
contrary, nations that view the issue of public health as territorial
in nature or that attempt to compartmentalize human rights on the
basis of geography, economic or political status, or artificial classi-
fications are only promoting parochial fantasy. To ignore the ef-
fects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the world's economy, on its
political stability, and on its ultimate peace and security is not only
a denial of the progression toward constitutionalism, it is the im-
position of a delusional, unsustainable, and repressive form of iso-
lationism.
With fourteen thousand individuals being infected each day,973
the HIV/AIDS crisis has served to highlight the frailty of mankind.
That frailty, however, also defines a fundamental commonality
among all people that is proving to be more sustainable than the
traditional policies of individual governments or the proprietary
claims of powerful interest groups. Despite economic, social, and
political differences, it is the individual who is the fundamental
unit of the global human rights society and it is the individual who
will stimulate both the domestic and international constitutional
process. While particular governmental regimes may attempt to
impose different sets of values, the desire for inherent dignity,
equality, and the rights to life and health is truly shared by most
individuals. As a result, this Article argues that not only have re-
973 AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2003, supra note 4.
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cent public and private actions signaled a progression toward
global constitutionalism in the area of human rights and public
health, but that common values, needs, and demands of individu-
als are in fact at the basis of that progression. While the pace of
this movement will continue to be influenced by the realities of
mistrust, animosity, and conflict, its evolution will remain inevita-
ble. In light of that inevitability, and in light of the very troubling
nature of the alternative, the international community would be
well served to take an increasingly constitutional approach to the
HIV/AIDS crisis and to actually embrace the broader context and
the boundless potential of progressive constitutionalism.
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